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A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

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Volume XXXII, Number 4 July 1980

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WORLD POLITICS. (ISSN 0043-8871). Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. July 1980. Vol. XXXII, No. 4. Second Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

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Erratum: World Politics, XXXII, No. 3 (April 1980)
This page replaces the first page of Abstracts.

ABSTRACTS

International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation

By O. R. YOUNG

Although we live in a world of international regimes, the scholarly literature on them remains rudimentary, especially in analytic terms. This essay examines the proposition that all international regimes are social institutions, even though there is great variation among them. Among other things, this suggests that regimes are dependent upon the maintenance of convergent expectations among actors; formalization is not a necessary condition for the effective operation of regimes; and regimes are always created rather than discovered. A conceptual framework and a research agenda for the comparative study of international regimes, as laid out in this essay, would guide studies of specific regimes and improve our ability to reach general conclusions about this fundamental, yet poorly understood, international phenomenon.

Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes

By E. B. HAAS

Why do nations create institutionalized modes of multilateral collaboration? How can common interests develop in the face of inequalities in power and asymmetries in interdependence? The author explores the role of knowledge in the definition of political objectives and interests. The systematic interplay of changing knowledge and changing objectives results in the redefinition of "issues" and the practice of "issue linkage." The dynamics of issue-linkage, in turn, tell us something about international regimes for the management of progressively more complex issue areas. An ideal-typical "regime" is described, theoretically applicable to all types of issues. Since the cognitive attributes of the actors who set up such a regime cannot be expected to remain stable, this concept of a "regime" can illuminate discussion and analysis, but cannot be expected to provide a clear model for desirable policy. However, it can illustrate the options open to policy makers wishing to choose a mode of collaboration. Regimes dealing with money, the oceans, and technology transfer are used for illustrative purposes.

Clio on the Couch

By H. N. HIRSCH

An analysis of six recent works of psychohistory. A scheme is presented for classifying such works. Four different types of psychohistory are discussed; this typology is offered as a means of understanding and controlling the methodological difficulties inherent in the genre.

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WORLD POLITICS

Vol. XXXII · July 1980 · No. 4

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ABSTRACTS

Development Issues in Recent Soviet Scholarship

By E. K. VALKENIER

Since the early 1970s, a cognitive reorientation has marked Soviet research on economic problems of the Third World. This shift arises from recognizing the primacy of scientific-technological progress, accepting the need for integration with the world market, and coming to terms with wide economic differentiation among the LDCs and the flux in their societies. Many recent Soviet studies stress the value of incremental change (as against decisive breaks with the capitalist system of production and exchange), and argue that socialism can best emerge from a sufficiently advanced economic system. In consequence, the benefits of the Western presence in the LDCs are recognized, excessive state *dirigisme* is discouraged, the ramifications of a mixed economy are investigated, and the relevance as development model of the Soviet experience with NEP is studied.

The Evolution in the Soviet World View

By J. F. HOUGH

Utilizing two editions of a Soviet textbook that was awarded a state prize and termed "the correct orientation" by a Central Committee official, the author analyzes the evolution of the Soviet view of the outside world in the first half of the 1970s. The movement away from ideological rigidity that began in the 1960s continued in the 1970s on a wide range of subjects. In addition, the analysis of the capitalist countries became intertwined with the debate on the future development of Soviet society; a number of features are said to have resulted from the imperatives of industrialization rather than the inner dynamics of capitalism, and hence are in need of adoption by the Soviet Union. The article closes with a brief survey of the issues subsequently raised in the published Soviet debates that continue on either side of the approved, centrist position.

Why Do Communist Parties Advocate Pluralism?

By P. HARDI

The concept of pluralism has been a familiar one in political science since the first decade of this century, and has appeared in different theoretical frameworks. Pluralism is regarded as inherent in Western democracies, but it has also been interpreted as a transitional form leading to socialism. The Western communist parties, in adopting the concept of pluralism, have found a theoretical justification for abandoning the concepts of a leading model and one authentic party. The new doctrine that embraces pluralism advocates that the communist parties transform their societies to a more advanced, partly socialistic state, and then attempt to gain power by consensual means. The main issues of debate on the transformation are the abolition of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the guarantee of human rights, and the pluralist power structure.

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A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations

By D. E. ALBRIGHT

Since the late 1950s, discussion of civil-military relations has taken place largely within one general conceptual framework. According to this theoretical perception, military and civilian authorities constitute two distinct groups (although they each consist of a variety of subgroups), and relations between them are inherently conflictual. What keeps the conflict within bounds is subordination of the officer corps to civilians except on matters requiring military expertise—i.e., civilian control. Shifts in civil-military relations, moreover, are a function of the degree of effectiveness of civilian control. A close examination of the experiences of the sixteen communist states indicates that these propositions lack comparative validity. It also suggests an alternative conceptualization of civil-military relations. Such relations can be thought of in terms of a continuum, with cooperation at one pole and conflict at the other. Where an individual country falls on that continuum at any time depends on a number of specific variables, of which the sharpness of the dividing line between military and civilian authorities is one. Modifications of civil-military relations can result from changes in any of these variables.

Problem or Model?
West Germany in the 1980s

By P. J. KATZENSTEIN

Political interpretations of Germany have shifted from their traditional concern over its instability and aggressiveness to an appreciation of West Germany's newly found stability and peacefulness. But the penchant of the Bonn Republic for stability creates new political problems in a world that experiences accelerating rates of political and economic changes.

The "Cologne School" of Electoral Research

By R. L. MERRITT

The "Cologne School" of electoral research, which flourished during the 1960s and early 1970s, sprang from research conducted by Erwin K. Scheuch and Rudolf Wildenmann, and included studies carried on by their students. As exemplified by the ten studies reviewed here, it brought to West German political sociologists the theories and findings from American electoral research, tested some of its assumptions with West German data on voting behavior, and expanded and refined its basic notions in a comparative perspective. Especially significant were findings stressing social context as a factor influencing voting, more useful distinctions among kinds of "floating voters," the lesser importance of party identification in the Federal Republic than in the United States, and the greater importance for West German voters of issues and ideology.

Democracy, Economic Growth, and Inequality in India's Development

By A. KOHLI

A new body of literature, including *India's Political Economy* by Francine Frankel, argues that the organization of the rural poor can facilitate a "democratic socialist" mode of development in India. The author dissents from this left-liberal world view. The organization of the lower classes has seldom led to a significant redistribution of economic resources in a democracy; it is not likely to do so in India. Attempts to convert lower-class interests into redistributive policies face institutionalized obstacles at the ideological, organizational, electoral, governmental, and bureaucratic levels. If the lower classes gain effective political power despite these obstacles, the stability of the democratic process generally tends to be undermined. For these reasons, simultaneous optimism for India's democracy and for India's poor is not realistic.

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

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DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN RECENT SOVIET SCHOLARSHIP

By ELIZABETH KRIDL VALKENIER*

I

A NEW spirit is manifest in Soviet studies of the Third World. Recent writings by the younger generation of scholars bear little resemblance to the development model set forth in the CPSU Program adopted in 1961:

> The young sovereign states do not belong either to the system of imperialist states or to the system of socialist states. But the overwhelming majority of them have not yet broken free from world capitalist economy even though they occupy a special place in it. They constitute that part of the world which is still being exploited by the capitalist monopolies. As long as they do not put an end to their economic dependence on imperialism, they will be playing the role of a "world countryside," and will remain objects of semi-colonial exploitation.[1]

This view still guides the older ideologues of academe who, like Rostislav Ulianovsky, continue to argue that all problems of underdevelopment can be solved only through the elimination of the capitalist system on the domestic and international levels. But the development strategy adumbrated by many younger specialists is no longer guided by the categories spelled out in the CPSU Program almost twenty years ago. It is being cast in the matrix of global processes and gradual change, not of irreconcilable antagonisms and decisive breaks. Issues of dependence and development are discussed in terms of what obtains now in the late 20th century—even if it does not always square with what Lenin had to say about the nature of imperialism some 65 years ago. These investigations, however, are not directed at questioning the validity of Marxism-Leninism, but rather at modernizing and updating it.[2] In addition, many younger scholars now treat Marxism-

* Research and work leading to this article were supported in whole from funds provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research.

[1] *Materialy XXII S'ezda KPSS* [Proceedings of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU] (Moscow: Izd. Politicheskoi Literatury, 1961), 352.

All translations are by the author of this article.

[2] For analysis of earlier evidence of plurality see Thomas P. Thornton, ed., *The Third World in Soviet Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); Valkenier, "Recent Soviet Research on the Developing Countries," *World Politics*, XX (July 1968), 644-59; and the reporting by *The Mizan Newsletter* (London) on Soviet publications.

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Leninism as an open-ended system of analysis, not as a predetermined schema that provides ready and correct answers for all possibilities.

The field is ready for renovation. A plurality of views is aired at frequent conferences and in pages of specialized journals. The aim of these exchanges is not to arrive at consensus and eliminate divergent interpretations, but to improve methodology and refine assumptions. Thus new concepts enter academic discourse and in turn stimulate further redefinition and refinement. In consequence, many Soviet books and articles no longer present the Western reader with dreary and fairly predictable litanies, but engage his interest with unexpected and challenging propositions. By now, the schools of thought on economic issues facing the Third World are sufficiently disparate so that one can no longer speak of a "Soviet theory of development"—at least as far as the academic community is concerned. (As I cannot adequately deal with the full range of views, I shall confine myself in this article mainly to those that redefine the role of capitalism.)

Before proceeding to the important features of the recent academic reassessment, two books should be mentioned that, by Soviet accounts, inaugurated the new phase in Third-World studies. Both appeared in 1974. Their very titles marked a departure from former conceptual constructs: *The Developing Countries: Regularities, Tendencies, Perspectives* and *The East Beyond Our Borders and Contemporary Times.* They superseded works that were entitled, respectively, *Class and Class Struggle in the Developing Countries* and *The National Liberation Movements in Asia and Africa.* Further, the introductions stated that the new books were intended as correctives to one-dimensional interpretations which, instead of investigating the problems at hand, had dealt in more or less deterministic fashion with the transition of the newly independent countries to socialism.[3]

Both volumes not only posed new questions but stressed the unresolved nature of many issues and the lack of consensus among the contributors. Each discussed the Third World from a different perspective. *The Developing Countries*, produced by the research staff of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), treated Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a unit, subject to global processes. In contrast, *The East Beyond Our Borders*, published by the

[3] *Razvivayushchiesia strany: zakonomernosti, tendentsii, perspektivy* (Moscow: Mysl', 1974); *Zarubezhnyi Vostok i sovremennost'* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974). *Klassy i klassovaya bor'ba v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Mysl', 1967-68); *Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Azii i Afrike*, 3 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1967-68).

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Oriental Institute, took an approach predicated on the domestic particularities of Asian and Near Eastern societies. Both books made tentative departures from regarding the development process as preventing capitalist take-over and perceiving the LDCs' backwardness as a counterpart to the affluence of the industrial West.

The simultaneous appearance of two such works infused Third-World studies in the Soviet Union with a new life. They opened up fresh vistas and stirred up discussion on the respective merits of the global versus the particularistic approaches at a time when tremendous changes in the wake of the fuel crisis presented both the industrialized states and the LDCs with problems that differed markedly from those of the initial postcolonial period.

II

Since 1974, three views that modify the traditional normative assumptions about development have gained wide acceptance. First, recognition of the wide economic differentiation among the newly independent countries calls into question the former theory of unrelieved imperialist exploitation. Second, the acceptance of a global division of labor as essential to development undermines the former equation of "economic liberation" with progress. Third, a coming to terms with the fluid, multilevel nature of Third-World economies and societies permits scholars to study the complexity and specificity of the LDCs with greater attention to their diversity and less adherence to a preordained uniformity.

ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIATION

The collective IMEMO volume noted the confusion of criteria used in analyzing development. It called attention to the indiscriminate mixture of socio-political and technical-economic categories, as well as the habit of treating the entire Third World as an undifferentiated unit. As a remedy, it proposed a wider and more stringent use of statistics to "separate that gigantic mass of Asian, African, and Latin American countries into smaller groups and subgroups," and a comparative analysis of economic development.[4]

The first purely economic typology of the LDCs, written by a group

[4] *Razvivayushchiesia strany* (fn. 3), 133. *Zarubezhnyi Vostok* (fn. 3), 256, also called for detailed statistical studies of different regions and separate countries to introduce greater precision.

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of mathematicians, economists, and political scientists, appeared in 1976.[5] Reviews praised it for departing from the existing "intuitive-heuristic" approach, and for using a mathematical, multidimensional taxonomy devised by Rudolph Rummel in the early 1960s and since amplified by Frederick Harbison and others. The novelty, it was noted, consisted not merely in using the latest computerized analyses, but in applying this methodology to all nonsocialist countries alike. No distinction was drawn between the capitalist West and the developing East: the same 31 indicators were applied to all 85 states in the study. Such an approach made possible a more exact analysis of the present-day world where—under the impact of the scientific revolution, the global division of labor, and the evolution of the newly independent countries—a considerable relocation of economic, technological, and political forces had taken place.[6]

As a result, economic typology has gained acceptance on a par with the hitherto prevalent political typology.[7] Different systems of grouping are proposed, but broadly speaking, four basic categories are recognized: the poorest land-locked countries (mostly in tropical Africa); the relatively advanced countries of North Africa and Asia; the oil-rich states; and Latin America. This classification is distinct and separate from the ones used to analyze the class nature and foreign policy of Third-World regimes, which are now grouped into capitalist-oriented and socialist-oriented countries for such analyses.

There is no agreement on what constitutes the most reliable system of indicators for including a country in one or another economic grouping. Although most of the disagreements concern the components of development—for example, the relative importance of income

[5] *Tipologiya nesotsialisticheskikh stran (opyt mnogomernogo statisticheskogo analiza narodnykh khoziaistv)* [Typology of the Non-Socialist Countries (an Attempt at Multidimensional Statistical Analysis of National Economies)] (Moscow: Nauka, 1976). It was more than six years in the making. See the first discussion of this collective undertaking by V. Tiagunenko, L. Gordon, and L. Fridman in *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* [hereafter cited as *MEMO*], Nos. 11 and 12 (November and December 1970), 151-57, 142-49.

[6] See reviews by Ye. A. Bragina and V. I. Liubchenko in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1 (January-February 1979), 198-202; V. Sheinis and N. Shustova in *MEMO*, No. 3 (March 1978), 144-47.

[7] However, the objective economic typology is not accepted by the entire academic community. Among fairly typical reservations, see Professor L. Klochkovsky's statement in the course of a discussion of the levels of capitalist development in Latin America. He held that the purely quantitative approach lost sight of the qualitative analysis that would indicate not only the levels of development but also the degree of persisting or increasing exploitation on the part of monopoly capital or the multinationals. "Kak otsenivat' osobennosti i uroven' razvitiya kapitalizma v Latinskoi Amerike" [How to Interpret the Traits and Level of Capitalist Development in Latin America], *Latinskaya Amerika*, No. 1 (January-February 1979), 56-58.

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per capita as against a well-rounded integration of the entire economy —the discussions range further than that. They do not stop with the static system of classification established by the 1976 volume on typology, but touch upon the dynamics of development or, more specifically, the degree of progress that can be acknowledged, and what accounts for it.

In this respect, the liveliest disputes concern the characterization of capitalist development. The more traditional interpretations hold that the Third World can develop only within the framework of "dependent" capitalism, while the innovators want to dispense with political categories altogether and press for the recognition of "semi-developed capitalism."[8] With recourse to statistics and logic, they argue that objective indicators show the more backward areas of Europe (i.e., Portugal, Greece, southern Italy) to be on the same level as the more developed countries of Latin America (i.e., Mexico or Brazil), and should be grouped together as countries that have reached a level of semi-developed capitalism. These arguments are opposed by the more traditional-minded economists who insist that, despite the enormous differentiation, the Third World is a definable politico-economic category and, no matter how far some countries manage to advance, they will never be able to transcend the limits of dependence.[9]

AN INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOR

Only recently have Soviet scholars come to the conclusion that participation in a worldwide division of labor is essential for overcoming economic backwardness. This outlook is a 180-degree turn: it departs from the former preference for import-substitution policies meant to curtail the Western presence; it modifies the once prevalent contention that only relations and integration with the Soviet bloc could offer truly advantageous and equitable exchanges; and it allows for a more objective analysis of the West's role in engendering development.

[8] Another dispute is brewing about monopoly capitalism in the Third World, which, according to strict Marxist-Leninist definition, would put countries where it prevails on a par with states that are designated as imperialist. Also, there is no agreement on whether Third-World capitalism will repeat the classical pattern.

[9] There are many contributions to this dispute. The concept was outlined by V. Sheinis in "Strany srednego kapitalizma" [Countries of Middle-level Capitalist Development], *MEMO*, No. 9 (September 1977), 105-24. It was subjected to public discussion and criticism at an academic conference in June 1978, "Kak otsenivat' . . ." (fn. 7), 53-100. V. Davydov, "O stepeni zrelosti i osobennostiakh kapitalizma 'latinsko-amerikanskogo' tipa" [On the Maturity and Peculiarities of the 'Latin American' Type of Capitalism], *MEMO*, No. 3 (March 1979), 116-29, provided a good summary of various positions and tried to pour oil on troubled waters by maintaining that the concept of dependence and development are by no means mutually exclusive.

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The first book to offer the new interpretation of the international division of labor frankly admitted that the "perfect" system of Soviet-LDC exchanges was not an operative but only a hypothetical situation. As for the present, technological progress had created a world market that in turn dictated the adjustment of national development to integration. Having made his innovative suggestion, the author did not theorize but concentrated on discussing the advantages of specific measures designed to bring maximum returns from adjusting production to international trade.[10]

A more weighty book appeared two years later. Written by V. Tiagunenko, a doyen of postwar experts on the Third World and a Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences, it was edited for publication, after Tiagunenko's untimely death, by a prestigious economist, V. Rymalov. It provided a theoretical justification for the present-day operation of the world economy and the place of the LDCs in the international division of labor. Tiagunenko held that it was impossible to study the "preconditions, nature, and consequences . . . of concrete social and economic changes" without taking into account "worldwide forces with which these processes are closely connected and intertwined."[11]

The book was hailed as a synthesis of the workings of the world economy that enabled Soviet scholarship to advance to a new stage.[12] Indeed, it provided the imprimatur for research on Third-World problems with reference to the global forces operating independently of either socialism or the U.S.S.R.

The need of the LDCs to intertwine with the world market (which, after all, is dominated by the capitalist economies) has by now been accepted by all scholars. Although this acceptance has considerably moderated the traditional hostility to the Western presence in the LDCs, there is certainly no unanimity on the consequences. Controversy persists as to where the benefits of interdependence end and the costs of dependence begin. The conservatives regard the interaction of the LDCs with the West as a necessary evil that should be eliminated as fast as possible. Representatives of the rearguard, such as R. Ulia-

[10] E. Ya. Obminsky, *Razvivayushchiesia strany i mezhdunarodnoe razdelenie truda* [The Developing Countries and the International Division of Labor] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodyne otnosheniya, 1974).

[11] *Mezhdunarodnoe razdelenie truda i razvivayushchiesia strany* [International Division of Labor and the Developing Countries] (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 9-10.

[12] S. Tiul'panov, "Poiskovaya teoreticheskaya rabota" [An Innovative Theoretical Work], *MEMO*, No. 5 (May 1977), 143-46.

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novsky, keep reiterating that exploitation remains the root economic problem of the Third World, and that it can be eradicated only by drastic "rupture with the capitalist way of production and exchange."[13]

Specialists of mid-range persuasion pay obeisance to the "exploitation" theme, but devote the major part of their work to providing masses of factual data that speak for themselves and amply demonstrate the economic advantages resulting from the internationalization of production.[14] There also are outspoken proponents of the international division of labor who address the subject much less gingerly. In the words of one economist, "foreign capitalist enterprise . . . is also one of the forms of 'penetration' of modern production methods into backward countries, one of the forms of economic ties linking them up with the world capitalist economy."[15]

MULTIPLICITY, OR MNOGOUKLADNOST'

The intransigent complexity of the Third World's social and economic structures has for a long time bedeviled Soviet experts. The problem was first acknowledged and threshed out in early 1964 during a conference held at IMEMO.[16] At first, much was made of the flexible official formula of non-capitalist development, devised at the 1960 meeting of the Communist Parties in Moscow to permit departures from a strict revolutionary timetable. But until the early 1970s, scholars wrote about economic progress primarily in terms of a slow zig-zag movement toward proto-socialist institutions. Currently, the concept of the multistructural nature (*mnogoukladnost'*) of society and economy in the Third World is being increasingly used to cope with the inescapable condition of diversity.[17] But again, although the new theory has

[13] *Sovremennye problemy Azii i Afriki* [Present-day Problems of Asia and Africa] (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 230.

[14] This was Tiagunenko's line. It is also observable in V. Rymalov's *Strukturnye izmeneniya v mirovom kapitalisticheskom khoziaistve* [Structural Changes in the World Capitalist Economy] (Moscow: Mysl', 1978).

[15] A. I. Levkovsky, "Nekotorye problemy izucheniya inostrannogo predprinimatel'stva v stranakh Vostoka" [Some Problems in Researching Foreign Enterprise in the Countries of the East], in Levkovsky, ed., *Inostrannyi kapital i inostrannoe predprinimatel'stvo v stranakh Azii i Severnoi Afriki* [Foreign Capital and Foreign Enterprise in the Countries of Asia and North Africa] (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 17.

[16] "Sotsializm, kapitalizm, razvivayushchiesia strany. Diskussiya" [Sozialism, Capitalism, the Developing Countries. A Discussion], *MEMO*, Nos. 4 and 6 (April and June 1964), 116-31, 62-81.

[17] The expression is a composite of two words *mnogo* (many) and *uklady* (structures). The English translation of *uklad* (singular of *uklady*) presents problems. Being part of Marxist theory, its meaning cannot be adequately rendered by one word. To put it simply, *uklady* are the various types of production relations that make up a country's economy. In a fully mature society they coalesce into a formation—feudal,

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gained acceptance, it is subject to different interpretations; sharp disagreements rage concerning the bounds of the new concept.

The traditionalists interpret *mnogoukladnost'* as in no way deflecting the course of general historical development from one economic order dominated by a single class and mode of production to another. For them, structural multiplicity is "an organic part of the evolution within the system of formations." They view the simultaneous existence of various modes of production as resembling the situation that Lenin saw in Soviet Russia in the early 1920s when he talked about the concurrent operation of patriarchal, small-commodity, capitalist, state-capitalist, and socialist *uklady*. And they insist that research and analysis should be directed at locating the leading economic structure that determines the evolution of the country toward the capitalist or socialist formation.[18]

A. I. Levkovsky, a prominent specialist on India, is a leading exponent of the open-ended interpretation of *mnogoukladnost'*. He argues that economic diversity is so pervasive and so complex that at the present time it is counterproductive to try to figure out which of the Marxist formations the LDCs are moving toward. LDCs are passing through a separate "inter-formation" period of extremely long duration.[19] While the conservatives object that Levkovsky's theories deviate from historical materialism,[20] other [like-minded] scholars welcome them as new analytical tools that have "rescued" the field from "oversimplifications which tried to fit the whole historical development of the Afro-Asian world into strictly deterministic cells of a linear construction obligatory for all." They deny the traditionalists' contention that Lenin interpreted multiplicity as mere variations on the theme—all being part of the predetermined scheme of "from here to there." They maintain that, on the contrary, he recognized multiplicity as an objective factor. And in support they cite Lenin's words: "The future revolutions in the immensely populated and socially variegated coun-

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capitalist, or socialist. But until that is achieved, they constitute separate, interacting, and ever-evolving structures or components.

[18] S. Tiul'panov, "Obshchestvo perekhodnogo tipa" [Transitional Society], *MEMO*, No. 1 (January 1979), 144-46.

[19] For Levkovsky's early formulation, consult *Tret'ii mir v sovremennom mire* [The Third World in the Contemporary World] (Moscow: Nauka, 1970); for the latest, *Sotsial'naya struktura razvivayushchikhsia stran* [Social Structure of the Developing Countries] (Moscow: Mysl', 1978).

[20] A. U. Roslavlev, "Eshche raz o teorii 'mnogoukladnosti' v stranakh 'tret'ego mira'" [Once Again About the Multisectoral Theory in the Countries of the Third World], *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir*, No. 1 (January-February 1977), 136-45, is an excellent expression of the conservatives' opinions and objections.

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tries of the East will, without doubt, bring up . . . much more originality (*svoeobrazie*) than did the Russian revolution."[21]

The concept of *mnogoukladnost'* is doggedly pursued by the research staff of the Institute of Oriental Studies. In addition to their critics among the conservatives, they face the opposition of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations. The specialists of IMEMO, with their global and somewhat technocratic outlook, express little interest, understanding, or patience for a theory that focuses on local peculiarities and deviations from the general pattern. Thus, IMEMO treats capitalist relations in the Third World as a reflection of worldwide processes, while the Institute of Oriental Studies interprets them as a phenomenon that is different from the classic West European model and at present shows many elements *sui generis*.[22]

III

Now that economic heterogeneity among the LDCs, the global division of labor, and local diversity are accepted terms of discourse, many old issues in the development process are being re-examined, and new issues are addressed. The findings, the re-interpretations, the new formulations (however tentative)—and their implications—constitute the new spirit that is discernible in Soviet studies of the Third World.

STABILITY

First of all, economic development is now often analyzed in terms of ensuring political and social stability. Ever since the dramatic and serial collapses of radical regimes, beginning with Ben Bella's in 1965, Soviet scholars have been wary of economic "extremism." However, their postmortems on these regimes remained scattered in separate articles and chapters, and were not examined in a systematic and sustained manner. Finally, in 1975, N. Simoniya published a book pinpointing the reason for the failure of numerous national liberation movements in Africa and Asia—namely, that the economic preconditions for success were insufficiently established. Simoniya cogently began with one of Lenin's quotations from Marx, "our teaching is not a dogma." A correct reading of the Marxist-Leninist classics, he argued, demonstrated their conviction that stable and lasting political change derives

[21] V. Maksimenko's untitled review of A. Levkovsky's *Sotsial'naya struktura* . . . , in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1 (January-February 1979), 208-14.

[22] See the discussion between the two Institutes, "Natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie: nekotorye voprosy differentsiatsii" [The National Liberation Movement: Some Problems of Differentiation], *Aziya i Afrika segodnia*, No. 6 (June 1978), 28-35.

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from a properly matured economic basis. Marx saw economic and political development as firmly sequential: socialism had to be the product of a developed and advanced economic system. Should revolution occur in a "weak link," as it had in Russia, then the situation demanded special attention to economic policies in order to bring industrial production, managerial skills, and labor discipline up to par with the requirements of the advanced political systems. More specifically, Simoniya argued, such a regime had to rely on and develop the economic institutions left by the predecessor in order to create a firm foundation for its own survival. It could not abolish them forthwith and replace them with socialist production relations until capitalist production relations had developed sufficiently to make such a substitution possible.[23]

Simoniya's study offered so many unorthodox and fresh interpretations that a special review session was called to assess their merit. Most of the participants, however, talked not about the book's "mistakes," but endorsed its contention that before genuine socialist revolutions or changes could take place in the East, an intermediate preparatory period of economic build-up and reconstruction was essential. As for countries of "socialist orientation," it was held that they would be unable to proceed toward genuine socialism unless they first overcame backwardness.[24]

Of course, on one level the book dealt with topical political issues —it was an argument against Chinese and other Leftist development theories—and that fact spared it from excessive criticism. As a scholar, however, Simoniya was concerned about something far less transitory: to get away from the prevalent *ad hoc* political evaluations of economic policies, and to define the place of economics in assuring genuine and lasting progress. In pursuing this line of interest in more recent publications, he has contrasted the relative failures of the radical economic policies that characterized the first decade of independence (1955-1965) with the success of the more moderate, "more rational" programs of the succeeding decade. He has argued that it is methodologically correct to analyze the present phase of economic development not in terms of dependence, but as an "essential transitional stage of accumulating elements for the future independent economic structure."[25]

[23] Simoniya, *Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiya* [Countries of the East: Paths of Development] (Moscow: Nauka, 1975).

[24] "Obsuzhdenie knigi N. Simoniya, 'Strany Vostoka: puti razvitiya'" [Debate on N. Simoniya's book, *Countries of the East*], in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 3 (May-June 1977), 54-65.

[25] "Metodologicheskie problemy analiza ekonomicheskogo razvitiya v osvobodiv-

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Other specialists view economic development in a similar light. At academic conferences, concern is evident about the fact that it is the most backward countries—burdened by overpopulation, unemployment, low living standards, a chronic payments problem, etc.—that are on the verge of social and political upheavals.[26] From a somewhat different angle, others argue that if one persists in treating the economic situation in the Third World solely in terms of "dependence" and "exploitation," then revolution is the only way out.[27]

MODELS

The concern for stable, balanced economic progress has in turn brought the investigation of less rigid patterns of development. As a result, the view on what is *the* Soviet model has changed considerably, and other, alternate models are being taken into account.

Recently, scholars have started discussing the NEP as being more relevant to the needs of the LDCs than the forced industrialization drive of the late 1920s and the subsequent reliance on heavy industry. (The New Economic Policy, introduced by Lenin in 1921, left the state in control of the "commanding heights," but permitted small-scale private enterprise, private agriculture, and foreign concessions.) L. Reisner's study of the theory of economic growth contains the most detailed discussion of specific NEP policies that could be useful today, such as: considering agriculture the basis for capital formation; promoting light industry to provide employment and income for the peasantry; undertaking measures to ease agrarian overpopulation; building up labor-intensive industries; balancing consumption with accumulation; creating a domestic industrial complex; engaging in extensive economic and technical cooperation with the advanced states. More than that, Reisner ascribed the success of Western development theories in gaining acceptance among the LDCs to the fact that the Soviet Union's valuable early experience has been "overshadowed" by the subsequent policy which posited "forced industrialization as the only basis, method, and strategy for overcoming backwardness."[28]

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shikhsia stranakh" [Methodological Problems of Economic Development Analysis in the Liberated Countries], in L. I. Reisner, ed., *Ekonomika razvivayushchikhsia stran. Teorii i metody issledovaniya* [The Economy of the Developing Countries. Theory and Method of Research] (Moscow: Nauka, 1979), 186-210.

[26] "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie i politicheskie posledstviya differentsiatsii razvivayushchikhsia stran" [Socio-economic and Political Consequences of the Differentiation among the Developing Countries], *MEMO*, No. 10 (October), 1977, p. 128.

[27] "Kak otsenivat' . . ." (fn. 7), 72.

[28] L. I. Reisner, *Razvivayushchiesia strany: ocherk teorii ekonomicheskogo rosta* [The Developing Countries: Outline of the Economic Growth Theory] (Moscow: Nauka,

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As one economist has written of alternate models, what is needed is a "new model for development that history has not yet known and could not have known, to . . . bring about a technical-economic and subsequently a socio-economic transformation."[29] No single comprehensive study of the subject has as yet appeared, although its elements are often touched upon in books and articles. Reisner, for example, has blamed the failures and malfunctioning of India's first three Five-Year Plans on the direct transfer of advanced economic patterns to an underdeveloped society.[30] Others have written more extensively on how the modern sector tends to form an isolated enclave that does not invigorate the rest of the economy but nevertheless produces such undesirable side-effects as urban overpopulation, unemployment, and a *Lumpenproletariat*.[31]

Although there is heightened concern for social stability, Soviet scholars thus far have not favored solving "basic human needs" through redistribution—a "utopian" solution that ignores the overall developmental needs. They propose building up other forms of production (such as small-scale industry, large-scale public works, or the processing of agricultural products) that will offer more of a "trickle-down" effect than does heavy industry.[32]

Agriculture is among the better researched and thought-out components of what could become the basis for an alternate model. To be sure, many researchers still treat the agrarian problem in terms of radical reforms that would dispossess the propertied classes, revolutionize the countryside, and organize large-scale production on state farms or cooperatives. But some are beginning to study the peasant-oriented

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1976), 51-72, 321. In 1975, Simoniya also discussed the applicability of the NEP, though in more general terms (fn. 23). That book's thesis holds that the Soviet experience of the early 1920s offers the LDCs the example of how a socialist government was strengthened by resorting to economic policies arising out of the preceding economic formation.

[29] A. I. Dinkevich, "O strategii ekonomicheskogo razvitiya osvobodivshikhsia stran" [About the Development Strategy of the Liberated Countries], in Dinkevich, ed., *Razvivayushchiesia strany: nakoplenie i ekonomicheskii rost* [The Developing Countries: Accumulation and Growth] (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 23.

[30] *Razvivayushchiesia strany* (fn. 3), 321.

[31] T. S. Pokataeva, *Razvivayushchiesia strany: problemy urbanizatsii* [The Developing Countries: Urbanization Problems] (Moscow: Mysl', 1977).

[32] For a favorable assessment of the changes introduced in Indian development policies, see Ye. Bragina, "Osnovnye napravleniya vnutrennei ekonomicheskoi politiki Indii" [Basic Direction of Indian Domestic Economic Policy], *MEMO*, No. 2 (February 1979), 134-42. However, there are indications that the egalitarian ideal and measures are beginning to get a sympathetic hearing. See the report on a round-table conference, "Klassovya bor'ba i kontseptsiya egalitarizma v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh" [Class Struggle and the Concept of Egalitarianism in the Developing Countries], *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6 (November-December 1978), 3-19.

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ideologies of the Third World, although these, for obvious ideological reasons, have not received explicit endorsement. And others consider land-ownership and tenure as secondary to such top-priority issues as food sufficiency, rural employment, and capital accumulation. The concentration on agricultural development in countries with political systems as different as Angola's and the Ivory Coast's is accepted as a viable strategy. Similarly, the high productivity of small individual peasant plots in Malaysia and Ceylon is analyzed as one successful method of dealing with the agrarian crisis.[33]

SCIENCE

An exaggerated respect for science as the motive force of change (capsuled in the phrase "the scientific-technological revolution," or STR) has undermined the traditional Soviet concepts of what generates progress. Many specialists regard science as the crucial factor in economic development. Further, they do not draw any distinction between "socialist" and "capitalist" science, writing about it as a genuinely international phenomenon that operates over and above the existing political systems. Science, developing and changing faster than any other sphere of human activity, determines the character of our time. Some Soviet writers go as far as to say that economic history proceeds through the primitive, the industrial, and the scientific-technological stages. It is scientific advances that generate and shape the whole process of change which the Third World is undergoing in the 1970s. This outlook leads to a new definition of the crux of underdevelopment:

> On the world scale, the economies [of the LDCs] have already begun to be transformed into a subordinate link of the new scientific-technological production forces, while at the same time, within their own framework, they face the problem of moving from the pre-industrial to the industrial modes of production.[34]

[33] V. G. Khoros, "Problema 'narodnichestva' kak internatsional'noi modeli ideologii razvivayushchikhsia stran" [Populism as an International Model of the Ideology of the Developing Countries], *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2 (March-April 1973), and "Udzhamaa: opyt nekapitalisticheskogo razvitiya" [Ujamaa: An Experiment in Noncapitalist Development], *Ibid.*, No. 5 (September-October 1977), 199-210; L. Aleksandrovskaya, "Ekonomicheskie polozhenie stran Afriki" [The Economic Conditions of African Countries], *Aziya i Afrika segodnia*, No. 5 (May 1978), 5-9; I. A. Svanidze, "Razvitie kapitalizma v sel'skom khoziaistve Berega Slonovoi Kosti" [The Development of Capitalism in the Agriculture of the Ivory Coast], *ibid.*, No. 2 (February 1979), 56-58; A. Ya. Elianov, *Razvivayushchiesia strany: problemy ekonomicheskogo rosta i rynok* [The Developing Countries: Economic Growth and the Market] (Moscow: Mysl', 1976), 198; I. A. Svanidze, *Sel'skoe khoziaistvo i agrarnyi stroi Tropicheskoi Afriki* [Agriculture and the Agrarian System in Tropical Africa] (Moscow: Nauka, 1977).

[34] V. Krylov, "Osobennosti razvitiya proizvoditel'nykh sil i vosproizvoditel'-nogo

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Serious study of the role of science in the Third World began in the U.S.S.R. in the late 1960s. The first substantial publication appeared in 1970, and a theoretical conference convened in 1971 marked a considerable step forward by posing new questions.[35] These early publications, however, were excessively concerned with Western methods of transferring technology in a manner intended to perpetuate dependence. Since then, much of the subject has become remarkably free of ideological overtones.

The work of G. E. Skorov represents the optimistic strain that predominated at the start. His first publications argue that because the LDCs did not have to start *ab ovo* they were not put at a disadvantage or at the mercy of the industrialized states. On the contrary, they could thus skip the preliminary stages and start modernizing their economies with the help of the latest advances of world science. This initial enthusiasm is tempered somewhat in a book Skorov published in 1975, which investigates why, despite the unprecedented availability of new means for speeding up economic development, the potentials offered by modern technology had been to a very large extent unrealized. The focus of the book, however, is on finding the appropriate local and international administrative measures to facilitate the transfer of technology.[36]

The work of R. M. Avakov, representing the more pessimistic strain, concentrates on analyzing the obstacles presented by archaic societies and backward economies to absorbing modern, advanced technology. In essence, he holds that technology cannot be simply grafted onto backwardness, questions the wisdom of supplying the ambitious and affluent LDCs with the most advanced hardware, and favors greater attention to intermediate technology.[37]

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protsessa v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh" [The Peculiarities of the Development of the Production Forces and Process in the Developing Countries], in Reisner (fn. 25), 183. See also M. A. Cheshkov, "Metodologicheskie problemy analiza gosuklada" [The Methodological Problems in the Analysis of the State Sector], *ibid.*, 324-51.

[35] A. Yu. Shpirt, *Nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revoliutsiya i razvivayushchiesia strany* [The Scientific-Technological Revolution and the Developing Countries] (Moscow: Nauka, 1970). The Conference was reported in the June, July, and August 1971 issues of *MEMO* and led to the publication of *'Tret'ii Mir' i nauchno-tekhnicheskii progress* [The "Third World" and Scientific-Technical Progress] (Moscow: Nauka, 1974).

[36] *Razvivayushchiesia strany: obrazovanie, zaniatost', ekonomicheskii rost* [The Developing Countries: Education, Employment, Economic Growth] (Moscow: Nauka, 1971); Skorov, ed., *Razvivayushchiesia strany: nauka, tekhnika, ekonomicheskii rost* [The Developing Countries: Science, Technology, Economic Growth] Moscow: Mysl', 1975).

[37] *Razvivayushchiesia strany: nauchno-tekhnologicheskaya revoliutsiya i problema nezavisimosti* [The Developing Countries: The Scientific-Technological Revolution and the Problem of Independence] (Moscow: Mysl', 1976).

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Recent research tends to fall into the latter, pessimistic category. The outlook is to some extent conditioned by the current concern for social and political stability. Since advanced technology is not labor-intensive, it does not help to alleviate the pressing problem of unemployment and underemployment. Consequently, there is a more forthright discussion of intermediate technology that can be adapted to the conditions and needs of the LDCs.[38]

NEOCOLONIALISM

While official pronouncements keep denouncing Western activities in the Third World, many scholars are probing the extent to which, and in what ways, the operations of neocolonialism have changed. The more conservative or cautious still marshal their arguments according to the formula that although the economic appearance of many LDCs has changed noticeably, their position in the world capitalist economy has not undergone any fundamental transformation.[39] Others concede some advance, proceeding from the premise that "the great historic changes in the world . . . have imposed certain limits on the pursuit of imperialist policy toward the periphery." They argue that, since underdevelopment acts as a brake on the expansion and profits of monopolies, the latter have been forced to transfer some industries (mainly labor-intensive and environmentally harmful ones) to the Third World. These authors acknowledge that the LDCs have advanced from being merely suppliers of raw-materials to semi-industrial, though still dependent, status.[40]

Still other scholars examine the role of Western business and capital not so much in terms of more efficient, up-to-date methods of exploitation as of the positive contributions. (This approach, it may be noted, in no way contravenes Marx, who recognized the progressive role of colonialism in introducing advanced production methods to their overseas possessions.) These specialists argue that one cannot limit the study of Third-World development to stressing the baneful, negative influence of the West. Rather, the positive aspects—such as the erosion

[38] See the contributions of L. I. Reisner and V. G. Khoros to the round-table discussion on egalitarianism, in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6 (November-December 1978), 10-12, 12-14.

[39] B. G. Gafurov, *Aktual'nye problemy sovremennogo natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya* [Topical Problems of the Contemporary National Liberation Movement] (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), and "Velikii katalizator natsional'no osvoboditel'noi bor'by" [The Great Catalyst of the National Liberation Struggle], *MEMO*, No. 7 (July 1977), 23-36.

[40] The discussion, "Neo-Colonialism—a New System of Dependence and Enslavement?" in *International Affairs*, No. 11 (November 1978), 65-93, from which this quote is taken (at 66), is a good example of this type of analysis.

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of ossified social relations, the initiation of speedy development in some sectors of the economy, and inclusion in the world market—deserve equal study as part of the development process. Accordingly, there are now books that investigate the contributions of foreign capital to local development plans, to capital formation, and to the implementation of social programs.[41]

Moreover, these writers do not treat the LDCs as the perpetual, helpless victims of the imperialist cabal. Some stress that nationalization of foreign property, increased local control over natural resources, changes in capital flows and in the world price structure, and the building of national industries have contributed to the "collapse of . . . dependent and exploitative relations." Others maintain that many LDCs have even attained a partnership status in international exchanges; as such, they both invite foreign capital and invest their own funds abroad.[42]

As yet no one has done a major, comprehensive study of how and why the position of the LDCs has changed in this respect. What is being written about the degree of economic differentiation and about the international division of labor bears on this issue. But in describing the actual situation, these works deal more with facts than with theory. Thus far, the liberal proponents of *mnogoukladnost'* have offered the most cogent theoretical arguments for dispelling the bogey of foreign and domestic capital—the basic problem that has to be surmounted if development is not to be examined exclusively in terms of systemic recipes. Their description of the Third-World economies as consisting of numerous indeterminate, ever-changing, transitional *uklady* that defy traditional classification makes the point that both foreign and local capital is diffused throughout the various components and interacts on many levels, and accordingly defies easy or exact identification and hence eradication. Rather than concentrate on foreign domination or the expansion of domestic capital, these writers prefer to investigate the changes and advances resulting from the multidimensional diffusion and interaction.[43] And it is on this very point that they have been

[41] L. V. Gavrilov, *Eksport kapitala v razvivayushchiesia strany Afriki* [The Export of Capital into the Developing Countries of Africa] (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), was among the first works to be written in this spirit. While most books tend to be factual, A. I. Levkovsky raises the discussion to a theoretical level (fn. 15).

[42] A. I. Medovoi and V. A. Yashkin, "Krizis kapitalisticheskoi formatsii" [Crisis of the Capitalist Formation], in A. I. Dinkevich, ed., *Razvivayushchiesia strany: problemy ekonomicheskogo razvitiya* ["The Developing Countries: Problems of Economic Development] (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 28; A. S. Kodachenko, *Vneshne-ekonomicheskaya politika imperializma v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh* [The Foreign Economic Policy of Imperialism in the Developing Countries] (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 26-51.

[43] This view is specifically defined and defended by Levkovsky in the introduction to

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most severely criticized by the conservatives, who object that this interpretation of *mnogoukladnost'* removes the guilty party from the scene.[44]

MULTINATIONALS

Since opinions differ about the nature of neocolonialism, there are inevitably disagreements about the multinationals. Some Soviet authors concentrate on denouncing the multinationals as instruments of capitalist or neocolonialist exploitation. Without bothering to go into any details about the evolution or operations of the MNCs, they simply keep citing total figures on Western overseas investment and profits,[45] and consider their case conclusively demonstrated. Other writers, less obscurantist in their censure, admit that the multinationals have instituted a new international division of labor, allocating some of the processes in the production cycle to the LDCs. Still, on balance, the change is considered to be no more than a new form of exploitation.[46] However, not all the negative views are mere political argumentation. A. Kovalevsky, for example, has dispassionately analyzed the operations of the multinationals in terms of Raymond Vernon's "product cycle" theory, and concludes that the LDCs play too passive and limited a role in this process.[47]

In addition, there is a sizable body of opinion that regards the multinationals as an inevitable aspect of the growing extent of the internationalization of production. Included in this group are those economists who appreciate the skill of the MNCs in devising new management methods to maximize efficiency and profit. Their analysis concentrates on the practical lessons that can be learned from the operations of the conglomerates, and only minimally on how these operations affect the less developed countries and regions.[48]

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the book he edited in 1977 (fn. 15). Simoniya (fn. 25) expresses it in more general terms.

[44] Levkovsky has even written about the "dying out" (*ugasanie*) of the foreign capitalist enterprise—to the horror of Roslavlev, the leading critic of the concept of *mnogoukladnost'* (fn. 20), 144-45.

[45] N. A. Sergeev, "Razvivayushchiesia strany protiv neo-kolonializma sverkhmonopolii" [The Developing Countries against the Neocolonialism of the Multinationals], *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5 (September-October 1977), 83-96, presents a fairly typical argument.

[46] R. A. Ulianovsky, "Ekonomicheskii front bor'by protiv neokolonializma" [Economic Front of the Struggle against Neocolonialism], *MEMO*, No. 4 (April 1978), 3-17.

[47] "Vozmozhnosti tekhnologicheskogo transfera v eksportnye otrasli razvivayushchikhsia stran" [The Possibility of Technical Transfer to the Export Sector of the Developing Countries], in Reisner (fn. 25), 7-21.

[48] M. Maksimova, *SSSR i mezhdunarodnoe ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo* [The

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And finally, there are those who either imply or openly acknowledge the contribution of the multinationals to economic development. According to Ye. Primakov, these companies have over the past ten years relinquished complete control over local firms; they now increasingly cooperate with both the state and the private sector.[49] Another attempt at a less Manichean view of the multinationals is that of N. Volkova, who points out that the Third World is by no means the main theater of their operations; but to the extent to which the transnationals are active in these parts, they help to integrate them into the world economy.[50]

I. Ivanov has produced probably the most outspoken positive appraisal of the multinationals to appear in print thus far. He sees them as a creatively resourceful new economic system, motivated by the logic of efficiency, that transcends geographic boundaries. As far as the Third World is concerned, they are the source of the capital and technology that provide the means for overcoming backwardness: "It would be wrong to deny, while taking a realistic view, that the multinationals are in principle incapable of making a contribution to development."[51]

It goes without saying that all Soviet authors favor, to some degree or another, national control over the operations of the transnationals. While the conservatives advocate stringent curbs ("full control"), the liberal moderates envisage a reasonable dialogue leading to mutually acceptable regulations that serve the interests of both parties.[52]

ROLE OF THE STATE

That Marxist article of faith—the capacity of the state to generate economic development and to effect the transition to socialism—has

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U.S.S.R. and International Economic Cooperation] (Moscow: Mysl', 1977), 35; E. Kirichenko, "Evoliutsiya upravleniya zagranichnoi deyatel'nostiu amerikanskikh kompanii" [The Evolution of Management of American Companies' Foreign Operations], *MEMO*, No. 12 (December 1978), 33-43; A. Porokhovsky, "Kapitalisticheskie monopolii i nauchno-tekhnicheskaya revoliutsiya" [The Capitalist Monopolies and the Scientific-Technological Revolution], *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 7 (July 1978), 141-47.

[49] "Nekotorye problemy razvivayushchikhsia stran" [Some Problems of the Developing Countries], *Kommunist*, No. 11 (July 1978), 81-91.

[50] "Nekotorye aspekty deyatel'nosti mnogonatsional'nykh korporatsii v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh" [Some Aspects of the Activities of the Multinationals in the Developing Countries], in Levkovsky (fn. 15), 52-65.

[51] "Multinationals: What Kind of a 'New World'," *World Marxist Review*, No. 7 (July 1978), 124.

[52] Compare R. Ulianovsky's "The Developing Countries: Economic Front," *New Times*, No. 34 (August 1976), 12-20, with N. Simoniya's "Syr'evaya problema sovremennogo kapitalizma" [The Raw-Material Problem of Contemporary Capitalism], *MEMO*, No. 3 (March 1978), 85-100.

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been considerably eroded in recent years on both practical and theoretical grounds. The limits to what public ownership can accomplish have been recognized, and the propriety of equating state controls with socialist production relations has been questioned.

At present, three different schools of thought are discernible in Soviet publications. The conservatives have not given up crediting the size of the public sector, the degree of control over private and foreign capital, and the comprehensiveness of planning with paving the way for the advent of socialism. But they now recognize the practical limits to these aspirations. These days, not even the most confirmed traditionalists will suggest indiscriminate nationalization as the most efficacious method to build up the state sector, accumulate funds, and strengthen central authority. Similarly, the former penchant for total planning has been moderated, but that does not mean that the standing of unregulated spontaneous processes has gone up. The aim remains to control and to limit the private sector through appropriate and progressively stricter planning and allocations.[53]

Although the objective or practical school does not directly challenge the above constructs, it concentrates on analyzing the difficulties that the state's orchestration of development encounters, and on discussing flexible policies that bring better economic results. Two important books have generalized the findings. Ye. Bragina's volume on industrial policy focuses on the stumbling blocks facing state management in the Third World, such as the shortages of administrative talent, of expert knowledge, and of experience. Emphasis here is shifted from scale to efficiency; economic feasibility demonstrates that a "striving for excessive statism, unrelated to economic conditions, can lead to serious disruptions of economic life, a fall in production, and the growth of unemployment. . . . The process of state ownership in the LDCs has its objective limits."[54]

A. Elianov's study of economic growth and the market is the first Soviet work to analyze the interaction between state planning and market processes. It accepts private enterprise as a necessary and useful

[53] This view is well summarized by G. Smirnov, "O sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi sushchnosti gosudarstvennogo sektora v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh" [On the Socio-Economic Essence of the State Sector in the Developing Countries], *Aziya i Afrika segodnia*, No. 5 (May 1979), 34-37. Smirnov headed the joint Soviet-East European team of economists who produced *Planning in Developing Countries: Theory and Methodology* for UNITAR in 1978. While the volume is still under review at the U.N., it has been published in Russian in Moscow.

[54] *Razvivayushchiesia strany: gosudarstvennaya politika i promyshlennost'* [The Developing Countries: State Policy and Industry] (Moscow: Mysl', 1977). The book has been criticized for taking a "narrow economic view of development problems" in *MEMO*, No. 2 (February 1978), 148-49.

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part of the national economy, recommends the peaceful coexistence of the public and private sectors, and regards market forces as an essential indicator of the general efficiency for both supply and demand. Like Bragina, Elianov considers the premature expansion of state ownership and excessive *dirigisme* as injurious to development. Within that context, he discusses the feasibility of a variety of policies, ranging from nationalization of the basic means of production and centralized planning to reliance on the private sector and indicative planning.[55]

Finally, there is a small theoretical school that treats the state sector not as one among several components of LDC economies, but as comprising the entire set of production relations. A. Levkovsky maintains that the state's prominence in the Third World is due to economic necessity, and has criticized the orthodox specialists for equating state ownership and management with the dawning of socialism. He believes that the public sector, at present and for a long time to come, fulfills general national tasks that attend to the interests of the various social groupings. It is the emanation of the amorphous multisectoral economy and society that are Levkovsky's object of research. Other scholars concentrate on the totality of the state's role. To categorize that situation, they have coined the phrase "étatism" (*etakratiya*), or use the term "state sector" (*gosudarstvennyi układ*), as designating the entire set of production relations; in other words, as being a historic formation.[56] In some respects, these views are related to the theory of the Asian mode of production, not so much in detail as in the general approach that sees the East as having institutions which differ wholly from those of the West; consequently the East cannot repeat Western patterns.

The arguments of this group of specialists are so extremely convoluted that they are not easy to summarize. In reference to economic development, they signify an attempt to create new theoretical constructs to permit a fresh analysis of the role of the state in the Third World—an analysis more in keeping with the realities of the modern world than with the old political theories. On the international level, they argue that the relations between the industrial West and the de-

[55] *Razvivayushchiesia strany: problemy ekonomicheskogo razvitiya i rynok* [The Developing Countries: Problems of Economic Growth and the Market] (Moscow: Mysl', 1976).

[56] Levkovsky, 1978 (fn. 19), 148-73. Cheshkov (fn. 34); see also his "Biurokratiya i 'etakratiya' v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh" [Bureaucracy and "Etatism" in the Developing Countries], in *Obshchestvo, elity i biurokratiya v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh Vostoka* (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), 3-29. V. Yashkin, "Gosudarstvennyi uklad v mnogoukladnoi ekonomike" [The State Sector in a Multisectoral Economy], *Aziya i Afrika segodnia*, No. 3 (March 1979), 40-44.

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veloping East are not those of exploitation, but rather of two contending monopolists—i.e., the Western multinationals on one side and the étatist monopolies of the LDCs on the other. On the domestic level, the issue of exploitation also becomes irrelevant because both managers and labor are state employees. Similarly, state policies have to be analyzed in a different light since they are neither purely capitalist nor purely socialist.

WHAT TYPE ECONOMY?

With all this rethinking of development strategy, what do Soviet scholars now accept as the best workable system for the Third World? There definitely is a common thread to their deliberations: to one degree or another, covertly or overtly, free enterprise and foreign investment are accepted as necessary components of progress. The answer inescapably points to a mixed economy.

As yet, that term is not widely used; most economists refer to it indirectly by arguing that capitalism has not yet exhausted its potential for generating growth. Surprisingly, the mixed economy is mentioned most often in discussions of the appropriate policies for developing countries of socialist orientation. It is the program the Soviets now propose to spare these states the costly and counterproductive excesses of premature socialist measures.

The concept of socialist orientation came into use in the late 1960s to denote states whose path of development offered a "socialist perspective." (Although it was meant to replace the concept of non-capitalist development, the two terms are now used interchangeably, and there is no agreement on what, if anything, differentiates them.) At the outset, the formula called for radical political reforms, an anti-Western foreign policy, and crippling restrictions on local entrepreneurs and foreign investment, as well as for active economic cooperation with the Soviet bloc (involving elements of a socialist division of labor).[57] At present, the Soviet stance on domestic politics and diplomacy remains basically unchanged, but the interpretation of economic policies suitable for countries of socialist orientation has been altered substantially.

To begin with, it is recognized that both the capitalist- and the socialist-oriented countries remain in the world capitalist market, and no one seriously considers integration with the Soviet bloc as a precondition for the noncapitalist path. "A specific feature of the develop-

[57] V. Tiagunenko, *Problemy sovremennykh natsional'no osvoboditel'nykh revoliutsii* [Problems of Present-Day National Liberation Revolutions] (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 187-88.

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ment of [these] countries . . . is that even after their choice of the noncapitalist way they are still in the orbit of the world capitalist system."[58] On the domestic level, the survival of capitalist relations is also recognized: "All economically backward countries, including those which politically adhere to the most advanced and progressive positions, pass through some phase of capitalist development."[59]

When the economic malfunctioning of the radical LDCs first became the subject of published commentary, most authors blamed the burgeoning bureaucracy for excessive costs and poor administration. At present, specialists increasingly advise more moderate policies on local free enterprise, foreign aid, and Western investment. Separately and together, all three are seen as indispensable to provide further stimulus to national efforts, to introduce the needed technology and specialists, to increase employment, to improve services, and to expand the food supply.[60]

Significantly, no specific set of economic policies is now designated as being essential for a socialist orientation, other than the vague enough theory about the state being the controlling agent. This is as much a "socialist" doctrine as it is an acceptance of what actually prevails in the Third World anyway. The more orthodox specialists like to dwell on what the state power in these countries can accomplish:

> A mixed economy in the countries of socialist orientation . . . permits the utilization of capitalist elements (*uklady*) for the development of the production forces under state control in ways that prevent the transformation of these elements into the ruling capitalist system but create the preconditions for the victory of the state and cooperative sectors.[61]

Those specialists who concentrate more on economic performance than on political labels envision the operations of a mixed economy in less manipulative terms. Recognizing the weakness of the state apparatus, they speak about the "coexistence" of state and private sectors and quote Engels to the effect that the state can successfully manage economic development only when it does not act as the sole agent but relies on the private sector.[62]

[58] V. Solodovnikov, "Elimination of the Colonial System, an Expression of the General Crisis of Capitalism," *International Affairs*, No. 8 (August 1976), 24.

[59] "The Revolutionary Process in the Socialism-Oriented Countries of Africa," *World Marxist Review*, No. 1 (January 1978), 92.

[60] A. V. Kiva, *Strany sotsialisticheskoi orientatsii. Osnovnye tendentsii razvitiya* [Countries of Socialist Orientation. Basic Development Tendencies] (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 176-87.

[61] G. B. Starushenko, *Sotsialisticheskaya orientatsiya v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh* [Socialist Orientation in the Developing Countries] Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1977), 51-52.

[62] Yashkin (fn. 56), 41.

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As for foreign capital, again realities are recognized by Soviet writers. They admit that the West provides as much as 70 percent of aid and credit to many radical regimes,[63] and do not urge the doctrinaire nationalization or exclusion of Western investment. On the contrary, even orthodox specialists argue that the socialist-oriented state should attract foreign capital and work out "a system of regulation . . . that will guarantee the interests of the radical regimes and grant sufficient advantages to foreign investors to attract them."[64]

IV

What are the academic, ideological, and political implications of the reassessment of development issues? Some of the implications are more marked than others; still others are quite tentative.

In scholarship, the new trends denote an abandonment of the deductive methodology and deterministic schemes. What interests many innovating specialists is not merely the refinement of analytical tools, but the principle of open-ended inquiry. Sometimes they plead that "one should not limit oneself in advance to some obligatory framework, [for] the world of the eighties will be more complex than the world of the seventies, and the world of the nineties more so than that of the eighties."[65] At other times and in other contexts, they accept the indeterminate nature of research, as did L. Reisner when he prefaced his book on the theory of development with a reference to Niels Bohr's principle of complementarity.[66] This spirit, having already enriched the field with solid research into new subjects and a variety of challenging interpretations, offers prospects of much more to come.

New theoretical constructs and new fields of research have a bearing on ideology as well. To regard science as the motive force of progress, to advise the LDCs to integrate with the world market, to acknowledge that private enterprise and foreign investment contribute much to development, to investigate the undefined yet distinct nature of Third-World economies—all these arguments modify the traditional Marxist-Leninist assumptions about the ubiquitously maleficent role of imperialism and capitalism. They take into consideration the changing configuration of forces in the world economy, general advances in knowledge, and the indigenous processes in the LDCs. To be sure, the updated and realistic outlook among scholars has not altered official statements on Third-World issues. Still, its existence should chasten

[63] Kiva (fn. 60), 28.
[64] Starushenko (fn. 61), 51.
[65] "Kak otsenivat' . . ." (fn. 7), 69-70.
[66] Reisner (fn. 25), 6.

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our conventional wisdom that all Soviet analysis views the economic problems of the LDCs from a purely political standpoint and as the consequences of an imperialist plot.

Inherent in the new interpretations of development issues is the recognition that the non-socialist world and its economic operations offer some dynamic solutions, and that in many respects the LDCs are not ready for socialism. Although official Soviet pronouncements keep stressing that the ideological struggle for the minds and the political allegiances of the Third World will persist despite peaceful diplomatic coexistence between the superpowers, recent specialized thinking on economic problems of the LDCs suggests a decline in the former confidence that socialism and the U.S.S.R. can provide both the alternative theory and the necessary means for overcoming backwardness. Soviet interest in incremental change in the LDCs, posited on the recognition of the non-antagonistic nature of capitalist relations and foreign investment, implies a changing outlook. And it allows for a productive dialogue on some highly explosive problems facing the Third World, and possibly for some cooperation with the West on the economic level as well.

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THE EVOLUTION IN THE SOVIET WORLD VIEW

By JERRY F. HOUGH

IN the Soviet Union, foreign policy is almost impossible to discuss in print in any sophisticated manner. No assertion that Soviet foreign policy is mistaken—let alone malevolent—would pass the censor; the same is true of any proposal for a concrete step in Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet leaders themselves hardly ever publicly acknowledge that they or their predecessors have made a mistake in foreign policy, or that they are changing policy. Even Stalin's conduct of foreign policy has been treated very gingerly.

Instead, published discussion of foreign policy takes place within the framework of a discussion of the "objective situation" in the outside world. Any change in Soviet policy, when acknowledged at all, is described as the natural response of a perfectly consistent program to differences in conditions. Because the restrictions on published scholarly debate about the outside world have been gradually relaxed over the years, scholars wanting to debate policy have frequently found it possible to do so in an Aesopian manner through debates on the conditions prevailing in the world.[1]

Consequently, an examination of Soviet analyses of foreign countries assumes great importance for the Western student of the Soviet Union—and not only of Soviet ideology, but also of foreign policy. Yet, the very factors that make these analyses important also make it difficult to generalize about Soviet views. The day has passed when one can assume that any book or article published in the U.S.S.R. represents official Soviet doctrine just because it has passed through the censor, and that therefore one can legitimately piece together "the Soviet world view" by quoting statements from a wide variety of sources. Today, a published statement may constitute an attempt to criticize official Soviet doctrine either from the right or the left, to draw the attention of officials and scholars to a phenomenon or an interpretation that has been relatively neglected in the past, or, conversely, to make a propagandistic statement for a mass or foreign audience. A sophisticated knowledge of the various debates is generally required in order to discern whether particular ideas are centrist or

[1] Franklyn Griffiths, "Images, Politics, and Learning in Soviet Behaviour toward the United States," Ph.D. diss. (Columbia University, 1972).

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extremist within the Soviet foreign policy establishment, and especially to judge the direction of movement of the center of gravity in the debates.

For these reasons, an event that took place on November 6, 1977, was quite significant for those interested in Soviet views concerning the outside world.[2] When the annual state prizes for scholarly achievement were awarded to twelve pieces of work—only two of them in the social sciences—one of these was the second edition of a two-volume study, *The Political Economy of Contemporary Monopolistic Capitalism*.[3] The study bore the endorsement of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Academy of Sciences and was, in effect, a collective work by the scholars of the Institute, written under the general leadership of Nikolai Inozemtsev, its director.

In most countries, the awarding of a prize to a book usually reveals little more than the taste and judgment of a committee whose members have been chosen by some idiosyncratic method. In the Soviet Union, however, a state prize awarded to a book on a topic as sensitive as the nature of the capitalist world reflects a very authoritative judgment indeed. The head of the economic sciences section of the Central Committee apparatus, M. Volkov, had already stated that *The Political Economy* represented "the correct orientation";[4] the announcement of the prize confirmed that this opinion was not limited to a middle-level official of the Central Committee.

The state prize does not mean, of course, that every view expressed in *The Political Economy* represents the thinking of the Kremlin. Each chapter was written by an individual scholar or scholars (46 of them wrote the 35 chapters), and, though the scholars were told to present an institutional point of view, there inevitably are some differences in outlook from chapter to chapter. Moreover, to the extent that the IMEMO authors share a common world view, it is one that is far from being universally accepted throughout the Soviet Union. At times the work attacks opposing views, and occasionally chapters even indirectly advocate economic reform within the Soviet Union. Finally, one must keep in mind that *The Political Economy* was published in a political system with a strong censorship; it is quite possible that a particular

[2] The announcement of the state prize is found in *Pravda*, November 6, 1977, p. 3.

[3] N. N. Inozemtsev, A. G. Mileikovsky, and V. A. Martynov, eds., *Politicheskaia ekonomiia sovremennogo monopolisticheskogo kapitalizma* [hereafter referred to as *The Political Economy*], 2 vols. (1st ed., Moscow: Mysl', 1971; 2d ed., Moscow: Mysl', 1975). Translations are by the author of this article.

[4] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 26 (June 1977), 10.

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statement reflects the needs of domestic or foreign propaganda rather than the actual views of the author or the leadership.

Nevertheless, the collective nature of *The Political Economy*, coupled with the significance of the state prize, provides an excellent opportunity for us to examine the contemporary Soviet world view in an especially sophisticated, comprehensive, and authoritative form. Indeed, since the prize was awarded to the second edition of *The Political Economy*, which was based directly on the first, it is possible to gain a sense of the direction of the evolution of Soviet thinking about the outside world by comparing the two editions. With the exception of one chapter that was dropped, the chapter structure is identical, and whole paragraphs and even pages were reprinted word for word; hence, the changes that were introduced were deliberate. Sometimes only one word has been changed in a sentence; sometimes sentences, paragraphs, or pages have been deleted, changed, or added; sometimes a whole chapter has been fundamentally rewritten. But in each case, a conscious decision was involved. Obviously, views that were at least tolerable to the editors in 1969 and 1970 when the first edition was written no longer seemed right in 1974 when it was being revised.

I

The basic framework of the analysis in *The Political Economy* is a Marxist-Leninist one; many of its fundamental conclusions could have been printed in the Soviet Union at any time during the last fifty years. The work retains Lenin's use of the word "imperialism" as a synonym for "the last stage of capitalism" and emphasizes the growing levels of the concentration of industry in the hands of the "monopolies" (the term used for large corporations). The state, of course is a bourgeois one "which has a clearly manifested class character and which embodies the rule of the monopolistic bourgeoisie" (2d ed., II, 403). The nature of the system and its policy is described in hair-raising terms:

> Imperialism [to repeat, simply a synonym for modern capitalism] is the infringement of freedom of the personality and human dignity, the propagation of violence, the injuring of public morality, and a revelry of racism and chauvinism (2d ed., II, 412).
>
> Imperialism is a most dangerous military threat. . . . It conducts never-ending local wars and provokes one new armed conflict after another. It has created a huge militaristic machine which devours colossal human and material resources and creates the threat of an unleashing of world thermonuclear war (2d ed., II, 412, 422).

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> Imperialism in every way blocks the real liberation of the developing countries [and] artificially blocks social-political progress in these countries (2d ed., II, 424).

As does the original Marxist-Leninist analysis, the book counterpoises its grim conclusions about the essential nature of capitalism with the conviction that that system will eventually be overthrown. "The future belongs to communism, to its great ideals of social progress for society and real freedom of the personality—ideals that answer the vital interests of all mankind" (2d ed., II, 427).

Yet, for all the continuity between the tenets of Marxism-Leninism as interpreted in the late Stalin era and the analysis of *The Political Economy*, even the 1971 first edition diverged sharply from the orthodoxies of the past.

The first major change was simply a marked increase in the level of knowledge about the world outside the Soviet Union. In 1949, the Institute of World Economy and World Politics had been abolished in the wake of severe criticism of its work and especially of that of its director, Eugene Varga. Graduate degrees in the social sciences could usually be issued only by history departments of universities, and in practice, only two types of reasonably contemporary subjects were permissible: the history of international relations (written, of course, from a very tendentious point of view), and the history of "movements"—revolutionary or trade union movements, and sometimes other protest movements by "exploited" groups. Scholarly work by more advanced scholars (other than graduate students) was in little better shape. At the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Anastas Mikoyan, a member of the Politburo, described the situation as follows:

> We seriously lag in our study of the contemporary stage of capitalism. We are not concerned with a deep study of facts and figures. We often limit ourselves to seizing upon individual signs of approaching crises and impoverishment of the toilers for the purpose of propaganda, but we do not make a comprehensive and deep evaluation of the phenomena that are occurring in the life of foreign countries.[5]

The regime began trying to correct this situation beginning in 1956. In that year, Varga's institute was re-established under its present name, and a man with extraordinarily powerful political connections, A. A. Arzumanian, was appointed as its director.[6] Varga himself, now

[5] *XX s"ezd kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskogo soiuza, Stenograficheskii otchet* [Stenographic Report of the 20th Party Congress] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1956), I, 323.

[6] Arzumanian had been active in Armenia in the early years of the Soviet state and had married the sister of Mikoyan's wife; during World War II, he had had the good fortune to work in the political department of the 18th Army under one of

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77 years of age, returned as a senior research associate of IMEMO, and his views about the ability of the Western systems to defend themselves against economic collapse returned to favor.

Even after 1956, however, the improvement in foreign area studies was slow. Probably the major problem was one of personnel. Training of scholars had been disrupted during the 1930s, abandoned during the war, and then severely restricted during the late Stalin years. Even aside from the question of quality or ideological orientation, there was a real shortage of people. There had been every reason for those with the best and most innovative minds to avoid foreign area studies in the late Stalin period; others had to struggle with their methodological training. A scholar who had become an expert on the communist or trade-union movements abroad could not easily or naturally shift to the study of the intricacies of the capitalist economies, especially since this topic required mathematical knowledge. As a result, people had to be brought into scholarship from the outside—for example, from journalism.

By the late 1960s, the situation had begun to change in fundamental ways. New Academy of Science institutes were gradually being created, and by 1967 there were eight of them, not counting the Institute of World History.[7] The new personnel drawn into scholarly work in the 1950s had gained a great deal of experience, and had begun to create a still younger generation of scholars. The store of knowledge about other countries had become substantial.

This accumulation of knowledge was reflected in the first edition of *The Political Economy*. The authors of the volumes did take care to criticize "mistaken" Western views (although never as "falsifications"), but much of their material consisted of very sophisticated descriptions and analyses of the non-Communist world. The patterns of growth in heavy and light industry, respectively, over the last hundred years, the technical reasons for growth in the size of the firm, the various monetary mechanisms that governments use to regulate the economy, the increasing tendency for Western countries to invest capital in each others' economies rather than in colonies or former colonial areas,

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Khrushchev's closest protégés, Leonid I. Brezhnev. *Mirovaia ekonomiia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 5 (May 1974), 118.

[7] Besides IMEMO, there were the Institutes for Africa, Oriental Studies, Economy of the World Socialist System, Far East, International Workers' Movement, Latin America, and the USA and Canada. Of these, only the Institute of Oriental Studies had existed at the time of Stalin's death, and in 1956 Mikoyan had said of it, "If the whole East has awakened in our time, this institute still slumbers until the present day." *XX s"ezd* (fn. 5), I, 324.

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the social structure in the Third World, the difficulties of achieving nationalization in these countries—these and many other phenomena were described much more fully than they would have been in the past.

This accretion of knowledge about the capitalist world continued between the first edition of 1971 and the second, of 1975. For example, a comparison of the two editions demonstrates that during the early 1970s, Soviet scholars were moving from a study of the economy as a whole to an examination of the structure within the corporation as well. In the second edition, the discussion of capitalist enterprises provides a much clearer focus on the distinction between the corporation and the plant (for instance, General Motors and one of its assembly plants). There is a new section on "the functions of the central organs of administration," as well as one on conglomerates. The discussion of the "optimal size" of the firm has become much more sophisticated, and the chapter on multinational corporations shows a better understanding of the inner logic of their operations (2d ed., I, chap. 5; 1st ed., I, 116-21, 138-41, 146-54; 2d ed., II, 95-97).

In addition, the section on "new forms of exploitation," which previously discussed only the hardships of the workers, has been expanded by two-and-a-half pages and now shows an awareness of the changes in managerial techniques used toward the workers (for example, the human relations approach).

> The traditional capitalist organization of labor, with its neglect of the physical and psychological limits, interests, and personality of the workers, with the utmost disregard of the creative basis of work, came into deep conflict with the demands which the working class persistently made about the character and content of work, and also with the level of education and professional preparation of a substantial part of the labor force, first of all the youth (2d ed., II, 293).

Inevitably, an increase in detailed knowledge about something that has been understood primarily through abstract theory tends to undercut at least some of the assumptions that had been held heretofore. An analysis of the ways in which the images and conclusions of the two editions of *The Political Economy* evolved from earlier doctrine would require far more space than is available here, but four changes were of special importance: (1) the ability of the Western capitalist countries to control the worst fluctuations in the business cycle; (2) the role of the government and its relationship to the financial and business leaders; (3) a recognition of the relevance of much of Western

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experience to future Soviet development; and (4) the nature of Western foreign policy.

II

Eugene Varga's views about the ability of capitalism to avoid, at least for the short and medium term, the type of major depression that might spell the end of the system came to be widely accepted within IMEMO. But that was not the case in other institutions, notably the universities and the Academy of Social Sciences of the party's Central Committee. Shortly before the publication of the first edition of *The Political economy*, a book by M. F. Kovaleva attacked Varga's views in particularly harsh form,[8] and in an important meeting of the economics division of the Academy of Sciences, Inozemtsev counterattacked with equal sharpness: "[Kovaleva's book] not only flows from opinions not supported by experience . . . but is a relapse into a biased approach in which arguments are replaced by unjustified accusations about the works of such an important scholar as Varga—an approach that has been condemned by the party."[9]

This combative attitude pervaded the first edition of *The Political Economy*. While emphasizing the continued existence of business cycles, the authors sharply criticized the "dogmatic concepts" of a "series of writers" who had predicted that capitalist depressions would become progressively worse (1st ed., I, 344). They recognized the tendency both for economic downturns to be shallower and for the economic rate of growth to be stronger in the 1960s than it had been in the 1950s. The countries in the contemporary capitalist world were said to have a level of industrial output in 1969 that was 5.8 times that of 1913, and the authors pointedly added that the level of production was now "essentially different from the level that V. I. Lenin analyzed in creating the theory of imperialism" (1st ed., I, 89).

The authors of the first edition of *The Political Economy* were especially scornful of the "simplified and one-sided approach that was disseminated at one time and that concentrated all attention on the factors retarding technical progress under conditions of contemporary capitalism and underestimated the factors stimulating it" (1st ed., I, 89). Indeed, they spoke of "the acceleration of scientific-technical progress in

[8] Kovaleva, *K voprosam metodologii politicheskoi ekonomii kapitalizma* [Toward Questions of the Methodology of the Political Economy of Capitalism] (Moscow: Mysl', 1969).

[9] *Mirovaia ekonomiia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 1 (January 1970), 124.

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the capitalist countries and first of all in the United States" (1st ed., I, 48-49). They went out of their way to emphasize that the capitalist countries had been able to prosper despite the loss of their colonies. Lenin's theory of imperialism had certainly seemed to suggest that an expanding network of colonies was vital to the functioning of advanced capitalist countries; but *The Political Economy*, while not criticizing Lenin, dismissed any such notion as incompatible with the "Leninist theory of imperialism."

> In a series of works by Soviet economists, particularly in the thirties and forties, the capitalist world economy began to be examined not as an independent phenomenon, but first of all as a consequence of the development of an all-embracing colonial system of imperialism. The collapse of the colonial system of imperialism graphically demonstrated the methodological incorrectness of such an approach to the analysis of the world economy of capitalism. The latter continues to function and develop as before, even under conditions of the downfall of the basic colonial empires (1st ed., I, 60-61).

In the second edition, the combativeness of the first edition toward the old-line dogmatists has been reduced, and a series of direct attacks on mistaken views of the past have simply been cut out. (Compare, for example, 1st ed., I, 60, 281, and II, 135, 176, and 374 with the corresponding sections in the second edition.) There has been absolutely no retreat on the substance of the issues involved, but apparently the need to fight old enemies who have been vanquished seems less pressing. A number of the key arguments expressed in *The Political Economy* were incorporated in Brezhnev's speech to the 25th Party Congress, and one of the authors reported in an interview that—at least temporarily—this took much of the fight out of many of the traditionalists who had not been convinced.

The serious recession of 1974 is reflected in somewhat greater caution on the topic of business cycles, and the conclusions on the subject are now labeled as "open to discussion" (2d ed., I, 318). Nevertheless, the second edition is much stronger than the first in its acknowledgement of the scientific and technical progress made under capitalism. (Compare, for example, 1st ed., I, 85-89, with 2d ed., I, 88-96). Often, a comparison of the statistics in the two editions dramatically shows the economic growth that occurred within relatively few years. Thus, in the first edition, the growth in industrial production in socialist countries between 1951 and 1968 was reported to be 10.7 percent a year, compared with 5.5 percent for the capitalist countries; in the second edi-

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tion, the comparable figures for the period 1961–1973 are 7.6 percent and 5.8 percent (1st ed., I, 45; 2d ed., I, 48).

III

The basic explanation given in *The Political Economy* for the ability of capitalism to function as well as it did was the growing capacity of the government to control the business cycle. Inozemtsev himself stated in the conclusion that "politics plays a huge and ever-growing role. The character of the whole economy and social development, its tempo and its peculiar characteristics depend in many respects on internal and foreign policy" (1st ed., II, 394). In fact, the role of the government was built into the structure of the analysis. One entire section was devoted to the role of the government in the economic system, and a number of chapters in other sections also centered on the governmental-political sphere.

The relationship of the government and the "monopolies" is a subject that clearly gave the authors of *The Political Economy* a great deal of trouble, and a comparison of the two editions shows a real evolution in views. In the first edition, the factors influencing the actions of the state were described with considerable ambiguity—or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that they were described rather inconsistently from chapter to chapter. The authors of some chapters asserted that the state serves only the interests of "the financial-oligarchical leaders" and that "the deeper the state penetrates into all spheres of public life, the less society is capable of supervising its activity" (1st ed., II, 12 and 310). Elsewhere, however the impact of the working class was depicted as follows: "The more favorable objective conditions and the unprecedented scope of the struggle of the proletariat of capitalist countries helps it to resist the most negative consequences of capitalist exploitation much more successfully than before and to obtain fairly serious concessions from the state and the monopolies" (1st ed., II, 256). In one chapter, the ability of the government to control the economy was related to the percentage of property that had been nationalized—thereby suggesting that the American government was in a considerably weaker position than some of the European ones (1st ed., II, chap. 20, 9-10)—while the author of another chapter explicitly denied that this was such an important criterion (1st ed., I, 383).

In the second edition, most of these inconsistencies have been removed. They had usually involved a conflict between the traditional

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views on a subject that had not been completely abandoned and newer analysis that had not been completely accepted. In a number of instances, the second edition has moved toward a more thorough adoption of the newer line of analysis, often by means of replacing those authors who expounded the more traditional opinions.

One such case involves the relationship between the government's ownership of the means of production and its role in controlling the economy. In the second edition, inconsistencies on this question have largely disappeared, as the more traditional views have simply been removed. The one chapter that was totally eliminated from the book dealt with the forms of property in contemporary capitalist society; a strong attack on the Berle-Means thesis that managers had come to dominate stockholders in the modern corporation has been eliminated in the process (1st ed., chap. 10). The contention that the lack of nationalization of industry in the United States prevents serious regulation of the economy has also been removed. While pointing out the limits on governmental control in an economy based on private property, the chapter also includes a discussion of the various indirect tools at the government's disposal: subsidies, tax credits, depreciation, regulation of prices and wages, financial support for strategic branches, and so forth. (See 2d ed., chap. 19. Especially compare 1st ed., II, 12-16, with 2d ed., II, 16-19.)

An analogous decline in the importance attributed to ownership has occurred in the analysis of the relationship between the large banks and industry. Chiefly because of a perceived need to link influence to ownership, the first edition had continued the tortuous Leninist practice of speaking of the "merging" (*sliianie*) of bank and business capital. In the second edition, this concept has been abandoned in favor of simply discussing the various types of contacts and interrelationships that exist between the two kinds of institutions (1st ed., chap. 9, esp. 196-203; 2d ed., chap. 9).

An even more important—although incomplete—attempt to eliminate inconsistencies that appeared in the first edition of *The Political Economy* is found in passages on the determinants of governmental action. The authors of the second edition continue to insist that in the non-communist world, the basic function of the state is to support the capitalist class rather than to try to reconcile the interests of different classes. However, they much less frequently describe the government as the arm of the "financial-oligarchical leaders." Instead, they argue that the government's "chief task is to secure the normal functioning

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of the whole system of capitalist relations" (2d ed., II, 9). In this view, that functioning requires the type of regulation of the economy, the type of "maneuvering," and the type of concessions to the workers that are analyzed in other chapters of the study.

Indeed, in explaining the government's "certain degree of autonomy" and its "relative independence from the [economic] base," the second edition also embodies a much clearer recognition that the capitalist class is often divided on current political issues. The second edition refers to " 'the pressure groups' which express the particular interests of this or that stratum of the bourgeoisie, of this or that monopolistic group," and hence it makes clear that the government cannot possibly represent all capitalists simultaneously, except on the general level of "preserving the capitalist mode of production as such."

> Depending on the force of these pressures [of the different business groups], depending on the degree of intensity of the basic contradictions of capitalism and the necessity to take account of them, depending on the degree of social instability in society at the given moment, the concrete goals of governmental regulation can reflect the demands of monopolistic capital for a maximization of current profits to a greater or lesser degree. It can to a certain extent favor the interests of some groups of monopolies over others" (2d ed., II, 10).

The authors of *The Political Economy* cannot bring themselves to say outright that the government to some extent represents and mediates between the short-term interests of all classes and groups, but that it gives greater weight to the interests of the business groups and opposes "the long-term interest" of the workers in a socialist revolution. But, if the second edition is read as a whole, that, in effect, is what is being said.

The Political Economy also contains assertions about the trends of political development within the capitalist world; the changes in this analysis are even more striking than in the analysis of the current role of government. On this question, the readers can judge for themselves: the paragraphs on the left are from the first edition, while those on the right are their counterparts in the second (1st ed., II, 310-11; 2d ed., II, 324-27).

Under the influence of the objective laws of state-monopolistic developments and of the political conditions engendered by the general crisis of capitalism, the tendencies

The internal political development in the capitalist countries takes place under the continuous influence of the competition and struggle between the two social systems

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toward reaction that are inherent in imperialism acquire particularly threatening dimensions.	on the world scale and of the historical achievements of socialism in different spheres of life. This compels the monopolistic bourgeoisie to make maneuvers that adjust to the changing conditions of the class struggle.
The more deeply the bourgeois state penetrates into all spheres of public life, the less capable society is of controlling its activity. . . . The antidemocratic tendencies in bourgeois politics rise sharply, fed by the concentration of economic power and by the aspiration common to all the bourgeoisie to rely upon authoritarian methods in the face of an intensifying revolutionary movement. The establishment of fascist regimes expresses in the most concentrated form a political tendency that is common in all countries which have entered the stage of state-monopoly capitalism.	The times of the undivided rule of the monopolistic bourgeoisie have passed. . . . As before, imperialism gives birth to tendencies toward extreme reaction that are fed by an ever-greater concentration of economic power, a sharp increase in the role of the state, and an aspiration of the bourgeoisie to "introduce order in its own house." . . . But this is only one side of the question. . . . Direct attacks on democratic rights and freedoms run up against the opposition of the broad masses. . . . This makes it difficult for the ruling class to turn to openly terroristic methods of exercising its authority. . . . The ruling class in the capitalist countries is not as free as it used to be in selecting its methods of rule.
Political freedom in the bourgeois-liberal interpretation comes into irreconcilable conflict with the interests of economic development. . . . It is not surprising that now even bourgeois proponents of democracy doubt the effectiveness of liberal-bourgeois politics and traditional bourgeois-democratic institutions.	The preservation of the attributes of bourgeois democracy better guarantees that flexibility which is so indispensable to the capitalist system under present conditions. . . . It facilitates the possibility of conducting the improvements and reforms without which the further functioning of the capitalist system is impossible under contemporary conditions.

IV

Another major change from the old orthodoxies is in the attitude *The Political Economy* exhibits toward the Western world. The last years of Stalin's administration were marked by a strong—really, pathological—denunciation of the practice of treating the West as an exam-

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ple; all significant inventions and discoveries were attributed to the Soviet Union or pre-1917 Russia. The approach of even the first edition is strikingly different. As Inozemtsev stated in the conclusion, the work analyzed many changes that had occurred in the capitalist world, and the purpose of this analysis was not simply ivory-tower scholarship:

> Marxist investigators naturally ask themselves the question: What has produced these changes [in capitalism] and what do they reflect—the objective needs of the development of productive forces, or the nature of imperialism and the features that are inherent in it? We, of course, have a fundamentally different attitude to these two groups of factors. The socialist states cannot ignore the objective laws of the development of productive forces. . . . At the same time, the features of economic development which flow from the exploitative essence of imperialism are organically alien to them (1st ed., II, 391).

One of the most striking features of *The Political Economy* is the number of attributes of the modern Western world that are considered to be the consequence of "the objective laws of development of productive forces"—that is, the inevitable result of industrialization and the scientific-technical revolution. Naturally, all the basic difficulties in the Western countries, such as exploitation of the workers, unemployment, inflation, alienation, neocolonialism, and an aggressive foreign policy are called a consequence of the capitalist system and, therefore, "alien" to socialist countries. However, many of the structural differences between the Western and Soviet economies are attributed to the process of industrialization; hence, the authors of *The Political Economy* are implicitly saying that they not only should, but must be adopted in the Soviet Union.

For example, Marx had developed a theory of land rent which implied that agriculture would always be technologically more backward than industry. Even in the first edition, the authors of *The Political Economy* indicated in an extremely theoretical discussion that modern capitalism is different from the capitalism of the 19th century about which Marx wrote. They emphasized that modern agriculture is, in fact, enormously capital-intensive. Twice they repeated that in the most advanced Western countries there is more capital investment per employee in agriculture than there is in manufacturing industry, even if the cost of the land is excluded from the calculation. They mentioned (with an exclamation mark) that many machines are used only 10 to 20 days a year (1st ed., I, 240 and 279). The implications of this seemingly abstract issue of land rent were thus very practical: if modern agriculture "objectively" is more capital-intensive than industry, then

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the Soviet Union clearly requires a continuing massive investment in agriculture.

Other statements about the Western economies were even more direct in their implications about the future of the Soviet economy:

> Research has convincingly shown that the growth of real consumption among the population is not only a consequence, but also a most important factor in the growth in the effectiveness and intensity of production. . . . A quick rise in living standards is a powerful stimulus to more rapid technological progress.
>
> Undoubtedly the growth in the relative weight of trade and the services sector in the capitalist countries is produced by the objective needs of the further development of the productive forces.
>
> It is also necessary to note the high relative weight of housing construction within the economy. The share of capital investment directed to housing construction in the highly developed capitalist countries (including Japan) in the post-World War II period has been approximately 20-25 percent. The persistence of this figure and its relative independence from the existing level of housing per capita is also a characteristic fact (1st ed., I, 53 and 320).[10]

The authors of *The Political Economy* used their interpretation of Western experience not only to advocate (at least by implication) a greater diversion of funds to agriculture and consumption, but also to suggest the need for substantial economic reforms. As I have already indicated, the first edition praised modern capitalism for its ability to produce technological innovation. It made very clear that socialism faces "particularly difficult problems" in this realm: "The objective advantages of socialism in the development of science and technology cannot be achieved by letting things drift. Victory in this part of the competition [with capitalism] is a very complicated matter" (1st ed., I, 48 and 49).

All of the statements suggesting the need for greater allocation of funds for consumption have been retained in the second edition, and those indicating the need to catch up with capitalism in technological innovation have been considerably reinforced and augmented. Apparently the first edition had been criticized on the ground that "it is not possible to compete with capitalism in the area of productivity of labor,

[10] A Soviet economist reading this is no doubt aware that the percentage of investment going to housing in the Soviet Union dropped from 22.9 percent in 1960 to 13.9 percent in 1976. See *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1965 godu, Statisticheskii sbornik* [National Economy of the USSR in 1965, Statistical Handbook] (Moscow: Statistika, 1965), 532, and *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR za 60 let, Iubileinyi statisticheskii sbornik* [National Economy of the USSR for 60 years, Jubilee Statistical Handbook] (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), 437.

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for it is high there in substantial part because of an exhausting speed-up in work." The authors of the second edition dismiss this objection out of hand:

> It seems to us that such a phrasing of the question is basically incorrect. While not in any way intending to "catch up" with capitalism in the strain it places on the worker, socialism does not have the right to weaken its efforts in automation and in perfecting the organization and administration of production.

They seal their argument with three quotes from Lenin about the need for higher productivity of labor under socialism than under capitalism (2d ed., I, 54).

While the second edition continues to argue, by indirection, for economic reform, some of the new passages are quite laudatory about the impact of competition on the market place:

> On the whole, in the long run, an improvement in quality and a widening in the variety of goods is an essential aspect of economic progress in contemporary conditions. Markets in capital goods play an especially important role in this respect. A real quality competition takes place on these markets (2d ed., I, 164).

> Scientific-technical progress strengthens the objective need for an internationalization of productive forces. . . . In many cases it becomes altogether impossible to secure highly efficient production of technically complicated goods if a country orients itself only on the narrow framework of the internal market (2d ed., II, 62).

V

Although the authors of *The Political Economy* seem to be attracted to some of the features of the "scientific-technical revolution" as manifested in the Western countries that are technologically more advanced than the Soviet Union, their views on the foreign policies of Western countries are much more negative. In the period between the two editions, the SALT-I treaty was signed, the rapprochement with the German Federal Republic completed, and Brezhnev had associated himself closely with the policy of détente (*razriadka*) of which these two agreements were the core. This policy is mentioned frequently, praised wholeheartedly, and given credit for any conceivable good. The reader is not, however, meant to infer that détente means the end of an aggressive foreign policy by the West and especially by the United States.

Thus, even in the second edition, both the chapter on militarism and Inozemtsev's conclusions on the subject remain very strong. The post-

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Stalin rejection of the doctrine that wars among capitalist countries are inevitable is naturally included, but in both editions the authors maintain that "the nature, sources, and causes of the aggressiveness of imperialism remain in principle unchanged" (2d ed., II, 193). The chapter on the multinational corporation, perhaps in response to the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile, has a new paragraph about "the unleashing of direct armed aggression against developing states and the organization of antigovernmental conspiracies and revolutions there" (2d ed., II, 111).

Still, the second edition does contain some modification of the analysis of international relations made in the first edition. For example, the first edition quite frequently referred to foreign policy actions of Western governments in the 1920s, the 1930s, and the 1940s—usually in most unfavorable terms. Many of these references, although not all, have been omitted from the second edition. The reasons for these excisions are not altogether clear. Obviously something had to be cut to make room for accounts of new developments, and historical discussion is always a logical candidate. Nevertheless, the changes on this topic were sufficiently consistent to suggest that a conscious decision was involved.

It is my impression from personal conversations that the decision to mute historical criticism involved tactical considerations more than a real change in view. While the opinions of Soviet scholars about the contemporary capitalist world are often far removed from earlier orthodoxies, their opinions about the past have generally undergone fewer changes. Thus, much of the analysis of Lenin's *Imperialism* is considered outdated as a tool for understanding the contemporary world, but in private conversation, many of the most sophisticated specialists on the West still tend to reiterate Lenin's explanations for the outbreak of World War I and to insist that that war was inevitable. In the case of the second edition of *The Political Economy*, however, it was presumably felt that a repetition of all the old criticisms (for example, of American intervention in the Russian Civil War) was less appropriate under conditions of détente—and, indeed, that it might fuel anti-Americanism among the readers and erode support for Brezhnev's foreign policy.

On the other hand, internal evidence and conversations with Soviet scholars suggest that the changes in analysis of current foreign policy in the second edition reflect a limited—but real—shift in perception. Inozemtsev's concluding chapter includes a new subsection on détente, and speaks of "serious changes for the better in the whole international situation." The foremost of these is a change in the "correlation of

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forces" between capitalism and socialism. Although such language is almost always interpreted by the West as evidence of aggressiveness, in the second edition of *The Political Economy* it is generally used in a context explaining why the capitalist powers now are not as aggressive as their inner nature suggests and why détente is more possible. In any case, the second edition conveys the impression of a reduction of the sense of threat from the outside; it is reflected in a change of wording in a number of passages:

Full use of the benefits of the international division of labor [i.e., foreign trade] can take place only under conditions of a fundamental breaking of the whole capitalist system, of the victory of the forces of socialism (1st ed., I, 26-27).	Full use of the benefits of the international division of labor can take place only on the basis of the principles of socialism (2d ed., I, 29).
[After World War II] the imperialists hoped to change the correlation of forces in the world to their advantage by means of war against socialism. . . . The adventuristic strategy, which counted on the smashing of socialism and the national-liberation movement by the direct threat of atomic blitzkrieg, suffered failure (1st ed., II, 32).	[After World War II] the international bourgeoisie aspired by any path—either military action or an exhausting arms race and a situation of "cold war"—to, if not completely eliminate, at least essentially weaken its basic opponent, the world socialist system, and suppress the workers' and national-liberation movement. This adventuristic strategy suffered failure (2d ed., II, 31).
The imperialist states . . . widely prepare for a new world war (1st ed., II, 71).	The capitalist states . . . do not cease preparation for a "big" war (2d ed., II, 73).
The capitalist world in no measure has renounced the hope that socialism can sooner or later be defeated by the military path. . . . Contemporary imperialism in the full sense of the word is inseparable from militarism (1st ed., II, 381).	The capitalist world in the postwar years put special emphasis upon a "policy of strength" and "superior forces," on the military aspects of the struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries (2d ed., II, 399).

It might be argued that these changes too are tactical, but there are several indications that they are more than that. One of the more subtle alterations is the gradual decline in the use of the word "imperialism" as a synonym for modern capitalism in the second edition. As the title itself indicates, Lenin, in his pamphlet, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, had used the term "imperialism" as a synonym for "the highest stage of capitalism," for he believed the drive for

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colonies and war were an inherent part of that stage (and, of course, he realized the propaganda advantages of the usage). Subsequent Soviet scholars followed his lead, and the two expressions were treated as identical: a writer would swing back and forth between them simply for variety in expression.

By the time of the publication of the first edition of *The Political Economy*, Soviet scholars had come to differ in the degree to which they used "imperialism" and "capitalism" interchangeably. Older authors, especially those writing about foreign policy or economic relations in the Third World, still did so frequently. Younger authors, especially those writing about economic or social developments inside the Western countries, tended not to use the word "imperialism" at all.

In the second edition, there is a substantial reduction in the number of times imperialism is used as a synonym for capitalism. The "period of imperialism" sometimes becomes "all the twentieth century"; the Common Market has turned from an "economic group of imperialist states" or "imperialist integration" into "an economic complex"; the "imperialist camp" is now often simply "the capitalist world" (1st ed., I, 129-30, and 2d ed., I, 131; 1st ed., II, 56 and 134, and 2d ed., II, 54 and 133; 1st ed., II, 154, and 2d ed., II, 159). The process is not as complete as if there had been an order from above: for example, the number of times "imperialism" or one of its adjectival forms is used in chapter 1 has declined from 72 to 40, in the chapter on international relations from 145 to 80, and in the chapter on regional integration from 73 to 24.[11] Some of the authors with whom I talked hardly seemed aware of the change, but others recognized that it reflected a gradually growing feeling of dissatisfaction with the emotional connotations of the word "imperialism" and with the inevitable suggestion it conveys about the unchanging nature of Western foreign policy.

VI

The statistics on the use of the word "imperialism" are in many ways indicative of the difference between the two editions of *The Political Economy*. A significant change did take place, but there were many continuities as well. Earlier in this article, I quoted some very

[11] These statistics should be treated only as approximate. Aside from the possibility of minor errors due to miscounting, some uses of "imperialism" probably should not have been counted at all because they were quotes from Lenin, or were being used in the Western sense of the term rather than in the Leninist sense. Still, the number of times in which the only change in a sentence is the replacement of "imperialism" by "capitalism" is striking.

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traditional sentences from Inozemtsev's concluding chapter; similar passages appear many times over. The framework of both editions is Marxist-Leninist, and the moral condemnation of capitalism remains pervasive and unchanged in both. A section in which "concessions" to the workers are discussed will have assertions about the fundamentally exploitative nature of capitalism dispersed throughout; the author of a chapter about restraints on Western action in the Third World will still insist that the basic situation is one of neocolonialism; and the author of a section that acknowledges a more "realistic"—that is, less threatening—foreign policy will attribute it to the changing correlation of forces. Indeed, the only acknowledgeable reasons for which the capitalists are ever said to do anything praiseworthy are that their profits will increase, that their system will be strengthened, or that they have been compelled to do so.

The opinions expressed in *The Political Economy* are, of course, not universally accepted in the Soviet Union. The further one moves from centers that study or deal with the outside world, the more primitive the views are likely to be. Within the scholarly community, there are debates on a substantial range of narrow points, and one may find leading scholars who disagree with the central thrust of the analysis in the second edition. Thus, the scholar who wrote the chapter in the first edition on the trend of capitalist politics in a fascist direction (S. S. Salychev) has become the head of a section at the Institute of World History, and seems not to have changed his views in the least.[12] A deputy director of the Institute of World History, A. A. Iskenderov, is very doubtful about the ability of the capitalist governments to continue to control developments in the 1980s, and entertains the idea that capitalism is entering a qualitatively new stage of crisis.[13]

Attacks on the viewpoint of *The Political Economy* do not, however, come solely from the conservative side. IMEMO is, first and foremost, an institute of economics; it has relatively few scholars who are studying foreign political systems. When one meets scholars connected with other institutes or reads their work, one often has the sense that with respect to the center of opinion in political analysis, IMEMO is generally the more conservative institute. It is possible to hear and read a series of views far less traditional than found even in the second edition of *The Political Economy*: that workers are part of the industrial-mili-

[12] See, for example, Salychev's participation in a discussion on Social Democrats in Latin America: *Latinskaia Amerika*, No. 4 (July-August 1978), 95-98, and the response of others (e.g., pp. 143-46).

[13] *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir*, No. 3 (May-June 1978), 18-29.

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tary complex, that the Social Democrats of Europe "sincerely struggle" for the short-term interests of the workers (this is actually the position of Salychev, who, to be sure, continues to favor the "long-term" interests of the workers in revolution);[14] that American policy making should be seen in terms of a "triangle" between executive department, congressional committee, and interest group;[15] that Latin America is more like southern Europe than other Third-World areas and that its politics will become more and more European;[16] and so forth. In the realm of international relations, a number of the scholars of the Institute of the USA and Canada—especially the younger ones—have produced analyses of international conflicts whose explanations of events center almost exclusively on the national political interests of the countries or the personal political interests of their leaders;[17] these scholars openly call themselves political scientists (*politiologs*). Even in economics, the younger generation seems much more taken with Galbraith's ideas than *The Political Economy* would suggest.[18]

How Soviet views will evolve in the future and which of them will become dominant within the party are matters on which we can do little more than speculate. Much will depend on the politics involved in selecting the next General Secretary. Much will also depend on developments in the West. As indicated earlier, the second edition is somewhat more cautious than the first on the degree of control over business cycles because of the serious recession of 1974; and future economic developments in the West will affect everyone's views on the seriousness of the present economic difficulties.

To the extent that one can sense straws in the wind, they are in the direction of evolution away from old stereotypes. The more conservative authors of the first edition whose work was removed from the second tended to be older than those whose work was substituted; in the study of international relations, there seems to be a real genera-

[14] *Salychev* (fn. 12), 96.

[15] See, for example, *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, No. 5 (1977), 198-99.

[16] The general proposition was advanced forcefully in B. I. Koval', S. I. Semenov, and A. F. Shul'govsky, *Revoliutsionnye protsessy v Latinskoi Amerike* [Revolutionary Processes in Latin America] (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), but the discussion of political developments has primarily come in a series of published debates in *Latinskaia Amerika*, esp. No. 4 (fn. 12), 88-146. For a review by I. N. Zorina that spells out some of the differences between *Revoliutsionnye protsessy* and the IMEMO position, see *Latinskaia Amerika*, No. 6 (November-December 1975), 196-200. Also see Hough, "The Evolving Soviet Debate on Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* (Spring 1981).

[17] See, for example, some of the chapters in Iu. P. Davydov, ed., *SShA-Zapadnaia Evropa: partnerstvo i sopernichestvo* [USA-Western Europe: Partnership and Competition] (Moscow: Nauka, 1978).

[18] See Marshall Goldman's report in the *New York Times*, January 25, 1978, p. 19.

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tional difference within a number of institutes; on questions such as the evolution of Latin America and the Third World in general, discussions have become much freer and more sophisticated in the last five years. The views held in high places within the Central Committee apparatus are more difficult to ascertain, although, as indicated, the published judgment that the second edition of *The Political Economy* embodies the "correct orientation" was quite authoritative. Perhaps most interesting was the outcome when Iskenderov sent his conservative article to the journal *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir* (The Working Class and the Contemporary World). The editor, who was the head of the Communist Movements Department of the Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism, insisted on attaching a note that the article was being published for purposes of discussion. In the past such a note had always signified a fear that the article was too nontraditional. Now, it seems, the most traditional is also acknowledged to be controversial.

It is important to emphasize one major significance of the developments that have occurred to date. Those who believe that the Soviet leadership and elite have some master plan on how to take over the world on the basis of rigid ideological prescriptions simply do not understand the contemporary Soviet Union. It is they, and not the Soviet elite, who have become totally enmeshed in the ideological rigidities of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Many of the most fundamental propositions about the evolution of the outside world and about the way the outside world *should* evolve have become the subject of heated debate in the Soviet Union; only a part of this debate has been permitted to surface in print. It extends deep into the Central Committee apparatus, for top officials of the Central Committee serve as editors of books that take controversial positions, and they themselves publish books and articles that criticize others and are in turn criticized.[19]

[19] For example, the responsible editor for Koval', Semenov, and Shul'govsky (fn. 16) was V. V. Zagladin, deputy head (now first deputy head) of the international department of the Central Committee. One of the most active participants in the debates has been R. A. Ul'ianovsky, deputy head of the international department for the Third World during the 1960s and most of the 1970s. See the conference report in *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie*, No. 4 (1958), esp. 218 and 222, and particularly the exchange between A. U. Roslavlev (a pseudonym of Ul'ianovsky) and his critics in *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir*, No. 6 (November-December 1974), 103-14; No. 2 (March-April 1975), pp. 136-50; No. 1 (January-February 1977), 136-45. For criticism under his own name, see "O nekotorykh voprosakh marksistsko-leninskoi teorii revoliutsionnogo protsessa" [About some Questions of Marxist-Leninist Theory of the Revolutionary Process], *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, No. 4 (July-August 1976), 61-82. The article was a response to criticism by N. A. Simoniia; it should be emphasized that it was merely part of the debate rather than an authoritative Central Committee statement. Simoniia received an administrative promotion within two years.

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Moreover, the advocacy of economic reform in *The Political Economy* is one of the mildest ways in which this debate is linked with debates about the way in which the Soviet Union itself should evolve. Specialists on Eastern Europe often are not even Aesopian in the way they advocate the adoption of this or that East European practice.[20] Some of the best books on the Third World—and a number of them are very good indeed—contain discussions about Soviet developments in the 1920s that many readers are bound to find interesting in their own right,[21] while the analyses of Eurocommunism—implicitly, at least—touch on the question of the acceptable course of future socialist development.

Americans would be mistaken if they thought that any evolution in Soviet views—or even the overthrow of the Soviet system—would lead to a world without conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, as in the past, Soviet debates on the outside world continue to have considerable relevance to policy. Implicitly they deal with the degree of openness that the Soviet Union should display toward the outside world, the courses of development on which it should place its bets, and the degree of threat—military or otherwise—that the outside world presents. At a minimum, a world in which the two great superpowers begin to move away from ideological, rigid stereotypes and begin to have a more realistic understanding of each other and the rest of the world is one which has an increased chance of avoiding war between them.

[20] See the discussion and quotations in Hough, "Policy-Making and the Worker," in Arcadius Kahan and Blair A. Ruble, eds., *Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 380.

[21] Lev I. Reisner, *Razvivayushchiesia strany: ocherk teorii ekonomicheskogo rosta* [The Developing Countries: Outline of the Economic Growth Theory] (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 73-104.

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WHY DO COMMUNIST PARTIES ADVOCATE PLURALISM?

By PETER HARDI*

FOR more than a decade, the Italian Communist Party has advocated pluralism as an essential feature of a coming socialist society; several other Western communist parties have done so for nearly as long.[1]

The concept of political pluralism has been a familiar one in political science since the first decade of this century, and has appeared in different theoretical frameworks.[2] After the Second World War, pluralist concepts gained influence both in the United States as a group-theoretical approach (mainly as a rival of elite theories), and in Western Europe as the most important democratic framework opposing totalitarian power structures.[3] In the latter version, pluralist characteristics are

* I wish to express my thanks to Robert A. Dahl and Paul M. Johnson for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft.

[1] These parties include: the British Communist Party, the French Communist Party, the Greek Communist Party (so-called external wing), the Spanish Communist Party, the Swedish Left (communist) Party, in Europe; and the Australian Communist Party, the Japanese Communist Party, and the Venezuelan Communist Party (known as the Movement Towards Socialism, or MAS), outside Europe.

[2] Some of the most significant European works are: Ernest Barker, *The Citizen's Choice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937); Barker, *Political Thought in England 1848–1914* (London: Oxford University Press, 1915); Francis W. Coker, "Pluralism," in E.R.A. Seligman, ed., *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, XXII (New York: Macmillan, 1937) 170-74; Coker, "Pluralistic Theories and the Attack upon State Sovereignty," in Charles E. Merriam and Harry E. Barnes, eds., *A History of Political Theories. Recent Times* (New York: Macmillan, 1924), 80-119; John Neville Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State* (London: Longmans, Green, 1913); Harold J. Laski, "The Pluralistic State," in Laski, *The Foundation of Sovereignty* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1921), 232-49; Laski, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917); Ernst Fraenkel, *Kollektive Demokratie* (Berlin: Neuer Staat, 1929); Otto Gierke, *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht*, I, *Rechtsgeschichte der deutschen Genossenschaft* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1868); Hugo Preuss, *Deutschlands republikanische Reichsverfassung* (Berlin: Neuer Staat, 1923); Walther Rathenau, *Der neue Staat* (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1919); Joseph Paul-Boncour, *Le fédéralisme économique* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1901).

In the United States, see Charles A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1913); John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Chicago: Swallow Press, 1954); Ellen Deborah Ellis, "The Pluralistic State," *American Political Science Review*, XIV (August 1920), 393-407; George H. Sabine, "Pluralism: A Point of View," *American Political Science Review*, XVII (February 1923), 34-50.

[3] In Europe see, for instance, Ernst Fraenkel, *Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968); Karl Loewenstein, *Verfassungslehre* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1959); Wolf-Dieter Narr, *Pluralistische Gesellschaft* (Hannover: Niedersächsische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1969); Klaus Offe, "Das pluralistische System von organisierten Interessen," in Heinz Joseph Varain, ed., *Interes-*

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regarded as inherent in Western democracies and as the antithesis of existing communist political practice. At the same time, however, social scientists with a socialist or social-democratic background have tried to interpret pluralism as a transitional form leading to socialism.[4] In view of these antecedents, it may seem surprising that the communist parties of the West have described pluralism as something that should be realized in a socialist society. On the other hand, the parties of the existing communist countries unanimously refused, at first, to accept pluralism as a feature of communist politics and society. One might wonder, therefore, why social scientists and politicians of the Western democracies were unwilling to believe this new thesis of the communist parties. The debate is still going on.

The tenets of pluralism today appear in many articles, speeches, communiqués, and even documents of certain Western communist parties.[5] According to them, pluralism is a form of democracy. (De-

senverbände in Deutschland (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1973); Goetz Antony Briefs, ed., *Laissez-faire-Pluralismus* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1966); Günther Doeker and Winfried Steffani, eds., *Klassenjustiz und Pluralismus* (Hamburg: Hoffman & Campe, 1973).

In the United States, among some of the most significant works are Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science*, II (July 1957), 201-15; Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 52 (June 1958), 463-69; Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956); Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959); Kornhauser, "Power Elite and Veto Groups," in Seymour M. Lipset and Leo Lowenthal, eds., *Culture and Social Character* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961); Nelson W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of Leadership* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Raymond E. Wolfinger, *The Politics of Progress* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York: Knopf, 1951).

[4] Rainer Eisfeld, *Pluralismus zwischen Liberalismus und Sozialismus* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1972); Léo Moulin, *Socialism of the West* (London: V. Gollancz, 1948); Alexander Schwan, "Die Herausforderung des Pluralismus durch den Marxismus," in Doeker and Steffani (fn. 3), 441-81.

[5] See, for instance, Enrico Berlinguer, *Austerità, occasione per trasformare l'Italia* (Rome: Riuniti, 1977); Berlinguer, "For New Roads towards Socialism in Italy and Europe," *The Italian Communist*, Nos. 2-3 (July 1976), 54-65; H. Hamm, "Dokumentatio," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (March 27, 1976); Eric J. Hobsbawn, ed., *Il PCI: Intervista con Giorgio Napolitano* (Rome: Laterza, 1976); Pietro Ingrao, *Masse e potere* (Rome: Riuniti, 1977); "Joint Declaration by the PCI and the PCF," *The Italian Communist*, Nos. 5-6 (December 1975), 74-79; Lucio Lombardo-Radice, "Pluralismus in einer sozialistischen Gesellschaft," in Erich Kellner, ed., *Christentum und Marxismus* (Wien: Europa Verlag, 1966), 251-62; Lombardo-Radice, "Due forme del pluralismo," *Rinascita*, No. 7 (February 1976); PCF, *Le parti communiste français: vivre libres* (Paris: Édition de l'Humanité, 1975); Edoardo Perna, "Il Parliamento e il pluralismo politico-sociale," *Critica Marxista*, No. 6 (December 1975). See also various

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mocracy, as they define it however, is not identical with bourgeois democracy, just as pluralism is not identical with bourgeois pluralism.) It is a general democratic value that must also be present in an emerging socialist society. Pluralism is an indispensable requirement of socialism in all countries that have entered the late stage of capitalist development. It manifests itself basically as political pluralism—that is, as the pluralism of power. But it represents more than the legitimate activity of several—including even opposing—political parties: beyond the number of participants, its essential feature is the belief that all social forces, whether large or small, have an equal right to contribute to decision making and the shaping of life. Political pluralism, therefore, means more than a multiparty system; it involves both the right to create parties and the guarantee of the most diverse forms and possibilities of social and political participation. Pluralism expresses the idea that a society consists of multiple, partly contradictory forces and interests, which cannot be ranked by *a priori* decisions of the leaders of the political party in a privileged position.

The Western communist parties acknowledge pluralism of interest mediation and, deductively, the freedom of different entrepreneurial initiatives—that is, pluralism in the forms of ownership and in the economic sphere. Through the acceptance of pluralism in interest mediation, the parties commit themselves to the pluralism of ideas and values. They stress that no ideology can be exclusively valid and that every ideology is a multiplex, complex phenomenon that is formed by overlapping factors. Thus, they also acknowledge that even non-Marxist ideologies (and parties) can foster socialist practice. The conflict and the divergent orientations of the different components in the society are necessary conditions in democracies where the political framework guarantees the legitimate forms of participation and the legitimacy of diverse opinions, dissensus, and even opposition. As a result of these requirements, pluralism functions as a comprehensive framework of general human rights. One can therefore understand why the Western communist parties usually mention pluralism together with the problem of human rights.

The definitions of pluralism by some communist parties are usually no more than the description of this desired phenomenon. An analysis of its historical context and social determinants, or a theoretical explication of the relation between pluralist and socialist values, is becoming difficult to find. Moreover, it is surprising how predominant the jour-

reports and resolutions, especially of the 22nd and 23rd Congress of the French Communist Party, and of the 14th and 15th Congress of the Italian Communist Party.

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nalistic version of the concept of pluralism is in the international communist movement, and to what extent all critiques of the different theories and concepts of pluralism are ignored. Therefore, it is time to analyze these new concepts professionally, and to study the historical and social determinants of their appearance.

HISTORICAL CHANGES

In analyzing the idea of pluralism, one has to realize that not only is it a new concept of a coming socialist society, but that in part it is also new for the advanced Western societies and the international communist movement. Among the historical determinants of this new concept it is possible to distinguish between external and internal conditions. The historical events of world politics and of the international communist movement are external conditions; the institutional and procedural changes in economics, politics, and culture are internal conditions. In addition, some previously established trends in the history of ideas have contributed to the emergence of the new concepts.

The historical events in the international communist movement include the changes after the 20th Congress of the CPSU; the conflict between the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties and, as a consequence, the split in the international communist movement; the debates after the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968; and all the changes in party relations (starting with the activity of Palmiro Togliatti, the late secretary general of the Italian Communist Party, and including the new forms of bi- and multi-lateral relations of communist and labor parties).

In the area of world politics, the changes include the end of the cold war; the acceptance of "peaceful coexistence"; the presence of an international military balance; the weakening of anticommunist coalitions; and the significant extension of the mass basis of certain communist parties in Western Europe.

INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES

Beyond a mere recital of facts, it is possible to explore the social processes contributing to the appearance of pluralism, including the problems of both the advanced industrial Western and the industrial communist countries. Analysts usually refer to these problems as crises of the whole society or of its institutions and procedures. In the decades after World War II, some significant changes have taken place in the economics of the political and power institutions, and the cultural-

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ideological processes of both the advanced Western and the communist East European societies.[6]

1. In the field of economics, there is a need to develop new institutions and procedures, based on advanced technical and technological processes as well as on intellectual and material resources. These new regulatory mechanisms by no means indicate the end of private ownership and market regulations (which in Marxist revolutionary theory is considered to be a necessary condition for the transformation of the socioeconomic system); they would merely introduce a new stage in the economic structure of the Western societies (often referred to as the post-industrial stage),[7] which might offer new possibilities and perspectives for the survival of these societies. The most significant problems calling for change are the ecological and social distortions brought about by the current patterns of production and consumption —more generally speaking, the disfunctional uses of material resources which create our societal environment and tend to decrease our dependence on nature. (Some of the most striking consequences are the crises of the post-Keynesian economic regulators as well as those of energy supply and of the international monetary system.)

The communist countries, on the other hand, have reached a stage where the change from the "extensive" period of economic transformation to the stabilization of the established structures and to further, "intensive" expansion is inevitable. This change raises several problems in connection with the institutional inadequacy of the present regulatory systems—problems that are regarded by certain Western communist parties as crises of these economies (and interpreted by the East European communist parties as the problems of the transition to "advanced socialism"). The necessity of modifying or changing the economic regulatory structures in those societies is illustrated by the different experiments aiming to reform the economic mechanism or to combine central planning with market regulations into redistributive regulation.[8] An accompanying problem is that these communist coun-

[6] For more about the conception of institutionalized processes as an approach to analyzing human societies and their transformations, see Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon, 1968).

[7] First in Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

[8] Paul M. Johnson, "Political Development, Penetration, and the Politics of Economic Policy in the European Communist States," Ph.D. diss. (Stanford University, 1978); Andrew Martin, "Political Constraints on Economic Strategies in Advanced Industrial Societies," *Comparative Political Studies*, x (October 1977), 323-54.

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tries have given up their autarchy and are no longer insulated from the boom-and-bust cycles of the Western economies.

2. The changes in economic institutions and processes have transformed the social structure of the Western societies, and strongly affect their political and power institutions and procedures. New social forces and changed social conditions have created a new attitude toward interest articulation and mediation; they have transformed traditional aspirations and value systems. The traditional institutions of power and politics have been unable to resolve the new conflicts, and sometimes could not even fit the challenges into the existing political framework.[9] At the same time, there has been a fairly wide rejection of the traditional working-class institutions of protest.[10] (This rejection has contributed to the prevailing institutional changes within the communist parties themselves.)[11] The first manifestations of this political crisis were the student revolts of 1968 and the appearance of extra-parliamentary opposition; since that time, we have witnessed the activity of marginal groups challenging the political institutional framework itself, and the emergence of international political terrorism.

The political institutions of the communist countries seem to be very stable and to function well by routine. A challenge to the political institutions constitutes a challenge to the whole social system; a crisis in any political institution appears to be a crisis of the whole social system (which is probably a deep problem of the legitimacy of authority and the overlapping forms of power and authority in these societies). That is why the communist systems have always tried to minimize, or deny altogether, the legitimacy of oppositional activities. Because their political structures can be maintained only in the expectation of dangerous shocks to the society (such as in Hungary and Poland in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and again in Poland in 1970 and 1976), the parties have allowed no legitimate form of political

[9] Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, "Post-Industrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?", *Comparative Politics*, VI (January 1974), 163-91; Ronald Inglehart, "Policy Problems of Advanced Industrial Societies," *Comparative Political Studies*, X (October 1977), 291-98; Howard D. Lasswell, "The World Revolution of Our Time," in Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., *World Revolutionary Elites* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), 29-96; Richard Rose, "Models of Governing," *Comparative Politics*, V (July 1973), 465-96; Lester G. Seligman, "Political Elites Reconsidered," *Comparative Politics*, VI (January 1974), 299-314; Jürgen Weber, *Interessengruppen im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Munich: Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, 1976).

[10] Hobsbawn (fn. 5); A. Santini, "Intervista con Giorgio Napolitano," *L'Europeo*, February 6, 1976.

[11] Cf. R. Rossanda, "The Risk of Spontaneity and the Logic of the Institution: An Interview with J. P. Sartre," *Telos*, IV (Summer 1969), 191-205.

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opposition. They refer to problems of "advancing socialist democracy" and to the need to democratize the decision-making processes and institutionalize spontaneous and direct democratic activities, while still maintaining and strengthening the leading role of the Communist Party.

3. Problems of economics and politics affect the ideology and the culture of the West. The factors requiring the transformation of economic and political institutions and procedures also help to create a partially new cultural environment, with its own advantages and disadvantages. The emerging new intellectual and emotional-psychological claims—which sometimes register only as a multiplicity of pathological symptoms—challenge the traditional Western cultural patterns and require that new patterns be discovered and institutionalized. Problems manifest themselves in the functional inefficiency of cultural and educational institutions and of communication systems, the restructuring of artistic values, the rejection of traditional moral norms, and so on.

The consequences (and often the causes) of these problems turn on the ideological changes that generate new ideas on stabilizing or transforming society. One aspect of the present change is the "end of ideology" phenomenon itself. But in the West European context, the transformation of traditional ideologies is more characteristic, and the communist ideology is not an exception.

Problems of cultural institutions are not unknown in the communist countries. The systematically emphasized benefits of cultural revolution attest to the importance attributed to the creation of a new value system and cultural pattern. The insufficient propagation of the so-called "socialist ethics," of the "ideal of socialist man," and the explanation of this inefficacy through the thesis of historical materialism—namely, that "social consciousness lags behind social existence"—demonstrate the inadequacy of institutional processes for internalizing these values in individuals and groups. Various social groups, including the traditional working class, have not (or have only superficially) adopted the ideology and value system advocated by the ruling communist parties.

The parallel series of crises and difficulties in both types of societies challenge the traditional ideologies of the Western communist parties which try to present an attractive alternative to the majority or at least to significant strata of the society. In order to meet the challenge of new ideas as well as to establish a distinctive communist identity, these parties have begun to elaborate a new approach. According to their theo-

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retical analyses, the symptoms of a triple crisis in the West indicate the final global crisis of the capitalist societies, which will bring about the possibility of transition to democratic socialism. The parties at the same time are aware of the significant differences between this crisis situation and that of the traditional Marxist-Leninist theory. Their problem is the following: if a capitalist society displays the multiple signs of its ultimate crisis and it is time to transform it into a fundamentally new—socialist—society, why shouldn't they rely further on the classical revolutionary theory of socialist transformation, especially if it has a provision for peaceful transition? The first part of the answer is undoubtedly related to the problems of the existing communist societies. In the post-1917 history of communism, the elaboration of the classical Marxist theory (together with the peaceful version) has been attached to the transformations that actually happened in the communist countries. But if the transitions and revolutionary actions resulted in societies that are as problematic as they are considered to be by certain Western communist parties, then the theory is no longer appealing. Second, the parties recognize that even if they assume a revolutionary change in the Western societies, they have to expect a basic continuity in social, cultural, and even in political and economic structures. Therefore, they have been elaborating a new framework for conceptualizing the social transition, combining models that are sometimes referred to in the literature as "political economy" and "structural differentiation."[12] This framework is the theory of "transition to socialism in two steps," which centers on the theses of "structural reform" and "pluralism." The first step calls for carrying out the above changes in the Western societies, transforming their institutional and procedural settings without changing the "socioeconomic formation"; the second step refers to this latter transformation without giving details.

In sum, the commitment of these parties to pluralist values is supported by the continuity of democratic values in the society to be transformed, and by the irrelevance and inadequacy of the existing communist structures to the problems of the highly advanced industrial societies.

4. The new conditions could also come into existence through a change in international relations. The two great world systems—the communist and the capitalist—each have to face their own problems

[12] Phillipe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe," *Comparative Political Studies*, x (April 1977), 7-38.

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of political stability. Both want to maintain the status quo in the international arena and insist on "peaceful coexistence." Moreover, they depend on each other for a lasting solution of their respective economic problems. Therefore, a new system of international relations would also serve to stabilize internal institutions and procedures.

Coexistence also influences the international relations of the communist parties, and has introduced the possibility of the existence and tolerance of diverse views within the communist movement; thus, a kind of pluralism has been established in the movement.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The emergence of pluralist ideas in the international communist movement was facilitated by the fact that different theories and adaptations of pluralism provided a pre-established conceptual framework. Pluralist theory as elaborated by Harold Laski offered an alternative to theories of state sovereignty; its anti-authoritarian features were picked up by the neo-pluralists, and its group basis of politics by the modern American pluralist theorists. By the sixties, a generally accepted body of ideas represented the different versions of pluralism. These ideas included mutual agreement on the rules of the political game and the role of the political arena, the view that conflict is fundamental in the relations of the participating political and social groups, and the concept of bargaining and consensus in decision making. The most important operational consequence of these principles has been that the meaning of political pluralism is extended to more than the variety of groups that participate in decision-making institutions and procedures: it means that constitutional-juridical equality, or even equality of opportunity to participate, is guaranteed by a given social-political institutional system. These characteristics differentiate the new kind of socialist societies from the socialist societies established through traditional revolutionary processes. Thus, the communist parties have established a coherent theoretical approach that is suitable both for conceptualizing their criticism of the prevailing communist societies and for creating a common conceptual framework with their allies.

The Concept of Pluralism as a Part of the Communist Ideology

Although the pluralist theory of certain communist parties sometimes seems to be considered as an independent series of statements, it is an inseparable part of their contemporary strategy of the transition

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to a new socialist society, based on two fundamental sets of concepts: a reinterpretation of socialism itself, and a change in the conceptualization of the mechanism of transition to socialism. The former set describes an end; the latter, the means of realizing that end.

THE IDEAL OF SOCIALISM REINTERPRETED

The *re*interpretation of socialism as an ideal means that not only differences, but also continuity and similarities, exist between the present and the previous concepts—even if the parties profess that they are going to establish a kind of socialism that has never been seen before. In several respects, these parties advance a view of socialism similar to the traditional communist interpretation and to that of the parties in the existing communist countries. For example, socialism is regarded as the preparatory state for a society in which all social injustice and inequality and all forms of alienation are eliminated; in which the possible maximum satisfaction of intellectual and material needs, the social affluence arising from the universal development of production forces, and the free creative activity of all individuals are ensured and even established. To reach these goals, the common prerequisite is the cessation of exploitation and private ownership.

The differences, however, are responsible for the introduction of pluralist views. These differences do not really affect the purposes of socialist transformation, but they do affect the concrete functions of the transitional society. One major difference is that the Western communist parties do not want to wait for many of the ideal features of socialism that are expected to appear with the second step of communism. Their ideal strategic goal is to establish the Marxian program of a "really socialist," "really humanist" revolution. The attributes "socialist" and "humanist" refer to the guarantees of freedom and rights, to the elimination of social injustice and poverty, and to the respect for personal sovereignty and equality; the adverb "really" denotes the differentiation from the existing communist societies. The new concept, "socialism in freedom" or "democratic socialism," describes a kind of socialism in which the power mechanism and the decision-making processes differ from those in the existing communist societies. Formally, these views do not diverge from the classical communism that the parties still advocate; but the very fact that they are highlighted, and that the system already established in the Soviet Union and the East European communist countries is—at least partially—rejected, gives them a certain distinctiveness.

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A further difference arises from present conditions in the Western countries. The previous socialist transitions occurred primarily in societies with backward social and economic structures and in immediate postwar situations (to mention only the most striking differences); the present transition is expected to take place in advanced industrial societies during an era of coexistence. Therefore, the parties have been forced to elaborate a new ideal that not only takes these changes into consideration, but that is an appealing alternative to the present forms of Western society. While such an ideal has to rely on the values of the supporting strata that are deeply rooted in the existing social systems, it must also provide a perspective for solving social, economic, and cultural problems—i.e., for transcending the ideals of the Western democracies. But the "surplus" in ideal cannot be the traditional revolutionary one or the pattern of the existing communist societies. Therefore, the "surplus" offered is basically not a new idea of democracy or pluralism, but a kind of idealized version of both: the parties allege that the socialist transition would create a situation in which the conditions of democracy, pluralism, equality, and liberty would be more genuinely established than in the existing bourgeois societies. They even state that this is the "surplus" that will distinguish the future society from the present one. To put it another way: they declare not merely that the emerging socialist society will be able to maintain a pluralist structure, but also that this new order will be *better* able than the previous bourgeois democracy to translate the values and ideas of pluralism into actual practice.

A NEW APPROACH TO SOCIALIST TRANSITION

The new interpretation of the transition as a mechanism presupposes an international context, both in regard to military problems and to joint actions that may be necessary for realizing the transition. The multiple fields of cooperation and integration among West European countries restrict the possibility, and especially the success, of any violent action. The new premises require democratic structures, a guarantee of the continuity and even the extension of political and human rights, and the exclusion of the possibility of violent conflict. There is a direct link between the Chilean events of 1973 and the Italian communists' concept of historical compromise, which has been further supported by the events in Portugal. Transition without violence means parliamentary struggle and a general social contest by political means. The parties do not want to destroy the existing state mecha-

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nism; they want to utilize it for socialist transformation. That is one of the main differences between their views and the classical communist theory of transition.[13] In fact, they seem to create a reverse formula: in traditional theory (and practice) the party first seizes power and only then starts to implement its program of "socialist transformation" of the society; in the new version, the Communist Party first tries to transform society into a more advanced, partly socialistic stage, and then (or simultaneously) attempts to gain power by consensual means in a pluralist society. One can therefore understand why the main issues of debate on the transformation are the abolition of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the guarantees of human rights, and the pluralist power structure.

The consensual pluralist method, of course, makes the transition to a socialist society difficult. The communist parties may face serious difficulties because of political regulations. As the political processes are becoming more and more international, even the socialization of monopoly capitalist ownership can be effective only on the international level. Economic and political integration that is supported by military integration seems to be unfavorable to any socialist transformation, at least in the short run: although a communist party may gain or share governmental power, it is unlikely that it will keep that power for very long. Without giving up pluralist democracy, and in the absence of a civil war (which would most likely follow such an abandonment, and might involve a wider war because of military integration), it would be extremely difficult to maintain a "revolutionary" process. External conditions are highly unfavorable to any military solution, and the internal processes favor the preservation of the existing democratic institutions. Efforts to abandon them could cause the mass base of the Communist Party to diminish significantly, and provoke the formation of a broad coalition against the party (or even the possibility of an extremist solution). At the same time, because of international economic integration, a communist take-over could spell the ruin of the economy of any West European country. At the present time, therefore, the guarantees of the declared nonviolent and democratic-pluralistic efforts of transition are coexistence and the prevailing status quo on the one hand, and the international integration of the Western countries on the other.

[13] See V. I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," in Lenin, *Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1975) 238-327. It is interesting to compare the new theses of the Italian communists with the late views of Friedrich Engels; e.g., "Zur Kritik des sozialdemokratischen Programmentwurfes 1891," *Die Neue Zeit*, 1 (xx, 1892), 10-13; Ignazio Delogu, ed., *La Via europea al socialismo* (Rome: Newton Compton, 1976).

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THE PLURALIST POLICY OF ALLIANCE

Classical communist theories hold that the party, or even the whole proletariat, cannot win the revolutionary struggle without allies. Although the stratification of societies has significantly changed since the last century, the principles of alliance have not. Alliances usually come about through two types of interactions. One is a concrete *practical* alliance, which means a commitment to common action and a definite political line despite divergent ideas and divergent cultural, moral, and theoretical values. The motivation of such joint action is dissatisfaction with the prevailing situation (even if the ultimate ends of political activity are only partially similar). The other form of alliance is based on a convergent *ideological* basis, in disregard of divergent wishes of the communities and their political views and practices. In this case, the values and ideals will be revealed through the common criticism of existing conditions, even if these values involve goals and actions that are only partly identical. Thus, alliances are produced by congruence or similarity of social aims, positions, and interests, or by coincidence or similarity of humanitarian, egalitarian, democratic, and developmental values. The former criteria create the traditional alliance of all exploited strata; the latter create the possibility of enlarging the social basis of alliance. In several Western countries, the Communist Party is no longer an elitist party, but a mass party that expresses and mediates a plurality of interests.

The ideal structure of alliance has to be converted into a concrete historical situation. Specifically, this means that the real basis of an alliance is the desire to transcend institutional crises and to develop the economy further. The communist parties of the Western societies have to take several facts into consideration: (1) The communists cannot change the economic and military integration of Western Europe; at most, they can try to exert influence "in a socialist direction" by struggling against the international monopolies. (2) The economic boom and economic modernization have changed the life styles and value systems of workers and employees. (3) The effects of the political-social culture within a nation cannot be ignored. These insights have played a significant role in the CPI, and at present the Italian communists are the most consistent analysts of these phenomena. (See the continuity from Gramsci's concept of historical bloc to Berlinguer's historical compromise.)[14]

[14] Antonio Gramsci, *Note sul Machiavelli* (Rome: Riuniti, 1977); Congress of the Gramsci Institute, *Politico e storia nell'opere di Gramsci* (Florence: Istituto Gramsci, 1977); Enrico Berlinguer, *Unità del popolo per salvare l'Italia* (Rome: Riuniti, 1975);

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Alliances that combine different cultures, traditions, and values for political action favor a commitment to the general idea of pluralism; they create the framework for unity among Christians, socialists, communists, progressives, and for widespread social cooperation. Political pluralism creates the framework for a narrower unity based on political parties. The purpose of the Communist Party is to turn significant masses of the middle class against a narrow group of the "monopoly capitalist" bourgeoisie. Success depends on economic, political, cultural, ideological, moral, and even psychic factors, such as the presence or absence of influence exerted by foreign investments, the effects of participation in European integration, the international political situation, the tension of the internal atmosphere, the presence of terrorist actions, and so forth.

The pluralist-based communist policy of alliance presupposes that the only hope of a successful fight against state monopolism lies in isolating the monopolist interests and minimizing social support for them. In advocation pluralism, a communist party develops an identity of interests and values within, and with its allies, so that it can represent and mediate the interests of other social forces—sometimes even to the extent of subordinating communist interests themselves.

Although this pluralist policy of alliance has met with some success in Italy,[15] some serious problems arise concerning the leading role of the Communist Party and the working class (which has always been the *sine qua non* of communist theory). In theory, the problem is a pressing one because the convergence of interests, values, and aims that makes the new policy of alliance possible is limited. The common interests lie in preserving stable democratic institutions, in maintaining the institutional forms of humanist values, in providing a uniform economic growth, and in bringing about a more just redistribution of resources. The basic difficulty in this alliance stems from the fact that the Communist Party has to make an effort to establish a new model of economic and social processes and institutions—in other words, to prepare the transition to a socialist type of society—in addition to

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Giorgio Amendola, "The Italian Road to Socialism," *New Left Review*, No. 106 (November-December 1977); M. Fedele, "Spontaneità e pluralismo," *Rinascita*, No. 39 (September 1976); L. Lombardo-Radice, "Partito, lotta di classe e pluralismo," *Rinascita*, No. 44 (November 1976); F. Mussi, "Intelettuali e potere nell'Italia che combia—Il 'moderno principe' e il pluralismo," *Rinascita*, No. 30 (July 1976); P. Spriano, "Lo spettro dell'egemonia—il dibattito sur pluralismo e democrazia," *Rinascita*, No. 38 (September 1976); "Il PCI, l'Europa, il socialismo" (Tavola rotonda), *Rinascita*, No. 11 (March 1976).

[15] See a series of interviews with Italian communist mayors, "Communists in the local self-governing organs," *Peace and Socialism* (Prague), No. 10 (October 1977).

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managing the crisis of the existing institutional and procedural forms. This problem raises a question of strategy: How can the party influence social and political processes in favor of this goal? The most elaborate solution lies in the Italian communists' concept of hegemony,[16] which requires a kind of reverse course in political action (similar to the reverse formula of socialist transformation). According to this strategy, the rule of the Communist Party (and the working class) should not be reached by gaining power positions first, but by the continuous influence it exerts on the controlling and directing bodies of cultural, scientific, and economic life—by its presence in every influential field of social life. Here, however, one must be aware of the problem of combining hegemony and pluralism in the long run—especially if the Communist Party proclaims that it intends to relinquish power voluntarily after losing in a fair election (which means that the party abandons even the thesis of hegemony).

THE PROBLEM OF MODELS

The interdependence of pluralist views and the changed idea of strategy affects both the concept of international relations within the communist movement and the role of ideology, since the logical consequences of the assimilation of pluralist ideas manifest themselves in all fields of the party's position. If a change in thinking is already prevalent, it can and will penetrate all other segments of the established views.

The historical experiences analyzed in relation to the new policy of alliance have contributed to a reinterpretation of party relations in the international communist movement. All the experiments—from 1917 on, through the establishment of the People's Democracies in the late forties, up to the successful or unsuccessful European, Asian, African, and Latin American socialist revolutions and transformations—have been reconsidered and have influenced the pluralist thesis. By far the most pressing question of this reconsideration is the problem of the *model* (the concept of socialism as a universal model).

The new body of doctrine seeks to justify the pluralist ideas and to show at the same time why they can be regarded as a part of the communist ideology. Pluralism, however, cannot be fitted into the series of historical experiences generalized from the practice of the foremost communist countries. As a result, the Western communist parties have been compelled to question the general validity of previous

[16] Gramsci, "Il moderno principe: Egemonia (società civile) e divisione dei poteri," in *Note sul Machiavelli* (fn. 14), 156-85.

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experiences. They have debated the limits of past experiences and emphasized the role of national characteristics. They have abandoned the prevailing view according to which all the significant features of any future type of socialism can be abstracted from socialism as it exists at present. Thus, they have abandoned a single, unified conception of socialism (which had already been challenged by the significant "deviations" of the Yugoslav and Chinese parties). Instead, they have insisted on stressing the importance of different historical and social conditions and the uniqueness of the socialism they desire to shape. All previous experiences are regarded as irrelevant to their problems.[17]

Beyond these arguments lies the view that the supposed general laws of history and society have been conceptualized *a posteriori*, and that they must be modified to fit changes in different times and contexts. This interpretation means that even if there are laws (general experiences), they are valid only within the limits of a given historical period; when that period has passed, the laws must be transformed. Accordingly, the present communist strategies need not take the so-called general laws of socialism into consideration (though Leninist theory stresses that in applying the general laws, every party must pay attention to national peculiarities). The new strategies must therefore be shaped by basically different factors, and none of the new theses —including pluralist views—should be condemned simply because they were not part of the previous strategies. The laws are relative, *a posteriori* generalizations that change continuously (but again *a posteriori*) as a result of new experiences. Consequently, there is no model in any *a priori* sense. The only possible teleological structure is the ideal of socialism which is yet to be realized, and which differs according to the strategies of the Western communist parties. Experience must, of course, be taken into consideration. But, interestingly enough—and basically as a consequence of the elusive nature of the ideal—the Western communist parties regard as important lessons mainly those past experiences that they want to avoid. Insofar as they want to preserve their communist identity, these parties seek to justify their approach by pointing out the nonsocialist characteristics of the experiences they are now rejecting. Thus, they criticize what does not fit their ideal of socialism, even if it is an internal feature of an existing communist society. The new body of theory is therefore alleged to be the result of a thoroughgoing critical analysis of the existing communist systems

[17] See the numerous articles in *Rinascita* and *France Nouvelle* in 1977 and 1978, especially the ones by J. Kanapa and J. Ellenstein; see also S. Carillo, *Eurocomunismo y estado* (Barcelona: Editorial Critica, 1977); Jean Fabre, François Hincker, and Lucien Sève, *Les communistes et l'État* (Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1977).

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(especially of the Soviet system, which is usually regarded as the paradigm). These systems are now regarded as irrelevant, partly because of their unique and very different origin, and partly because they never abandoned the practices that contradict the requirements of the present Western communist parties—namely, the requirements of pluralism.

Such a point of view poses several problems. By keeping their distance from the Soviet model and experience, most of these parties do not necessarily (and at least not formally) wish to suggest that the Soviet and East European societies are not socialist. Among the factors that work against such an open split are the beliefs of their grassroots electors and the core of their membership, the fact that these policies were pursued for decades by the parties themselves, and even a fear of being isolated. In the cases of the Spanish and the Japanese Communist Parties, some of these factors are very weak, and the possibility of an open split does exist. As an intermediate solution, the Western communist parties refuse to recognize the existence of a universal model and the general laws of socialism. Without substituting anything else, without defining what socialist regimes do have in common—whether they are aware of it or not—they recommend the pluralism of models. If there is, however, a pluralism of socialist societies, there cannot be a single model. Thus, in accepting pluralism in social and political institutions and processes, the parties also admit the pluralism of international political systems.

Another serious difficulty lies in the lack of rigorous analysis from the standpoint of historical materialism, which is still the official philosophy of every communist party. This difficulty can lead to a change in the role of Marxist ideology. Before analyzing that aspect, it is important to examine the consequences that pluralism has on the concept of the institutional framework of the international communist movement.

THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONALISM

The heart of the debate is the Western communist parties' refutation of the classical concept of proletarian internationalism. From the original communist insistence on a universal model for socialism and on the validity of general experiences, it follows that the party that has the deepest experience for the longest time in creating a communist society must play the dominant role in the international communist movement. If, at the same time, that party's country is a superpower both in resources and military potential (and thus the safeguard of the communist world order), then the leading role of that country and that

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party in the international communist movement seems unquestionable. Yet, from the moment that country is no longer the sole representative of a communist society and the sole target of a unified attack by the whole hostile world, the unconditional solidarity of the entire movement is no longer vital. The existence and the significance of the movement no longer depends exclusively on that one country. It is therefore possible to challenge its leading role and the accepted practice and theory of proletarian internationalism.[18] For a long time, that practice had been based on the existence of a center and the noncritical and submissive behavior of all other parties. After the death of Stalin, and especially after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, some of the leaders of the non-Soviet communist parties began to change, or at least to challenge, this practice. The challenge was based on their re-evaluation of the activities of the Comintern and Cominform (including relations with the Yugoslav communists), the split between the Soviet and the Chinese Communist Parties, the negative consequences of military intervention in the name of proletarian internationalism in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and, finally, their discouraging experiences at meetings and conferences of the communist parties.

The rejection of the universal model and the reconsideration of the ideal of socialism, as well as the historical and ideological changes in the communist world movement in the seventies, culminated in the refutation of the notion of proletarian internationalism.[19] The West European parties now favor the polycentrism of the communist movement, the sovereignty and equality of parties, and bilateral or multilateral negotiations instead of conferences such as the meeting of the European communist parties in East Berlin in 1976. In sum, they favor the pluralism of the international communist movement. But in the present stage of the movement, this commitment leads to a "slippery slope." The parties have not ceased to regard themselves as part of an anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist world movement, pluralized though it may be. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is by its mere existence a decisive factor in that movement; it is usually supported by the Western communist parties, even if they arrive at that support by their autonomous decisions and their own will. The logic of the pluralist views, however, sooner or later leads them to question even this empirical

[18] Berlinguer (fn. 5); Berlinguer, *La politica internazionale dei communisti italiani, 1975–1976* (Rome: Riuniti, 1976); J. Kanapa, "Les caracteristiques de l'eurocommunisme," *l'Humanité*, November 29, 1977; M. Macaluso, "I tesi dei PCI e PCSU," *l'Unita*, July 5, 1977.

[19] Cf. Julio Luelmo and Henry Winston, *Eurocomunismo y Estado o la desintegración del P.C.E. y la ruptura con el movimiento comunista internacional* (Madrid: AKAL, 1978).

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leading role and refuses to allow an overlap between a superpower's interest and the interest of a national party in its effort to transform the society. That is why these parties prefer the principle of consensus rather than majority rule in any issue that concerns the international communist movement.

The interests of the Soviet Union and the Western communist parties further differ because the Soviet Union and the East European countries maintain official state relations with the capitalist states. It is to the advantage of the communist countries to keep these relations in equilibrium or even at status quo—a condition that is fundamentally opposed by all Western communist parties whose long-run aim is to transform these societies into socialist ones. Thus, these parties stress that their main contribution to the common cause of international communism is the promotion of the socialist transformation in their own respective countries and the support of all kinds of socialist transformation all over the world.[20] This point is expressed in the term *international solidarity*, accepted at the East Berlin Conference of 1976. The national struggle calls for analyses and tasks to be carried out only by the concerned party, and is known as the "national road toward socialism." Here, one can detect feedback: the more the parties become distinct from the existing models—that is, from the prevailing practices of the communist countries—the more they need internal support, which they try to gain by advocating pluralist views. By breaking with leftist radicalism (extremist and extraparliamentary forces) and restraining acute class struggle in spite of strong labor-union ties and traditions, they help to establish pluralist, consensual relationships with social democratic and Christian strata.

IDEOLOGY RECONSIDERED

Finally, it is important to examine the consequences of pluralist views on the concept of ideology. Communist ideology is not immune to changes. In the international labor movement, divergent ideologies and strategies have often led to great splits. The communist movement has not succeeded in avoiding that problem, even though after the formation of the Third Internationale, Marxism and the official ideology of the communist parties became identical—an identity that survived the split with Yugoslavia in 1948. Beyond the unquestioned authority of party ideology, communist identity was synonymous with the authority of the CPSU up to 1956.

[20] Delogu (*fn.* 13); cf. the French Communist Party's thesis on "socialism in national colors."

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Since 1956, and since the Soviet-Chinese split, more and more individual communists and organized groups and factions have challenged the authenticity of the communist parties' ideology: the rapid pluralization of "authentic" Marxist ideologies has seriously affected the views of the Western communist parties. It is clear now that neither one nor several communist parties can claim the right of exclusive interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory. Moreover, the Western communist parties consider Marxism to be a theory that is constantly developing, through the contributions not only of communists, but also of socialists, social democrats, and different Marxist groups and individuals—that is, through the plurality of the contributors.

In widening their theoretical horizons, these parties have recognized that they do not have an adequate theory to deal with the present crises of economic, social, and political institutions. At the same time, the effort to mobilize different strata of the society in alliance with the communists can be successful only if the traditional ideologies are not constantly confronted by a hostile Marxist ideology. Marxist ideology should be able to assimilate divergent aspirations and views. The Western communist parties cannot meet their aims of divergence without giving up their monopoly of ideology. Thus, Marxism cannot pretend to be the only scientific philosophy; it will be just one among other necessary and legitimate methods in the social sciences. The parties are thus opening communist ideology to the findings and viewpoints of different scientific and political views. In other words, they are establishing pluralism in the field of communist ideology.[21]

In applying the pluralist viewpoint to ideology itself, the Western communist parties have found a theoretical justification for abandoning the concept of a leading model, an authentic party, and all the related issues. If Marxism is only a critical, relativizing element of thinking and not the repository of truth, then no particular party or set of parties can claim a monopoly on communist theory, and no group can have unlimited theoretical power based on the thesis of "only one correct reflection of reality."

Conclusion

The communist parties discussed here have recognized some of the limitations of the traditional communist ideology and have tried to elaborate a more adequate program of social transformation.

These parties do not accept the existing Western industrial democra-

[21] L. Lombardo-Radice, *La Stampa*, September 16, 1977.

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cies as perfect societies, or the existing communist societies as the ideal of socialism. They cannot refer to the original Marxian ideal of a future communist society because of its controversial interpretations and its strong bias toward the Soviet and East European communist societies and parties. At the same time, they believe in the final crisis of capitalist society—though in practice, they have to accept its capacity to survive. Thus, they must find a common denominator in an ideal version of both the communist and the pluralist theory; the latter is the most acceptable non-Marxist social explanation.

A basic problem is that these parties are trying to adopt a theoretical framework at a time when it is problematic, if not obsolete. One could even say that they are trying to combine two theories, both of which are inadequate for conceptualizing and analyzing the present historical, social, economic, political, cultural, and ideological structures and changes.

Any of the characteristic theses analyzed in this study can be regarded as a consequence of a previously accepted paradigm of pluralism that affects the traditional communist tenets; conversely, all the changes in communist precepts initiated by the historical and social changes of the present societies involve pluralist views. These two interpretations cannot be separated; they create a feedback system in which one cannot separate unilinear causal series. The changed communist theses and the pluralist theses are mutually dependent, and this mutuality is supported by the fact that no strict chronology of consecutive pluralist theses can be reconstructed. Probably the first sign of a shift toward pluralism was the new interpretation of the communist movement (polycentrism);[22] the second was the discussion and the acceptance of pluralism as a theoretical and political model of a transient society;[23] but all that followed can be interpreted only as an interaction of pluralist and changed communist thoughts. Neither the pluralist ideas nor the changes in the communist ideology can be considered as independent variables.

In the international debate on a communist version of pluralism, one often hears the accusation that the advocacy of pluralism by communist parties is only a tactical trick to broaden their electoral base. If that were the case, it would not be worth the effort to analyze these theses. However, the systematic and logically coherent appearance of pluralist

[22] Palmiro Togliatti, *La via italiana al socialismo* (Rome: Riuniti, 1964).

[23] P. Ingrao, "Un primo dibattito sul pluralismo politico," *Rinascita*, No. 27 (June 1964); Ingrao, "Sul rapporto tra democrazia e socialismo," *Rinascita*, No. 21 (May 1964); Lombardo-Radice (fn. 5), 251-62.

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views in every segment of the communist ideology is evidence of the significant changes that have taken place in the theory advanced by these parties. The significance of these changes lies in their influence on the social, political, and ideological practices of the existing communist movement.

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Research Note

A COMPARATIVE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

By DAVID E. ALBRIGHT*

FOR more than two decades, a single underlying conceptualization has informed most of the research and writing on civil-military relations. The framework was first set forth in Samuel P. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*.[1] Accumulating empirical evidence, however, raises serious questions about the merits of these theoretical notions as a basis for comparative analysis. Such a state of affairs suggests a need for a fundamental reassessment of the conceptual framework within which much of the current discussion of civil-military relations takes place.

This article represents an effort at such a reassessment in light of the experiences of the sixteen communist states. It will review briefly the nature of Huntington's perceptions of civil-military relations and their influence on subsequent thinking with regard to the subject. Then it will look in some detail at the incongruities between the experiences of the communist countries and Huntington's theoretical views. Finally, drawing upon the experiences of these states, it will advance an alternative conceptualization of civil-military relations to the generally prevailing one.

The Predominant Conceptual Framework

In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington began with the thesis that "the existence of the officer corps as a professional body gives a unique cast to the modern problems of civil-military relations."[2] While he recognized that "prior to 1800 there was no such thing as a professional officer corps," he held that by 1900 "such bodies existed in virtually all major countries."[3]

* The views expressed in this article are the writer's and not those of the U.S. International Communication Agency or the U.S. government. He wishes to express his gratitude to Dale R. Herspring, Timothy J. Colton, and Peter Hauslohner for comments on the initial draft. However, they bear no responsibility for the final product.

[1] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).

[2] *Ibid.*, 7.

[3] *Ibid.*, 19.

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As a consequence of the emergence of a professional officer corps, Huntington went on, "the problem in the modern state is . . . the relation of the expert to the politician"—that is, "the cleavage between the military and civilian spheres." This "cleavage" produces "tensions" between the two spheres.[4] These tensions, in turn, raise the issue of "civilian control," for the members of the military profession "have specialized competence within their field and lack that competence outside their field." Specifically, politics, which "deals with the goals of state policy," is "beyond the scope of military competence."[5]

According to Huntington, "civilian control exists when there is . . . subordination of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy." On the one hand, the statesman acknowledges "the integrity of the [military] profession and its subject matter"; on the other, the military officer remains "neutral politically" and accepts "political guidance from the statesman."[6]

Changes in civil-military relations occur, in Huntington's eyes, when this balance is destroyed.[7] The latter eventuality, he contended, is more likely if civilian control rests on "subjective" as opposed to "objective" foundations. Subjective civilian control involves no firm boundaries between civilian and military authority but relies on a shared outlook and common modes of thought. Such conditions tend to prevail where there is a maximization of civilian power. Objective civilian control, in contrast, entails clear-cut boundaries between civilian and military authority. These are present when "recognition of autonomous military professionalism" exists.[8]

In a later examination of "praetorianism," or military intervention in politics, however, Huntington broadened his perspective somewhat on the factors that undermine civilian control.[9] Specifically, he conceded that "the political and institutional structure of society" rather than "the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment" pose the greatest threat to civilian control in countries "where political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action" are absent or weak. The more extensive the political participation in such countries, he added, the more complex the threat is, and the more difficult it is to counter.

[4] *Ibid.*, 20. [5] *Ibid.*, 70-71.

[6] *Ibid.*, 70-72. While Huntington couched the analysis in this passage in normative terms, it is clear from the ensuing discussion that he regarded his notion of civilian control as descriptive of actual conditions in at least some countries at some times.

[7] See, for example, *ibid.*, 98-124. [8] *Ibid.*, 80-85.

[9] See "Praetorianism and Political Decay," which appears as chap. 4 in Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

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Four aspects of Huntington's view of civil-military relations should be underscored for our purposes. First, he posited that military officers and civilians constitute two distinct groups (although he acknowledged that the latter, in particular, consist of a variety of subgroups[10]). Second, he saw relations between these groups as inherently conflictual in nature. Third, he held that what keeps the conflict within bounds is subordination of the officer corps to civilians except on matters requiring military expertise—in other words, civilian control. Finally, he perceived shifts in civil-military relations over time as a function of the degree of effectiveness of civilian control.

Even those general theorists who have subsequently found fault with elements of Huntington's analysis have not challenged these fundamental notions. Morris Janowitz, for example, has taken issue with Huntington's stress on "objective" institutional constraints as a determinant of civilian control, but Janowitz has accepted the general conceptual framework that Huntington advanced.[11] Bengt Abrahamsson has questioned Huntington's linkage of military professionalism and political neutrality, and for this reason Abrahamsson too has rejected Huntington's proposition that civilian control is most solidly entrenched where professionalism has been maximized. Nevertheless, he has not contested other features of Huntington's theoretical outlook.[12] Writers such as Eric A. Nordlinger, Amos Perlmutter, and Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Arthur K. Smith have at least implicitly adopted the position that Huntington's conceptual ideas do not offer much insight into the behavior of military, or "praetorian," governments once they emerge; yet these same authors have relied heavily on his concepts to define the basic character of "praetorianism." Nordlinger, for instance, has described praetorianism as the antithesis of civilian control and has argued that it arises when there is conflict between soldiers and civilian governors that leads to a breakdown of civilian supremacy.[13]

In light of this situation, it is hardly surprising that most of the concrete work done on civil-military relations over the last twenty years or so has followed lines suggested by Huntington's theoretical notions. There have been a variety of efforts, for example, to assess the

[10] Huntington (fn. 1), 80-81.

[11] See, for instance, Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1960).

[12] Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972).

[13] See Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Welch and Smith, *Military Role and Rule* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974).

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degree of professionalization of specific militaries.[14] Numerous other studies have examined individual militaries as interest groups within their local political systems.[15] Probably the most popular subject of inquiry has been the breakdown of civilian control and the intervention of the military in political affairs.[16]

[14] For purposes of illustration, see P. R. Chari, "Civil-Military Relations in India," *Armed Forces and Society*, IV (Fall 1977); Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army and Professionalism," *Problems of Communism*, XXVII (November-December 1978); Lyle M. McAlister and others, *The Military in Latin American Sociopolitical Evolution: Four Case Studies* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970); Amos Perlmutter, "The Israeli Army in Politics: The Persistence of the Civilian Over the Military," *World Politics*, XX (July 1968); Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

[15] See, for instance, Carlos Alberto Astiz, *Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969); Astiz, "The Argentine Armed Forces: Their Role and Political Involvement," *Western Political Quarterly*, XXII (December 1969); Henry L. Bretton, *Power and Politics in Africa* (Chicago: Aldine, 1973); J. Stephen Hoadley, *Soldiers and Politics in Southeast Asia: Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1975); Ellis Joffe, *Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949–1964* (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1965); John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964); Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967); Kolkowicz, "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds., *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1978); Ernest Lefever, *Spear and Scepter: Army, Police and Politics in Tropical Africa* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970); Ergun Ozbudun, *The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1966); Robin Alison Remington, "The Military as an Interest Group in Yugoslav Politics," in Herspring and Volgyes, *op. cit.*; Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (March 1968).

[16] See, for example, Henry Bienen, ed., *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968); William H. Brill, *Military Intervention in Bolivia: The Overthrow of Paz Estenssoro and the MNR* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1967); Thomas S. Cox, *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone: A Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976); Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Egon Fossum, "Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups d'Etat in Latin America," *Journal of Peace Research*, IV No. 3 (1967); Richard Higgott and Finn Fuglestad, "The 1974 Coup d'Etat in Niger: Towards an Explanation," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, XIII (September 1975); Morris Janowitz and Jacques van Doorn, eds., *On Military Intervention* (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971); C. I. Eugene Kim, "The South Korean Military Coup of May 1961: Its Causes and the Social Characteristics of Its Leaders," in Jacques van Doorn, ed., *Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968); Se-Jin Kim, *The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971); Michael F. Lofchie, "The Uganda Coup: Class Action by the Military," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, X (March 1972); Robin Luckham, *The*

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A few hardy souls, to be sure, have swum against the tide and expressed misgivings about the applicability of Huntington's concepts in particular contexts. Indeed, William E. Odom and Timothy J. Colton have even gone so far as to articulate alternative views of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union. Odom has set forth an institutional congruence approach rooted in the specifics of Russian historical experience, while Colton has offered a participatory model in which civilian authorities accord the military substantial say in political affairs to win military support.[17] None of these critiques, however, has directed itself to the general utility of Huntington's theoretical ideas. All have confined themselves to denying the merit of these ideas in an individual case.

The Experiences of Communist States

Despite the widespread assumption that his conceptualization of civil-military relations has comparative validity, Huntington did not in fact consider the communist states in formulating it.[18] Nor have subsequent writers on the theory of civil-military relations paid much attention to the communist countries. Yet the experiences of these states simply do not accord with Huntington's conceptual notions. Thus, they cast grave doubt on the comparative validity of the prevailing view of civil-military relations.

Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 60 (September 1966); José Nun, "The Middle-Class Military Coup," in Claudio Veliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); Robert D. Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," *World Politics*, XX (October 1967); Mauricio Solaun and Michael A. Quinn, *Sinners and Heretics: The Politics of Military Intervention in Latin America* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975); William R. Thompson, *The Grievances of Coup-Makers* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1973); Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., *Soldier and State in Africa* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

[17] Odom's position is laid out in "The Soviet Military: The Party Connection," *Problems of Communism*, XXII (September-October 1973), and the revised and expanded version of this article that appears as "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in Herspring and Volgyes (fn. 15). On Colton's participatory model, see his "The Party-Military Connection: A Participatory Model," in Herspring and Volgyes, *ibid.*, and Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

[18] The concrete data base from which Huntington generalized was essentially Western, and especially American, experience. Although he did talk about civil-military relations in Japan, he used the Japanese case simply to show the applicability of his theory to non-Western contexts; he did not employ Japanese experience either to derive his conceptualization or to test it. Indeed, his discussion of Japan in *The Soldier and the State* (pp. 124-39) is sketchy at best.

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In exploring this lack of "fit" in depth, it is useful to divide the discussion into two parts. The first part will deal with the character of civil-military relations in the sixteen countries that currently have communist governments, during the initial period after these governments came to power. Since communist takeovers occurred in all sixteen states during the 20th century—that is, within the time frame upon which Huntington concentrates—such a temporal slicing of experiences for analytical purposes does not seem to introduce any obvious distortions, and it facilitates the establishment of a base line from which to assess subsequent changes in relations. The second part of the discussion will cover shifts in civil-military relations in the sixteen countries over time, with particular attention to the causes of these shifts.

During the first phase of communist rule, not a single one of the states displayed a pattern of civil-military relations in line with Huntington's conceptualization. To begin with, there was no basis on which to distinguish between military and civilian authorities in Cuba during the early years of Fidel Castro's rule.[19] Castro's small guerrilla force that had operated in the Sierras in the late 1950s had not come into being under the guiding hand of a communist party. Indeed, the orthodox communist party in the country waited until the final months of the revolutionary struggle before it extended its support to the rebel army. Nor had the military band attempted to fashion a party organization of its own during its march to power. Thus, it was in essence the rebel army that took over political and administrative control of the state after the collapse of the Batista dictatorship in January 1959. This situation prevailed until the mid-1960s, when a formal party structure commenced to take shape.

Despite the absence of a party organization in Cuba, it is true, conflict was by no means unknown there during these years. But the conflict occurred within the ranks of the former rebel army—causing splits among those performing civilian functions as well as among those with strictly military roles—and it derived fundamentally from political disagreements about the direction of the revolution, not from battles over military professionalism. Moreover, Castro coped with

[19] For relevant analyses of the initial period of the Cuban revolution, see in particular Jorge I. Domínguez, "The Civic Soldier in Cuba," in Catherine Kelleher, ed., *Political-Military Systems: Comparative Perspectives* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1974); Louis A. Pérez, Jr., "Army Politics in Socialist Cuba," *Latin American Studies*, VIII (November 1976); William M. LeoGrande, "A Bureaucratic Approach to Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems: The Case of Cuba," in Herspring and Volgyes (fn. 15).

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such conflict by relying upon the personal loyalty of the majority of the rebel army to him and, secondarily, to his brother Raúl.

In the other fifteen states, separate institutions which can be identified as "military" and "civilian" in nature did exist from the opening period of communist rule, yet the relationship between the two institutions in these countries either lacked visible tension or was conflictual for reasons that had nothing to do with military professionalism. Circumstances in China, Yugoslavia, Albania, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos conformed to the former pattern, while those in the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and North Korea followed the latter.

Communist governments emerged in all the first group of countries basically as a result of local guerrilla struggles, and this fact explains much about the character of civil-military relations there during the initial post-takeover period.[20] Although the origins of some of these

[20] Information is less plentiful on the situations in some of these countries than on the situations in others, but it is good enough in all cases to sustain the argument set forth in the ensuing paragraphs. For pertinent discussions of the state of affairs in each country, see the following sources:

On China—Joffe (fn. 15); Samuel B. Griffith, II, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967); John Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); William W. Whitson, *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927–71* (New York: Praeger, 1973); Paul H. B. Godwin's contribution to the symposium on "Civil-Military Relations in Communist States: First Steps Toward Theory," *Studies in Comparative Communism,* XI (Autumn 1978); Jonathan R. Adelman, "The Formative Influence of the Civil Wars: Societal Roles of the Soviet and Chinese Armies," *Armed Forces and Society,* V (Autumn 1978).

On Yugoslavia—A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia,* Memorandum P-6070 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, January 1978); Remington (fn. 15), and also her contribution to the symposium in *Studies in Comparative Communism, op. cit.*

On Albania—Stavro Skendi, ed., *Albania* (New York: Praeger, 1956); Nicholas C. Pano, *The People's Republic of Albania* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968); Eugene K. Keefe and others, *Area Handbook for Albania* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971); Peter R. Prifti, *Socialist Albania since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1978), esp. chap. 10.

On Vietnam—George K. Tanham, *Communist Revolutionary Warfare: From the Vietminh to the Vietcong,* rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1967); William Turley, "Civil-military Relations in North Vietnam," *Asian Survey,* IX (December 1969); Turley, "Army, Party, and Society in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: Civil-Military Relations in a Mass Mobilization System," Ph.D. diss. (University of Washington, 1972); Turley, "Origins and Development of Communist Military Leadership in Vietnam," *Armed Forces and Society,* III (Winter 1977).

On Cambodia—Kenneth M. Quinn, "Political Change in Wartime: The Khmer Krahom Revolution in Southern Cambodia, 1970–1974," *Naval War College Review,* XXVIII (Spring 1976); François Ponchaud, *Cambodge Année Zéro* (Paris: Juillard, 1977); Timothy M. Carney, *Communist Party Power in Kampuchea: Documents and Discussion* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Southeast Asian Program Data Paper, January 1977); Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, eds., *Communism in Indochina:*

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guerrilla struggles were complex, the indigenous communist parties in the six states embraced and fostered the struggles as part of their own political strategies. That is, the parties sought to build up guerrilla armies as a means of seizing political authority and carrying out revolution. To further such ends, they conducted programs of political education and socialization within military units during the march to power. Thus, there was a high degree of congruence in the political values of the military and the party leaderships, and hence no reason for strife between the two on this score, at the conclusion of the guerrilla wars and the assumption of governmental control.

Another feature of the guerrilla struggles—namely, the absence of clear-cut distinctions between military and civilian roles—also removed military professionalism as a source of potential conflict in the early years after the winning of power. The waging of guerrilla warfare entailed substantial work to build popular support for insurgent forces, as well as straightforward military activity; consequently, commanders had to operate not only in a military but also in a political capacity. As an outgrowth of this imperative, the persons who actually served as commanders often wore two hats simultaneously. In addition to being military leaders, they held important posts in the hierarchies of their individual communist parties. After the parties had accomplished their revolutionary takeovers, the new situations that confronted them tended to reinforce such a blurring of military and civilian functions for at least a while. The organization of local administration and economic recovery from the ravages of war, for example, typically required major inputs from the armed forces during this period. By the same token, the reliance of all the new governments on some variant of "people's war" as their doctrine for defense against both internal and external enemies dictated continuing efforts by the military to foster close links with the local populace.

A specific aspect of the guerrilla struggle in Cambodia, it should be noted, did lay some groundwork for possible civil-military tensions

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New Perspectives (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1975); Zasloff and Brown, *Communist Indochina and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1978); Zasloff and Brown, "The Passion of Kampuchea," *Problems of Communism*, XXVII (January-February 1979).

On Laos—Joseph J. Zasloff, *The Pathet Lao: Leadership and Organization* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973); Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy, eds., *Laos: War and Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Brown and Zasloff, "Laos 1976: Faltering First Steps toward Socialism," *Asian Survey*, XVII (February 1977); Zasloff and Brown, 1975 and 1978, *op. cit.*; Joel M. Halpern and William S. Turley, eds., *The Training of Vietnamese Communist Cadres in Laos* (Brussels: Centre d'étude du Sud-Est Asiatique et de l'Extrême Orient, 1977).

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there in the wake of the military triumph in 1975. While the formation of a Cambodian Communist Party predated the rise of a revolutionary army, the party did not expand nearly as rapidly as the army during the years before takeover. According to one estimate, the party's membership at the time of the founding of the Republic of Kampuchea in 1975 stood at 1,000, while the military forces numbered roughly 70,000. Thus, the party amounted to little more than a guiding directorate. The party leaders could only decree national policy; they had to rely on the military forces to implement their wishes. Their unwillingness at the outset to acknowledge that a communist party existed points up their situation. They simply spoke in the name of *Angkar* or the "Organization."[21] Nonetheless, there is no evidence that the Kampuchean army ever actually posed a challenge to Pol Pot and his associates during the early months after the new government came into being. Rather, it seems to have faithfully executed the policies of the political leadership.

Communist elements in the second group of countries gained power in diverse ways, but the nine countries had one thing in common during the initial phase of communist rule that gave their civil-military relations a similar character. In all of these states, the communist party found itself facing armed forces at least portions of which held political values at odds with those of the new order. This situation bred mutual suspicion and distrust between party officials and the military and laid the foundation for direct conflict.[22]

[21] See Zasloff and Brown, 1979 (fn. 20). The estimate of membership in the party and the revolutionary army in 1975 appears in William Shawcross, "Cambodia Under Its New Rulers," *New York Review of Books*, March 4, 1976.

[22] Here again, the amount of precise information on circumstances in the different countries varies. For discussions of what is known with respect to each, see:

On the Soviet Union—John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History 1918–1941* (London: Macmillan, 1962); D. Fedotoff White, *The Growth of the Red Army* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944); B. H. Liddell-Hart, ed., *The Red Army* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956); Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), chap. 14; Colton, 1979 (fn. 17); Colton in the symposium in *Studies in Comparative Communism* (fn. 20); Adelman (fn. 20).

On the East European countries (German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria)—Ithiel de Sola Pool and others, *Satellite Generals: A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955); Stephen Fischer-Galati, ed., *Romania* (New York: Praeger, 1957); L.A.D. Dellin, *Bulgaria* (New York: Praeger, 1957); O. Halecki, ed., *Poland* (New York: Praeger, 1957); V. Busek, ed., *Czechoslovakia* (New York: Praeger, 1957); E. Helmreich, ed., *Hungary* (New York: Praeger, 1957); Dale R. Herspring, *East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949–1972* (New York: Praeger, 1973); Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political Socialization in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Framework," *Armed Forces and Society*, III (Winter 1977); Herspring, "Technology and Civil-Military Re-

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In the case of the Soviet Union, such circumstances reflected a distinctive set of conditions. The October Revolution of 1917 amounted to little more than an urban coup, and the Bolsheviks at that juncture did not have extensive military forces at their command. Therefore, as civil war erupted and spread, the Bolsheviks had to put together a Red Army in a hurry to prevent themselves from being swept from authority. The result was an amalgamation of diffuse elements, including officers who had served the Tsarist regime, and not all of these elements rendered the Bolshevik government unwavering support.

For the other eight nations, civil-military tensions had essentially the same roots. The communist parties in all of them were relatively weak at the time of takeover, and the establishment of communist rule resulted largely from foreign backing. Every country except Czechoslovakia, for example, had Soviet troops on its soil when a communist government came into being in it. And, even though there were no Soviet military forces in Czechoslovakia in 1948 when the local communists seized power, Prague's last non-communist leaders eschewed firm resistance to the coup because they feared that Soviet troops elsewhere in Eastern Europe might intervene in behalf of the Czechoslovak communists. Lacking sufficient trained cadres to meet the staffing needs of their local militaries, the new communist governments at the outset had to depend in part on co-optation of persons with military experience under prior rulers. Hence, the political loyalty of segments of the armed forces at the disposal of the communist governments was, at a minimum, open to question—especially in the context

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lations: The Polish and East German Cases"; Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political Socialization: The Case of Hungary"; Walter M. Bacon, Jr., "The Military and the Party in Romania"; A. Ross Johnson, "Soviet-East European Military Relations: An Overview," all in Herspring and Volgyes, (fn. 15); Dale R. Herspring and Walter M. Bacon, Jr., in the symposium in *Studies in Comparative Communism* (fn. 20).

On North Korea—Kiwon Chung, "The North Korean People's Army and the Party," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *North Korea Today* (New York: Praeger, 1963); Koon Woo Nam, *The North Korean Communist Leadership, 1945–1965: A Study of Factionalism and Political Consolidation* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1974); Ilpyong J. Kim, *Communist Politics in North Korea* (New York: Praeger, 1975); Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Nena Vreeland and others, *Area Handbook for North Korea*, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976); Chong-Sik Lee, *Korean Workers' Party: A Short History* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978).

On Mongolia—Robert A. Rupen, *The Mongolian People's Republic* (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1966); George G. S. Murphy, *Soviet Mongolia: A Study of the Oldest Political Satellite* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); Trevor N. Dupuy and others, *Area Handbook for Mongolia* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970); Ram Rahul, "Mongolia Between China and Russia," *Asian Survey*, XVIII (July 1978).

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of fairly widespread popular feeling that the road to power of these governments made them illegitimate.

In some of these eight states, however, the tensions seem to have been exacerbated by local traditions regarding the role of the military in political affairs. The German Democratic Republic provides perhaps the best illustration. Here, the historical tendency of Prussian military officers to try to exert influence in the political realm appears to have made the new communist government particularly leery of its armed forces, although the G.D.R. military gave no public sign of any inclination to follow this traditional path.

Since the opening phase of communist rule, each of the sixteen states has experienced some modifications in its civil-military relations, but these have not stemmed from fluctuations in the effectiveness of civilian control of the armed forces. They have resulted from a variety of other factors, of which we can identify seven.[23] Some of these have

[23] The ensuing analysis draws upon my "Civil-Military Relations: Developmental Contingencies," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, XI (Autumn 1978). For more detailed treatments of the developments mentioned—though sometimes within broad interpretive frameworks that do not coincide with my own—see the sources cited in fns. 20 and 22, plus the following:

On the U.S.S.R.—Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., *Political Controls in the Soviet Army* (New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954); Raymond A. Garthoff, "The Marshals and the Party: Soviet Civil-Military Relations in the Postwar Period," in Harry Coles, ed., *Total War and Cold War: Problems in Civilian Control of the Military* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1962); Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1966); Kolkowicz, 1967 (fn. 15); William R. Kintner and Harriet F. Scott, eds., *The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs* (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968); Thomas Wolfe, "The Military," in Alan Kassof, ed., *Prospects for Soviet Society* (New York: Praeger, 1970); David Holloway, *Technology, Management, and the Soviet Military Establishment*, Adelphi Papers, No. 76 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971); Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex—Does It Exist?" *Journal of International Affairs*, XXVI (Spring-Summer 1972); William T. Lee, "The 'Politico-Military Industrial Complex' of the U.S.S.R.," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXVI (Spring-Summer 1972); William J. Spahr, "The Soviet High Command, 1957–1967: Political Socialization, Modernization and Professionalization," Ph.D. diss. (George Washington University, 1972); William E. Odom, *The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Christopher D. Jones, "The 'Revolution in Military Affairs' and Party-Military Relations, 1965–70," *Survey*, XX (Winter 1974); Herbert Goldhammer, *The Soviet Soldier* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975); Edward L. Warner, III, *The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1977); Michael Deane, *Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977); Colton in Herspring and Volgyes (fn. 15); Colton, "The Zhukov Affair Reconsidered," *Soviet Studies*, No. 29 (April 1977).

On China—David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," *China Quarterly*, No. 18 (April-June 1964); John Gittings, "Military Control and Leadership, 1949–1964," *China Quarterly*, No. 26 (April-June 1966); Chalmers Johnson, "Lin Piao's Army and Its Role in Chinese Society," *Current Scene*, IV (July 1 and July 15, 1966); Juergen Domes, "The Cultural Revolution and the Army," *Asian Survey*, VIII (May 1968); *The Role of the People's Liberation Army* (Brussels: Centre d'étude du

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links with one another, but each is sufficiently distinct in both analytic and practical terms to merit attention.

1. *Circumstances under which a regime came to power.* In a number of countries, these circumstances have later led to specific sequences of change in civil-military relations. Cuba affords a prime example. The fact that Castro established control of the island without setting up a party meant that his regime then had to resolve the issue of whether to form one. If it did so, such a move would inevitably alter civil-military relations by tending to differentiate military and civilian roles. One

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outcome of the emergence of the Cuban Communist Party has been precisely that.

In Cambodia, the weakness of the party in comparison with the army left open to question the ability of civilian leaders to ensure the implementation of their policies. Any shift in the balance of strength between party and army, therefore, would obviously affect civil-military relations. Prior to the latter part of 1978, when an opposition Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation formed in eastern Cambodia near the border with Vietnam, the trend—insofar as one could determine—seemed to be toward growing party might, and this appeared to embolden the party to abandon anonymity and thereby implicitly to assert civilian supremacy in the nation.

The Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and North Korea lacked military organizations of unquestioned political loyalty at the outset of communist rule, and this situation encouraged the new regimes to undertake major rectification efforts. These efforts have proceeded in three stages, although not all nine countries have yet entered the final stage.[24] During the first, or *transformation*, stage, the chief aim has been to neutralize overt hostility toward the political system. In this context, the party-political apparatus within the military has played largely a loose supervisory or control role. That is, it has overseen the work of individuals not necessarily committed to the system to assure that their expertise is used to further party interests. During the second, or *consolidation*, stage, the primary concern has been to bring pressure to bear on the armed forces to internalize the party's value system. Thus, the party-political apparatus has intensified its supervision and control of the military, and there has been a corresponding politicization of all aspects of military life. During the third, or *maintenance*, stage, the political pressure on the armed forces has receded, for the party leadership has concluded that the armed forces are supportive of the regime under most conditions. The fundamental stress has been on the preservation of the existing situation. Consequently, the party-political apparatus has turned its attention mainly to helping military officers carry out their basic mission—for example, by providing assistance in dealing with the socio-psychological problems confronting a modern military organization.

While there have been regressions in this general process in some of

[24] The notion of a three-stage process is derived from Herspring and Volgyes (fn. 22). However, they label the three stages "transformation," "consolidation," and "systems maintenance."

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the states over the years, all of the states seem to be out of the transformation phase in the early 1980s. But only the Soviet Union, Poland, Mongolia, Hungary, and perhaps North Korea have moved into the maintenance phase. The Soviet Union initially passed into the latter stage in the late 1920s; however, Josef Stalin's suspicions that seeds of disloyalty still remained within the officer corps led to a reversion to the consolidation stage in the late 1930s. Another advance to the maintenance phase then occurred in the 1940s. Poland left the consolidation stage after the events of October 1956. Mongolia entered the maintenance phase in the early 1960s, and Hungary did likewise in the mid-1960s. Although the evidence is less than conclusive, North Korea may have reached the maintenance stage by the 1970s.

2. *Shifts in relations with outside powers.* Such developments have taken one of two basic forms: assertions of greater autonomy or major increases in dependency (perhaps in the face of some foreign threat). Those of the first type have occurred more frequently than those of the second. The best examples of the former are Yugoslavia in the late 1940s at the time of Belgrade's break with Moscow; Albania in the late 1940s when Tirana disassociated itself from Yugoslavia, in the early 1960s when it quarreled with the U.S.S.R., and in the late 1970s when it split with China; North Korea in the 1950s and early 1960s as Pyongyang established its policy of self-reliance and renounced both Soviet and Chinese tutelage; and Romania in the 1960s when Bucharest opted for a policy of independence from Moscow within the framework of membership in the Warsaw Pact and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. Illustrations of a more fleeting character include Mongolia in the 1950s as Ulan Bator sought to reduce Moscow's leverage by balancing Soviet influence with Chinese influence, Hungary in 1956 during its brief period of revolution under Imre Nagy, Poland in 1956 when Warsaw declared its autonomy in domestic affairs, and Czechoslovakia to some extent during the Prague Spring of 1968 (although both the army and the party were visibly divided over the Dubcek reforms). The clearest instances of increased dependency are Laos during 1977–78 when Vientiane strengthened its ties with Vietnam, Cambodia in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion of 1978–79, and Mongolia in the 1960s when Ulan Bator reverted to full alignment with the Soviet Union.

Not surprisingly, the two kinds of change have had opposite effects on civil-military relations. Assertions of greater autonomy have tended to encourage greater cooperation between local civilian and military

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elements and have often given military leaders substantial influence in the formulation of certain aspects of national policy, for local political leaders have had to rely on the indigenous armed forces to maintain internal order and sometimes even to protect the regime against military challenges from abroad. Heightened dependency, on the other hand, has usually moved civil-military relations out of the domestic realm and into the sphere of foreign policy. If the local armed forces have retained primary responsibility for keeping the domestic situation under control, these relations have continued to have an internal dimension, but the external aspect has still predominated.

3. *Alterations in the extent of functional specialization among the upper-echelon political elite as a result of local political and economic developments.* Two things about these alterations require underscoring. First, they have involved *levels* of role differentiation. The present communist regimes have characteristically exhibited different degrees of such differentiation among their high-ranking elite. In part, these differences have reflected the personalities of individual leaders. China's Mao Tse-tung, for example, had much greater interest in military affairs than Poland's Edward Gierek has displayed. In part, the differences have derived from specific historical circumstances. Governments that came to power through guerrilla wars, for instance, have tended to manifest less functional specialization among their upper-echelon elite than have governments that attained power by other means. Whatever the precise level of role differentiation among their top-ranking elite, however, many regimes have experienced major shifts of a common nature in the level of role differentiation.

Second, the alterations have stemmed from *political and economic factors* affecting the society at large. While Huntington held that changes in the degree of functional specialization take place in all countries over time and that these changes in turn have an impact on civil-military relations, he saw these changes as flowing essentially from technological factors. That is, he believed that with the increasing complexity of military tasks the capacity of civilians to deal with military issues diminishes; hence, there is greater potential for the effectiveness of civilian control to decrease. Moreover, he posited what are fundamentally one-way shifts in functional specialization: as military endeavors become more complex, role differentiation grows more pronounced. In contrast, the alterations in role differentiation referred to here have grown out of broad changes in the local political and economic environment. These include such things as the end of a civil or

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international war, a decision to decentralize the economy, and efforts to institutionalize the revolution. In addition, the shifts in the extent of role differentiation have occurred in two directions—that is, the level has both risen and fallen.

Increased functional specialization of the elite has been the more frequent phenomenon. Important changes of this kind took place in the Soviet Union during the 1920s after the end of the civil war and again during the late 1940s after World War II, in China during the 1950s in the wake of the conclusion of both the civil war on the mainland and the Korean War, in Yugoslavia during the 1950s after the break with the Soviet Union, in North Korea during the late 1950s with the close of the Korean War and Kim Il-sung's proclamation of "self-reliance," in Mongolia during the 1950s in the wake of World War II and the victory of the communists in the Chinese civil war, in Cuba during the 1970s as the Castro regime set up civilian bodies to institutionalize the revolution, in Vietnam during the mid-1970s after the triumph of communist forces in the South, and in Laos during the mid-1970s with the communist takeover and the subsiding of the civil war.

In several instances, however, the degree of elite role differentiation has gone down. The prime illustrations are the Soviet Union during World War II, China during the 1960s and especially during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–69, Yugoslavia during the latter 1960s at the time of the devolution of political and economic authority to the republics, and Romania during the 1970s in the wake of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and Bucharest's enhanced perception of threat from the Soviet Union.

These changes have produced similar effects on civil-military relations in the states concerned, but the precise nature of the effects has depended on the direction of the change. Where functional specialization has increased, the incidence of conflict between civilian and military elements has risen. Although persons with specialized roles in a political system may be in complete agreement about political values and ultimate societal goals, their involvement in distinct spheres of activity tends to color their perspectives on such things as priorities and means. Differences on these matters may in turn lead to policy disagreements and political strife. Where functional specialization has decreased, the amount of conflict between civilian authorities and the armed forces has normally declined, for the blurring of civilian and military roles has forced elites to consider a variety of viewpoints and to weigh trade-offs, thus making them less prone to disputes with one

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another. However, there is an exception to this rule: when a highly professionalized military has found itself suddenly thrust into activities that seem to undermine its professionalism, heightened tensions between civilian and military officials have resulted.

4. *The emergence of major factional political conflict.* Such conflict has arisen essentially among the political elite, although it has had ramifications in society at large if (as in China in the 1960s) the contending factions have attempted to mobilize popular support on behalf of their individual causes. Sometimes military elements have figured in the conflict from the outset; sometimes they have not. But they have normally become involved as the conflict has escalated and one faction or another has sought the backing of the armed forces to bolster its own particular position.

The best examples of factional political struggles that have affected civil-military relations in communist countries are Nikita Khrushchev's battle against the "anti-party group" in the Soviet Union in the mid-1950s; the strife among the Yenan, Soviet-Korean, and Kapsan groups in North Korea in the mid-1950s; the conflict between the Maoists and the so-called "capitalist roaders" headed by Liu Shao-ch'i in China during the first half of the 1960s; the strife among the national groups in Yugoslavia in the early 1970s; and the struggle between the Pol Pot and Hanoi-trained or -oriented groups in Cambodia in 1977–78. Other illustrations of a more tenuous nature include the battle between pro-Nagy and anti-Nagy forces in Hungary in 1956, the conflict over de-Stalinization in Poland in 1956, and the contest between Dubcek "reformers" and traditional hardliners in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The impact that the involvement of the armed forces in such factional political conflicts has had on civil-military relations has depended on the degree of unity within military ranks. If the officer corps by and large threw its weight behind one faction, its political influence tended to rise, especially if that faction eventually triumphed in the conflict. On the other hand, if there was a split in the officer corps and a corresponding extension of the conflict into the military sphere, certain elements in the officer corps typically gained in political stature as the conflict moved toward resolution, while others suffered eclipse and even outright purge.

5. *The bureaucratization of politics.* This development has several distinctive features. To begin with, the polity becomes laced with more or less lasting institutions, and individuals who work in those institu-

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tions manifest a reasonably high level of functional specialization. Shared perspectives rooted primarily in functional commonalities tend to promote various forms of group cohesiveness. While these functional commonalities normally have an institutional aspect, they do not necessarily embrace entire institutions and may even cut across institutions; thus, group cohesiveness rests on a more complex foundation than broad institutional identification. Group outlooks gain significance because political generalists, conscious of a need for expertise on many questions, seek advice from specialists. Since issues often require inputs from more than one group of experts and the views of different groups do not always agree, competition prevails among the groups for acceptance of their positions by political generalists. This competition takes place within prescribed legal parameters—i.e., essentially those of a one-party state here—and does not carry any anti-system overtones or pose any basic threat to the system.

A few additional things about such a development are important to keep in mind. Its characteristic features may emerge gradually; hence, it constitutes a process. This process is more likely to reach an advanced stage in large states or states with inbuilt complexities than in small, relatively homogeneous countries. Finally, the process, once it has passed a certain point, may be irreversible except through an overturning of the existing political system, although the evidence is not altogether conclusive on this matter. Certainly, the difficulties of reversal mount as the process unfolds.

In its advanced stages, this process produces a kind of politics which in some respects resembles that which Huntington deemed conducive to "praetorianism," but there is one crucial difference. The communist party serves as a mechanism through which group political actions get mediated, refined, and moderated.

As of the early 1980s, only three communist states exhibit a pronounced bureaucratization of politics that appears to embrace the military, and even these three countries have done so only fairly recently. They are the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev era, Yugoslavia since the mid-1960s (although group competition went so far in the early 1970s as to shake the foundations of the political system), and Cuba during the 1970s.[25]

[25] Since assessing the degree to which bureaucratization of politics has occurred in any country is far from a precise undertaking, some analysts may dispute these interpretive judgments. For discussions of some of the evidence on which they rest, however, see Jerry F. Hough, "The Brezhnev Era: The Man and the System," *Problems of Communism*, XXV (March-April 1976); Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How*

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This bureaucratization of politics has affected civil-military relations in a rather complicated fashion. Throughout the political system, it has acted as a counter to hierarchical patterns by fostering competition within institutions as well as between institutions. A group in one institution whose views on certain issues coincide with those of groups in other institutions may make common cause with these groups to enhance its own ability to oppose the policy recommendations of groups within its own institution that do not share its outlook. Thus, one finds competing aggregations of groups that span the civilian-military divide, in addition to those that pit civilian elements against military elements. Perhaps the best illustration lies in the so-called "military-industrial complex" in the Soviet Union. Such circumstances obviously heighten the complexity of civil-military relations.

6. *Changes in military doctrine.* Three fundamental types of alterations in doctrine have taken place: (1) from some version of "people's war" to conventional, modern war; (2) from conventional, modern war to a form of "people's war"; and (3) from non-nuclear to nuclear war. While some prominent Chinese and Albanian military leaders have advocated a doctrinal shift of the first kind, Yugoslavia has been the sole communist state to implement such a change. It did so in the late 1940s, particularly after the break with Moscow. Both Yugoslavia and Romania altered their military doctrines in the second manner during the latter 1960s and especially after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces in 1968. The Soviet Union introduced a doctrinal shift of the third type in the early 1960s.[26]

The precise impact of such changes on civil-military relations has varied according to the nature of the modifications involved. As far as the shift from "people's war" to conventional, modern war is concerned, the effect was to sharpen the line between military and civilian roles. Military officers no longer expended much energy worrying about the link between civilian morale and military performance or spent much time administering civilian-oriented programs; rather, they focused their attention on improving the capabilities of the armed

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the Soviet Union Is Governed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979); Remington (fn. 15); Dean (fn. 23); Rusinow (fn. 23); Edward Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy," *Problems of Communism*, XXV (January-February 1976).

[26] Besides the general works cited in fns. 20 and 23, see particularly Harriet Fast Scott's analysis and commentary in V. D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, 3rd ed. (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975); A. Ross Johnson, "Yugoslav Total National Defense," *Survival*, XV (March-April 1973).

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forces to fulfill military tasks. This "professional" orientation presented increased possibilities for a divergence in outlook between civilian authorities and the military on issues of mutual interest.

Change in the opposite direction—that is, from conventional, modern war to "people's war"—has by and large resulted in the reverse situation. Civilian and military roles have become less distinct, and the opportunities for a dissimilarity of views to emerge between civilian and military officials have tended to decline. However, the resentment that Romanian military officers have seemed to feel at being saddled with responsibilities that detract from their straightforward military duties may have offset this trend in Romania, at least to some extent.

The shift from non-nuclear to nuclear war has affected civil-military relations in complex ways. Generally speaking, it has further eroded the division between political expertise and military expertise, for it has fuzzed, on a global basis, the line between defense policy and foreign policy. (Previously, the two overlapped significantly for the Soviet Union only with regard to the Eurasian land mass, and especially Europe.) Thus, the military has found civilians advancing opinions on matters that the armed forces once deemed their private turf, and vice versa.[27] On the one hand, this state of affairs has created new potential for conflict; on the other, it has bolstered the mutuality of civilian and military interests.

7. *Threats to domestic order.* China during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966–69 and Yugoslavia during the nationalities crisis of 1971–72 afford the two clear illustrations of such threats. Cambodia after the outbreak of open hostilities between Vietnamese-backed Khmer rebels and the Pol Pot government in 1977–78 and before the overthrow of Pol Pot as a result of Vietnam's incursion into Cambodia in early 1979 furnishes another example, but the demise of the Pol Pot regime sets this example somewhat apart from the other two.

Three aspects of these situations bear stressing. First, the challenges did not originate with the armed forces, although in the Cambodian case dissident military units did eventually join the opposition to Pol Pot. Therefore, civilian control of the military in Huntington's sense was not at issue. Second, at least China and Yugoslavia have historically had political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and mod-

[27] For particularly revealing signs of the influence of the revision in Soviet doctrine on civil-military relations in the Soviet Union, see Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism*, XXIV (January-February 1975).

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erating group political actions, but factional conflict among the elite grew so acute in these particular instances that it caused a temporary breakdown in political authority and spilled over into the mass arena. Third, the military became involved in the strife at the invitation of one or more of the contending elite factions—normally the dominant one(s) in the central government. Since the armed forces wield the ultimate instruments of power in communist states, their backing was deemed essential not only to the re-establishment of internal peace but also to resolution of the elite conflict.

Threats to internal stability have typically led to an increased role in political affairs for the officer corps, whether they have sought it or not. While their additional involvement has taken both military and nonmilitary forms, it has invariably given them a larger voice in national policy. Furthermore, the officers have usually sided with those civilian elements urging measures to restore domestic order and preserve national unity, and the officers have normally resisted any reduction in their own influence after the accomplishment of these goals.

A Reconceptualization

If Huntington's conceptualization of civil-military relations and their dynamics does not hold up under comparative scrutiny, what sort of conceptualization will meet such a test? The experiences of the sixteen communist states afford a basis to put forth some concrete conclusions.

To begin with, it is imperative to think of military and civilian authorities in something other than dichotomous terms. While a high degree of differentiation of the two has been evident in the German Democratic Republic, for example, throughout much of that country's thirty-year history, the case of Cuba during the early years of Castro's rule illustrates that at times there is no meaningful distinction between them. Even where one can identify separate "military" and "civilian" institutions, the dividing line is frequently quite murky. During and immediately after the Cultural Revolution in China, for instance, military officers exercised political authority in the name of the Communist Party in many provinces, and the military constituted one of the three elements—along with leading party cadres and representatives of mass organizations—of the revolutionary committees designated by the central political authorities in Peking as their instruments of rule at the provincial and local levels.[28] The murkiness does not appear to reflect

[28] See Chang (fn. 23), both articles; Joffe (fns. 14 and 23).

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simply the degree of modernization of a particular society. Rather, it stems from a variety of factors, including such things as the state of order in a polity, national traditions, and a country's military doctrine.

Adoption of a continuum approach would seem to be the best way to encompass such diversity. From this perspective, the extent of differentiation of military and civilian authorities is seen as ranging from nonexistent at one pole to total at the other. At any given moment, each state falls somewhere between these two poles; however, its exact position can change over time as circumstances affecting it alter.

It is also essential to discard the notion that civil-military relations have some sort of inherent nature. While conflict may sometimes be the predominant feature of civil-military relations in specific countries, it by no means enjoys such a status at all times, in all places. Indeed, cooperation may often constitute the prevailing characteristic. One would be hard put, for example, to cite much evidence of civil-military strife in Hungary since the late 1950s. Nor can the general pattern of civil-military cooperation there be dismissed as simply the outcome of highly effective civilian control, for it appears to have had quite different origins. Specifically, it seems to have reflected the widespread apathy in Hungarian society toward the political process during these years.[29] In many instances, moreover, it is possible to discern elements of both conflict and cooperation in civil-military relations. The situation in Yugoslavia in the late 1960s and early 1970s provides a good illustration. In the wake of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Yugoslav military accepted the necessity of returning to a military doctrine based on the principles of partisan popular resistance, yet portions of the armed forces, especially officers of Serbian background, opposed any form of territorial defense in which local units would automatically have commanders of the major nationality or ethnic group in that territory—a position at odds with that of the leaderships in some of the republics, particularly Croatia.[30]

Here, too, a continuum approach would appear necessary to make sense of the complexity. In this framework, civil-military relations are viewed as ranging from total conflict to complete cooperation. At any given juncture, an individual state can be located at some point between these two poles; however, that point can shift over time in accordance with changes in the conditions relevant to the state.

Clearly, there is a connection between the two continua. That is, the degree of differentiation of military and civilian authorities in a particular country affects the extent to which that country's civil-mili-

[29] See Volgyes (fn. 22).

[30] See Remington (fn. 15).

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tary relations are conflictual or cooperative in nature. The fuzzier the line between military and civilian authorities, for example, the greater the probability that cooperation will dominate their interaction.

But the amount of differentiation of military and civilian authorities by no means constitutes the sole determinant of where a country's civil-military relations fall between the poles of conflict and cooperation. Our earlier discussion of the sources of alterations in civil-military relations in communist states suggests a number of other pertinent variables. These include: (1) the circumstances under which the government came to power, (2) relations with other states, (3) the extent of functional specialization among upper-echelon elements of the ruling elite, (4) the degree of factional strife within the governing elite, (5) the amount of bureaucratization of politics, (6) the country's military doctrine, and (7) the extent of domestic order. To this list must plainly be added (8) historical attitudes concerning the role of the military in political life. While such attitudes have not generated changes in civil-military relations in communist states, they have unquestionably had a bearing on the amount of tension present in those relations. In the German Democratic Republic, for instance, the Prussian tradition of military meddling in political affairs contributed to the communist regime's distrust of its armed forces during the early years of its rule. Nor should two factors to which Huntington calls attention—namely, (9) the institutional structure of society and (10) the degree of corporate interests of the military—be overlooked. Although the former has not caused the shifts that have occurred in civil-military relations in communist countries, it has definitely influenced the extent to which military and civilian elements have cooperated and/or clashed with one another. The experiences of China during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–69 and of Yugoslavia during the nationalities crisis of 1971–72 offer eloquent testimony on this score. In both cases, a temporary lapse in the ability of political institutions to perform mediating, refining, and moderating functions led to consequences that had a major impact on civil-military relations. While thus far corporate interests of the military have not visibly induced modifications in civil-military relations in communist states, such interests have developed to one degree or another in many of these countries, and in places like Romania and the Soviet Union, as we have observed, they have unmistakably affected the level of civil-military tension.

Alterations in any *one* of these variables, it should be emphasized, can bring about shifts in the degree of conflict and/or cooperation prevailing in a nation's civil-military relations. Yet the susceptibility of

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individual variables to change differs markedly. Historical attitudes concerning the role of the military in political life and the institutional structure of society, for example, tend to have a staying quality about them. If they undergo modification at all, they generally do so in a slow, evolutionary manner. Connections with foreign powers and the extent of factional strife among the ruling elite, in contrast, can alter abruptly and frequently, even over a rather brief time span. Thus, factors like the former ones appear to serve as basic conditioners of civil-military relations, while those like the latter ones constitute the prime shapers of the dynamics of the relations.

Furthermore, the predictability of the results of change is by no means uniform from variable to variable. Some variables have such deep roots in specific conditions that modifications in these variables have essentially unique effects from country to country. Alterations in traditions about the place of the military in political affairs afford a good illustration. At the same time, as we have seen, shifts in a number of variables seem to take place in common patterns and with similar consequences from state to state. For instance, an increase in functional specialization among the upper-echelon political elite promotes rising conflict between military and civilian authorities wherever it occurs, and a decrease in such functional specialization fosters additional cooperation wherever it manifests itself.

The foregoing conceptualization of civil-military relations suggests some imperatives for future research on the topic. In setting out to assess the character of civil-military relations in any specific context, one needs to recognize that these relations can range across a broad spectrum and that precisely where they fall on that spectrum at any given juncture depends on a multiplicity of variables. Focusing on merely one or two of these variables can produce a seriously distorted picture. Moreover, one must realize that the dynamics of that country's civil-military relations over time can be highly complex, for many factors can spark changes in these relations. Understanding the evolution of the relations, therefore, requires an effort to identify the full array of factors that have been at work in the particular situation.

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Review Articles

PROBLEM OR MODEL?
West Germany in the 1980s

By PETER J. KATZENSTEIN*

David Calleo, *The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, 239 pp., $11.95.

Lewis Edinger, *Politics in West Germany* (2d ed.; revision of *Politics in Germany*). Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977, 375 pp., $6.95 paper.

FOR the last 30 years, political analyses of German history have centered upon two sets of questions: Why World War I and World War II? Why Hitler and Auschwitz? These questions have invited what by now are familiar answers. Delayed political unification and late but rapid industrialization in the second half of the 19th century led to a combination of extreme military aggressiveness abroad and extreme political illiberalism at home. Such has been the conventional depiction of the "German problem."

The preoccupation with the German problem is gradually fading in the scholarly analyses of the Federal Republic. Fears are receding of a revival of German militarism and authoritarianism feeding on the sore issue of national reunification and reinforced by a downturn in the economic fortunes of the Bonn Republic. In the eyes of many, West Germany has succeeded in combining Anglo-Saxon liberalism with continental statism in a modern social welfare state. A successful capitalism and a stable democracy have emerged which provide other advanced industrial states with a "German model" of what their own future might look like.[1]

* Research and writing of this paper was supported by a grant of the German Marshall Fund. I would like to thank Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, Stefan Leibfried, T. J. Pempel, Martin Shefter, and Sidney Tarrow for their comments.

[1] Recent years have witnessed the publication of a growing number of English-language textbooks and bibliographies. Besides Edinger's *Politics in West Germany*, recent textbooks include David P. Conradt, *The German Polity* (New York: Longman, 1978); Gunther Kloss, *West Germany: An Introduction* (London: Macmillan, 1976); Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Donald P. Kommers, *The Governments of Germany* (4th ed.; New York: Crowell, 1975); Guido Goldman, *The German Political System* (New York: Random House, 1974); Kurt Sontheimer, *The Government and Politics of West Germany* (New York: Praeger, 1972); and Alfred Grosser, *Germany in Our Time: A Political History of the Postwar Years* (New York: Praeger, 1971). The most important English-language bibliographies include the first three volumes of Klaus

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This remarkable transformation in the interpretation of Germany from problem to model is reflected in David Calleo's *The German Problem Reconsidered* and Lewis Edinger's *Politics in West Germany*. Both books merit wide attention because they offer broad interpretations and thoughtful reflections on the course of German politics. Furthermore, both books provide this essay with the dual opportunity of re-examining the accepted interpretations of German politics and of thinking about West Germany's future. Both are self-conscious in describing the situation from the perspective of the late 1970s. Historical distance prompts both, for different reasons, to argue against the presumed uniqueness of Germany. Calleo emphasizes the unexceptional qualities of Germany's domestic politics; Edinger points to the new beginning since 1945. By looking at Germany in a broader comparative perspective both books search for general insights into politics. Calleo compares Germany primarily to Britain—the presumed opposite in internal development and international position—and finds few differences. Edinger compares West Germany to the other large advanced industrial states, but especially the United States; the problems they confront and their economic, social, and political structures look remarkably similar to him.

The books differ in a number of respects. Some of the differences are minor. Calleo's nine essays present a provocative thesis to the interested lay reader well versed in European history. Edinger offers a plausible theme in a textbook for North American undergraduates with little knowledge of either Germany or Europe. Other differences are of greater importance because they reveal that Calleo and Edinger travel different roads before reaching a common destination. Calleo adheres to the tradition of German *Realpolitik* and German Idealism; he emphasizes political conflict among states of unequal power, and the continuity and universality of power politics in international relations. Edinger is a product of Anglo-Saxon liberalism; he stresses the politi-

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von Beyme, ed., *German Political Studies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1974–1978), each of which includes an extensive bibliographical essay or bibliography; Douglas E. Ashford, Peter J. Katzenstein, and T. J. Pempel, *Comparative Public Policy: A Cross-National Bibliography* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1978), which contains a selected, annotated bibliography of West German material in eight public policy cases; Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, *Politics, Economics, and Society in the Two Germanies, 1945–1975: A Bibliography of English-Language Works* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978); Arnold H. Price, *The Federal Republic of Germany: A Selected Bibliography of English-Language Publications* (2d rev. ed., Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1978); David P. Conradt, ed., *Research Directory 1976* (Conference Group on German Politics, 1976); Gisela Hersch, *A Bibliography of German Studies 1945–1971* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972).

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cal bargaining among roughly equal partners in domestic politics, and the discontinuity of German history in 1945. The two authors thus reflect the traditional German distinction between the primacy of foreign policy and the primacy of domestic policy. Two different philosophical traditions, statism and liberalism, and two different professional perspectives, international relations and comparative politics, converge in the conclusion of each of these books: the transformation of Germany from problem to model.

I. The German Problem

David Calleo seeks to answer two questions. "Why, since the 1860s, has Germany been so often at war with its neighbors? . . . What made a Nazi regime possible in so advanced and civilized a country?" (p. 1). Through his answer, Calleo hopes to lend doubt to conventional, liberal interpretations of German politics (pp. 7, 157, 211). The originality of his perspective lies in his broad view of the German problem as "the problem of modern society in general" (p. 208). His analysis focuses on the explosiveness of modernity rather than on particular features of German culture, society, or politics (p. 206). Calleo draws two lessons: "Neither is particularly novel. The first is the fragility of all modern societies. . . . The second is the danger of 'overloading' the international system" (p. 157).

In Calleo's thesis, history and geography are the two main determinants of Germany's aggressiveness and illiberalism (pp. 6, 206). The Industrial Revolution instilled in Germany, as in all the major powers, a "power-hungry materialism characteristic of nineteenth-century culture everywhere" (p. 132). Calleo follows Gerschenkron in viewing Germany as a latecomer to the Industrial Revolution, distinguished not by unique aggressiveness but by unique success (pp. 24, 70, 73). In contrast to early industrializers like Britain, Belgium, and France, latecomers like authoritarian Germany or democratic America developed a distinct capacity for the design of large-scale organizations; and their definite preference for mercantilist policies was rooted in the changing character of modern industry (especially in steel and the science-based industries), rather than in any particular features of domestic politics (pp. 59, 64, 70, 72). According to Calleo, "it is hard to escape from the rather traditional Leninist view that Imperial Germany's international problem sprang less from its 'feudal' remnants than from the timing of its capitalist development" (p. 83).

The geopolitics inherent in the international state system is the sec-

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ond major factor explaining the German problem (pp. 126, 158-59, 206). Germany's belated unification under Prussian leadership in 1871 condemned her to the position of a political latecomer during the period of dynamic expansion characteristic of the other major powers. Unlike the United States and Russia, Germany simply lacked the space to become absorbed in continental conquest. Overseas expansion was blocked by existing empires, primarily Britain's (pp. 5-6, 24). In scraping the bottom of the imperialist barrel, Germany thus became guilty of aggression against the status quo (p. 50). With the rapid growth of her industrial might, such aggression almost inevitably changed from market competition to political conflict. Furthermore, German aggressiveness was not unique; others, like Spain and France, had in prior centuries pretended to continental hegemony (pp. 51-52). The Germans were not more aggressive; they were simply less fortunate. "Unlike the British, they did not find the world empty before them . . . their rise was too swift for the international system to accommodate without a major war" (pp. 83-84).

In developing his argument about the importance of history and geography, Calleo considers and dismisses the prevailing liberal interpretations offered by historians like Fritz Fischer, Fritz Stern, and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, sociologists like Ralf Dahrendorf, and political scientists like Karl Dietrich Bracher.[2] Calleo argues that, because they lack a comparative perspective and are impelled by a moral revulsion against National Socialism, their writings stress—erroneously in his opinion—particular features of Germany which are neither unique nor closely related to the German problem (pp. 58, 147, 148, 156, 217-18). "The German Problem," he states, "does not somehow emanate from some special German 'character' " (p. 206). Calleo considers and dismisses the three most prominent explanations of the "German exception" rooted in society, culture, and politics: (1) an atavistic feudal elite, (2) an apolitical philosophical tradition, and (3) a strong anti-Semitism. He concludes that "it cannot be established that Germany was inherently more prone to wickedness than other Western nations" (p. 126; also p. 59). In his criticism of the liberal interpretation, Calleo

[2] Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: Norton, 1967), and *The War of Illusions* (New York: Norton, 1975); Fritz Stern, *The Failure of Illiberalism: Essays on the Political Culture of Modern Germany* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971), and *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire* (New York: Knopf, 1977); Wehler, *Bismarck und der Imperialismus* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1969), summarized in "Bismarck's Imperialism, 1862–1890," *Past and Present*, XLVIII (1970), 119-50; Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969); Bracher, *The German Dilemma: The Relationship of State and Democracy* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

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succeeds brilliantly in examining the pieces of the German puzzle. For a variety of reasons, he is less successful in undermining the liberal interpretation as a whole.

(1) Calleo rejects Schumpeter's thesis (elaborated also by writers such as Veblen, Gerschenkron, and Barrington Moore) which fastens on the "traditional" Prussian Junker elite and its authoritarian politics, protectionist instincts, and militarist values as the prime cause of German militarism and illiberalism (pp. 73-84, 126-33). Relying largely on Kehr's study[3] of the passing of the first two Naval Laws of 1898 and 1900, Calleo develops instead an interpretation that stresses the political prominence of the self-confident "modernist" elements of German society: the industrial, commercial, and financial sectors that benefitted from the expansion of the navy and were ardent supporters of Germany's bid for world power. Although his interpretation serves the useful purpose of correcting the view of the Junkers as monsters with monocles, it is fundamentally flawed. His thesis of the dichotomy between "traditional" and "modern" elements in Imperial Germany passes too lightly over the political consequences of the coalition between iron and rye emanating from the tariff and navy debates. In his eagerness to challenge the view of the Junkers' dominance, Calleo errs by going to the other extreme of characterizing the politics of Imperial Germany as "plural and shifting as might be expected from so diverse and rapidly evolving a society" (p. 82). One could argue that the interest-group politics stressed by Calleo was less important than a uniquely German alignment of social blocs that encouraged militarism and illiberalism.

(2) Calleo also rejects the views of Bracher, Dahrendorf, Stern, and others who single out the effect of the Idealist tradition in German philosophy on the elevated notion of state-above-politics and the deep yearning for consensus in the body politic. In his impassioned defense of Idealism, Calleo finds this interpretation to be "excessive and . . . its diagnosis of German political culture . . . seriously distorted" (p. 148). He rejects as presumptuous and inaccurate the identification of German Idealism with authoritarianism, and of Anglo-Saxon Liberalism with democracy (pp. 151-57). For him, Idealism is part of the general rise of Romanticism which spread throughout Europe in the 19th century and has continued into our own. With some mischievousness, Calleo reminds us that Britain has a venerable tradition of political idealism. "Figures like Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet seem no less

[3] Eckart Kehr, *Battleship Building and Party Politics in Germany, 1894–1901* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).

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firmly rooted in British culture than the Viennese immigrants who did so much to revive logical positivism" (p. 153).

Calleo's argument is unconvincing for two reasons. First, in considering the ideological foundations of the German problem, Calleo looks principally at the philosophical tradition of Idealism rather than at Germany's political culture, and thereby misses the target. The historical analysis of Germany's illiberal political culture does not focus on the Idealist tradition but on its bastardization, which Fritz Stern calls *Vulgäridealismus*.[4] Second, in those parts of his argument which do focus on Germany's political culture, Calleo characterizes it as very different from Anglo-Saxon political culture. German Idealism, he points out repeatedly, failed in proclaiming itself universal. Anglo-Saxon Liberalism, by contrast, projected a mixture of British self-confidence and American exuberance which succeeded in its justification of the exercise of hegemonic power (pp. 115-16, 120-21, 206-7). Germany's political culture was marked by an inwardness that was based on a sense of cultural superiority and was inimical to the incorporation of the values of other cultures. For example, as late as the 1950s, West Germany's primary schools inculcated in this author's mind a sharp distinction between the superiority of German "culture" (as illustrated by Goethe) over modern "civilization" (as illustrated by chewing gum). Such inwardness and exclusiveness are traits that belong to the illiberal political culture that Stern and others have depicted as distinctly German.

(3) Finally, using Fritz Stern's recent *Gold and Iron* as a vehicle, Calleo tries to challenge the view of a uniquely German anti-Semitism as the cause of the German problem (pp. 133-46). He develops a typology of anti-Semitism that encompasses an individualized, objective type (expressing a reaction to individuals) as well as a generalized social type (expressing reaction to stereotypes); neither of these two kinds of anti-Semitism, Calleo argues, was or is in any way unique to German society (pp. 144-46). He finds that there is a third, "political," anti-Semitism rooted in the political needs of conservatives to build a mass political base for themselves. According to Calleo, political anti-Semitism was neither the dominant force among German conservatives nor the principal source of Hitler's appeal; moreover, it was not restricted to Germany. "It illustrates not so much atavistic reversion to ancestral racism as an abiding preoccupation with power" (p. 144). In other words, political anti-Semitism is a reflection of the "Faustian

[4] Stern (fn. 2, 1971), 17.

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lust after infinity" (p. 133) which characterizes bourgeois culture throughout Europe in the late 19th century. This argument is open to serious criticism. Power-hungry conservatives everywhere built a mass base in the late 19th century. Yet only in Central Europe did they rely on that explosive mixture of anti-modernist and anti-Semitic ideology which two generations later would bring about their own destruction. Even though anti-Semitism was not unique to Germany, its connection with the conservative strategy of mass mobilization was.

Calleo's attack on the established interpretations of the German problem is a brilliant failure. His argument about the importance of the international determinants of Germany's aggressiveness is compelling. Since, among all the countries that industrialized after Britain, only Germany has been at the center of two world wars, Calleo's analysis pushes us forward to ask further questions about the political consequences of different types of delayed industrialization and different geopolitical settings.

Calleo is not so successful in criticizing the "exceptionalism" of Germany's illiberalism. His eclectic use of some of the major interpretations of Germany's history is bound to raise eyebrows among historians. Calleo accepts, for example, Gerschenkron's focus on the timing of the Industrial Revolution, but rejects his interpretation of the Junkers.[5] He relies heavily on Stern's treatment of anti-Semitism, but neglects his work on political culture. And West Germany's social historians who have worked in the tradition of Fischer or Wehler will be astonished to find their views on Imperial Germany contrasted rather than aligned with Kehr's interpretation. More importantly, Calleo's book suffers from an inadequate use of the comparative method. Its exclusive focus on the Anglo-Saxon countries fails to uncover the ways in which Germany's domestic politics was different from or similar to the politics of other industrial latecomers, such as Italy or Japan. In Calleo's geopolitical argument, Britain and the United States are the proper focus for comparison; but in his argument about the unexceptional qualities of Germany's domestic politics, they are not.[6] Eclecticism and unease are to be expected and welcomed in a book offering new perspectives on an old problem. Yet it is baffling that throughout

[5] Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962), and *Bread and Democracy in Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943).

[6] In a few instances (pp. 54, 76-77, 105) Calleo refers to the importance of Germany's domestic politics. But his argument is weighted overwhelmingly in favor of the critical importance of international factors.

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this book Calleo denies the existence of any distinct aspects in the development of Germany's domestic structure which have a direct bearing on the German problem.

The reason lies in the book's hidden agenda, its criticism of Anglo-Saxon Liberalism.[7] Like all good comparative analysis, this work looks to the politics of another society in search for a better understanding of one's own. Calleo's treatment of Britain's policy in 1914 and in the 1930s leads to the conclusion that, in the face of crisis, muddling through was a deliberate method for concealing British determination to crush the German upstart (pp. 29, 34, 42, 47, 77, 97, 99-100). In contending for world power, British and German politics differed in style rather than in substance. But in contrast to Idealism, Liberalism's hegemonic ideology has provided to its allies (and historians) an ethical justification for the exercise of world power (206-7). "For it is not to Germany that we would go today to find the most egregious examples of ambitions outrunning resources, nor it might be argued, is it the Germans whose arrogant failure to adjust to a new world strains the international system beyond endurance" (p. 209). At bottom, Calleo's book is an attack on the pretensions of liberal hegemony. Its treatment of the German problem is thus both brilliantly single-minded and misleadingly one-sided.

II. The German Model

Lewis Edinger addresses two questions.[8]

> One is comparative: How heavy is the German accent? What distinguishes policy-relevant attitudes and processes in the Federal Republic from those in other advanced industrial societies with democratic regimes? The other question concerns the future development of West German politics. Will there be significant changes or will present patterns continue? (p. 351).

In arguing that the German accent is no longer distinct, his unequivocal answer to the first question agrees with Calleo. Although his re-

[7] See also Calleo, *Coleridge and the Idea of the Modern State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland, *America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National Realities* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973). Geoffrey Barraclough offers another critique of the liberal interpretation of German history which leads to very different conclusions. See his three articles in *The New York Review of Books*, October 19, November 2, and November 16, 1972.

[8] The difference between the first and the second edition of Edinger's book is substantial and reflects changes in the field of West European politics. The second edition covers questions of political sociology and political culture less intensively and instead devotes more attention to public policy.

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sponse to the second question is very tentative, Edinger's analysis emphasizes the stability and conservative orientation of the Federal Republic. The central purpose of this book is to render a descriptive characterization of what people in Germany these days refer to—sometimes with tongue in cheek—as the German model (*Modell Deutschland*). The broad lesson Edinger draws from his analysis is that of success. "The tale concerns a Great Dane that thought itself a little dachshund—and an ugly one to boot—because people refused to take it into their laps and pet it. Then came the day when the creature came across a mirror, realized its true identity, and henceforth played the big dog, looking down its nose on smaller ones" (p. 350).

In 1945—often dubbed "Year Zero"—the heroic, entrepreneurial victor of World War II who imposed order on the German chaos chewed gum and recreated West Germany in the image of the United States. Where Calleo emphasizes continuity and the importance of modern elements in the old Germany, Edinger stresses discontinuity and the importance of change (Calleo, 27-29, 211-12; Edinger, 76-77, 89, 94). To Edinger, the occupation years were "a process of reorganization and, to some extent, restoration" (p. 98). For the first time in modern German history, the Bonn Republic permitted a convergence of political conservatism with economic liberalism typical of the Anglo-Saxon countries.[9] Discontinuity was most pronounced in the political realm. Allied insistence on the dispersion of state power converted West Germany into a little America with its own brand of the separation of powers. And under American tutelage, the postwar party elite designed a system of popular participation that transformed national conservatism and prohibited the re-emergence of political anti-Semitism. In the private sector, change and continuity were more evenly balanced. The elimination of the Junkers and the army from the West German arena enhanced the political importance of a centralized business community and a centralized labor movement. The occupation, gladly accepted by an overwhelming majority of the Germans, thus imposed what Charles Maier has aptly characterized as America's vision of a "politics of productivity."[10] As a result, economic issues have remained central to both domestic and foreign policy throughout the history of the Federal Republic (pp. 44, 60, 63), and West German perceptions of the state

[9] Hans-Jürgen Puhle, "Conservatism in Modern German History," *Journal of Contemporary History*, XIII (October 1978), 697, 713.

[10] Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II," in Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

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have been demystified; the state is now viewed as a "giant impersonal corporation" whose performance should be evaluated primarily in terms of economic efficiency (pp. 99-100, 113). In sum, the impact of the occupation was to weaken the three traditional elements of German distinctiveness—its atavistic elite, its apolitical conception of the state, and its political anti-Semitism. "The structural switches had been thrown and policy choices locked into courses of action that promised to keep the capitalist train on track at maximum safe speed" (p. 43).

The decentralization of the West German state combines American political precepts (a strong federalism, judicial review, and an independent Federal Reserve) with the emerging political characteristics of the Federal Republic (the perpetuation of coalition governments, the growing importance of the Federal Diet [*Bundesrat*], and increasing judicial activism in policy making). Countervailing tendencies, to be sure, do exist. Bonn's "chancellor democracy" offers great power to the man at the top who has the instinct and talent to exploit the advantages of his office. And a complex system of interbureaucratic relations provides a substantial measure of effective policy coordination. Still, Edinger's detailed treatment of these subjects leads to the conclusion that, compared to the United States and its fragmented central government, "pluralism *within* the Federal Government has been far more pronounced in West Germany" (p. 266; emphasis in original). Recent studies have illustrated that this pluralism has created a reactive rather than an active West German policy in both domestic and foreign affairs.[11]

In sharp contrast, power in the private sector is centralized. "Interest associations are more inclusive, more tightly organized, and occupy a more privileged position in public policy processes than their American counterparts" (p. 211). "[T]raditional patterns of functional representation that bypass political parties have been complemented by the marked increase in collaborative interelite relations" (p. 219). The political foundations of the business community and of the Federal Republic are inextricably merged (pp. 42-43). A comparison is in order with the military in Latin America or the state bureaucracy in Japan: the credit that has accrued to business (rather than to the government or to fortuitous circumstances) for the "economic miracle" of the 1950s has provided it with a pervasive legitimizing myth. Business enjoys to-

[11] Renate Mayntz and Fritz W. Scharpf, *Policy-Making in the German Federal Bureaucracy* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1975); Helga Haftendorn, Wolf-Dieter Karl, Joachim Krause, and Lothar Wilker, eds., *Verwaltete Aussenpolitik: Sicherheits- und entspannungspolitische Entscheidungsprozesse in Bonn* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1978).

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day a "preeminent position in both economic and political life" (p. 223). A unified labor movement emerged in West Germany only in response to Fascism. The centralization of labor is less strong than that of business, but what matters is the political acceptance of the unions as a legitimate spokesman for the interests of organized and unorganized workers alike. Centralized and powerful interest groups are represented directly in the political parties and their "study groups" (*Arbeitskreise*), as well as in parliamentary committees dealing with matters of special concern to them (p. 221). And habit as well as the law assure these groups of privileged access to the state bureaucracy. In most cases, large institutions delegate political authority and limit political participation (pp. 157-59, 217). These arrangements have two consequences.

> First, they encourage behind-the-scenes interelite bargaining and accommodation among pressure group spokesmen and key public officials. . . . Second, these procedures induce the rank-and-file members of interest associations to depend on their formal representatives to obtain satisfaction for their policy demands and compel the constituent organizations of federal peak associations to rely on top interest group elites who have direct access to national policy makers (p. 216; see also pp. 248-49).

West Germany's party system serves to fuse a decentralized public and a centralized private sector. It provides an arena for elite collaboration as well as mass participation. According to Edinger, the West German "party state" (*Parteienstaat*) differs sharply from the "administrative state" (*Verwaltungsstaat*) of Imperial Germany, the "interest group state" (*Verbändestaat*) of Weimar, and the dictatorial "leadership state" (*Führerstaat*) of Nazi Germany. From the outset, political parties in the Bonn Republic enjoyed a "paraconstitutional" position; later they came to benefit from extensive state subsidies (pp. 168, 170, 174, 176). The party system provides the central arena for elite collaboration in policy making which occurs on a scale that was unknown to Germany's previous regimes. Before making significant decisions, the West German policy network consults with all of the important contestants for power (pp. 220, 222, 277-78, 290). "Many of the laws passed by federal as well as state parliaments have been the product of informal 'behind-the-scenes' agreements among leaders of nominally opposing parties" (p. 188).

At the same time, West Germany's party system also provides a forum for mass political participation. By and large, however, elite collaboration has withstood the pressures of electoral competition (pp. 186-87). Legal restrictions imposed on extreme opposition and very

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small parties, and a widely shared consensus "that policy-making is best left to 'experts'" (p. 142), are less important than the simple fact that "close to three decades of elite-controlled institutionalization had yielded orderly, unspectacular relationships between the rulers and ruled under a representative, liberal democratic form of government" (p. 165). The gradual implantation of the West German party state has led to the result that "electoral pressure group politics today carry less weight than in the early days of the Federal Republic" (p. 218). Political developments during the past three decades have not encouraged mass participation as much as elite collaboration.

Although rich in nuance, Edinger's descriptive analysis of West German politics suffers from one central weakness: its inability to bring into clear focus the dual character of West Germany's collaborative and competitive politics. For example, his description of the Federal Republic's policy network characterizes it as both open (p. 254) and closed (pp. 277-78, 290-91). The reason for the inconsistency lies in the pluralist framework that informs Edinger's analysis. Rather than structuring the real world, pluralism merely mirrors its complexity. The pluralism of social forces (pp. 101-2, 149, 207, 249-50, 252) and of bureaucratic factors (chapters 8 and 9) that emerges from Edinger's description builds into the analysis a perspective which stresses the elements common to West Germany and other advanced industrial states. But it fails to identify precisely and consistently how these common elements merge into a distinctive configuration of power.

The distinctiveness lies in the transformation of the West German party state (*Parteienstaat*) into a system of state parties (*Staatsparteien*) which, to some extent, resembles the postwar regimes in Italy and Japan.[12] Fifteen years ago, Ralf Dahrendorf discerned an elite cartel founded on anxiety;[13] its political manifestation was the official Grand Coalition of 1966–1969. Edinger describes instead an elite collaboration based on self-confidence; its political reflection has been the secret Grand Coalition since 1976.[14] In trying to overcome West Germany's two postwar recessions, both coalitions elevated consensus above

[12] Kenneth H. F. Dyson, *Party, State, and Bureaucracy in Western Germany* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977); Wolf-Dieter Narr, ed., *Auf dem Weg zum Einparteienstaat* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1977); Jürgen Dittberger and Rolf Ebbinghausen, eds., *Parteiensystem in der Legitimationskrise: Studien und Materialien zur Soziologie der Parteien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973).

[13] Dahrendorf (fn. 2), 252-65.

[14] The secret coalition since 1976 is due to the dominance of the CDU-CSU in the Federal Diet (*Bundesrat*) and its control over the arbitration committee which resolves conflicts with Parliament (*Bundestag*).

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confrontation. The fusion of Germany's statist tradition with the West German party state has transformed all of the major parties into instruments of responsible governance rather than of democratic participation. There is less to the partisan conflict between West Germany's administered people's parties than meets the eye. The Social Democratic Party's (SPD) Chancellor Schmidt as the West German synthesis of both "Reds" and "Experts" is the best Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Chancellor the Federal Republic ever had.

The diffusion of conflict and the demobilization of the electorate that derive from West Germany's state parties have created their own political opposition. With the exception of 1969 and 1972, electoral competition between the major parties in the 1960s and 1970s has revealed virtual unanimity in matters of political substance. The ideological intensification of the debate between the government SPD-FDP (Free Democratic Party) and the opposition CDU-CSU (Christian Social Union, Bavaria) stems in part from electoral pressures. It reveals an increase in the irresponsibility and irrelevance of partisan politics in the Federal Republic. The transformation of the West German party system to a bloc system in the 1970s has made intrabloc politics (within the SPD-FDP government and the CDU-CSU opposition) more important to the process of policy initiation than inter-party competition (between SPD-FDP and CDU-CSU). And the coordination of policies between the dominant political forces, which have moved each bloc further to the right, needs to be concealed with rhetorical flourishes in the interest of the electoral mobilization of each bloc's constituency. Ideological intensification is also due to the existence of opposition movements that question the basic consensus among party leaders and offer the prospect of electoral gains to a party able to accommodate them. In the 1950s, rearmament and nuclear weapons became the focus of a movement that was still related in part to the SPD (then in opposition). In the 1960s, emergency legislation and the Grand Coalition created its own extra-parliamentary opposition and boosted the strength of the student movement. In the 1970s, the number of people who have at one time or another participated in civic initiative groups (*Bürgerinitiativen*) is probably larger than the combined membership of all the established political parties. The "green parties" of the ecology movement, though small, are sufficiently attractive to some segments of the voting public to have an important effect on the delicately balanced relations in West Germany's two-and-a-half-party system. And the antinuclear movement is challenging the leadership of all the major parties on an issue of vital importance to West Germany's fu-

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ture. The combination of stability with unanimity in West Germany's state parties gives a unique twist to the dilemma of participation which, according to Edinger, is common to all advanced industrial societies (pp. 121, 141). West Germany illustrates with particular clarity that the contradictions of capitalist democracy are political as well as economic.

A cursory glance at other large advanced industrial states reveals the distinctiveness of the German model. Unlike Japan and France, West Germany lacks a radical labor movement and an assertive state bureaucracy. Organized labor in the Federal Republic is very much part of the dominant coalition, and the gradual politicization of the top civil service has further secured the position of party leaders. West Germany's social market economy, unlike the United States' and Britain's, lacks a sharp distinction between state and society and features an intimate fusion between industry and finance. And unlike Italy, West Germany shows no trace of political exploitation of the economy and the state bureaucracy by a conservative, broad-based coalition intent on defending its power against a Communist Party of growing strength. The smaller advanced industrial states like Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria approximate the German model more closely than the larger ones. Like West Germany, they have succeeded to an unusual degree in combining political stability with economic prosperity. Like West Germany, they have brought about important institutional modifications within a capitalist economy. And like West Germany, they have encouraged extensive elite collaboration without negating the effect of electoral competition.

The uniqueness of the German model has both international and domestic roots. The reduction in Germany's size after 1945 (rather than Social Democratic hegemony in the 1970s) introduced a relatively decentralized form of neocorporatism that has been distinctive also of some small European states such as Switzerland and the Netherlands since the late 1960s. And elite collaboration in a system of statist political parties and of social partnership between the business community and the labor unions is the West German contribution to a longstanding tradition of Central European political culture.[15] But despite its distinctiveness, the German model may well offer a common reference point for a political interpretation of other large advanced industrial states. Political change in statist or liberal forms of capitalism may be rendered more intelligible by measuring it against the loose neocor-

[15] Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government," *Comparative Political Studies*, x (April 1977), 91-126.

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poratist structures of the Federal Republic. Within their different political traditions, all large advanced industrial states are experimenting with institutional modifications of industrial capitalism. And, with the possible exception of Japan, the relative importance of these countries in the international economy is shrinking not only in objective terms, but also in the perception of their political elites. That is not true of West Germany. In the 1980s we shall not be able to overlook the effect of West Germany on others, be it as model or as problem.

III. West Germany in the 1980s

In what ways will the Germany of the 1980s differ from the Germany of the 1930s or the 1880s? The answer to that question depends in large measure on one's perception of the German problem or the German model. Calleo's and Edinger's provocative and plausible books, in moving away from the specialization of area studies, signal an important process of reorientation in the analysis of German politics. Political analysis now focuses on German politics not for the problem it poses but for the model it proffers. The emphasis is on the universality of the German experience rather than on its uniqueness. But the two books have a common shortcoming: their detailed analysis of the pieces of the German puzzle does not yield a sense of the whole. Neither work succeeds in sifting out that specific combination of political elements which distinguishes the Federal Republic from all other advanced industrial states. And neither work yields criteria for distinguishing between elements of continuity or change in either the German problem or the German model. In dealing with the West German future, Calleo relies on extrapolation and Edinger on indeterminacy in balancing continuity against change. Neither method is fully satisfactory. I would argue that, in comparison to the other large advanced industrial states, West Germany's distinctiveness lies in the divergence between an unusually large demand for change imposed from abroad and an unusually small tolerance of change acceptable at home. In the 1980s, West Germany is likely to become *both* a model and a problem.

Calleo's method of extrapolation is exemplified in his treatment of political change since 1945. He sees the global rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union as first narrowing and then resolving Germany's national question; he thus cavalierly dismisses the entire unification question in a few pages. A *Pax Americana* stunted the revisionist impulses of rump Germany by securing for it a com-

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fortable place in the liberal international regime of the postwar era (pp. 163, 165-69, 201). But the conditions favoring the evasion of hard choices between West Germany's national, continental, and global objectives are eroding. Pluralism in security politics and neomercantilism in economic affairs are the political manifestations of a rising new tide of nationalism (pp. 177, 187-88, 209). Calleo maintains that, because Europe provides the most natural solution to West Germany's conflicting objectives, the German problem is likely to experience its reincarnation in a European guise (pp. 7, 116-17, 119, 165-69, 202).

Although this argument is ingenious, it is implausible for two reasons. First, the rising forces of economic nationalism differ in the impact they have on different advanced industrial states. The internationalism of big business in West Germany is not declining: economic globalism is in the national interest of the Federal Republic. And a strong coalition uniting export industries with labor unions represents that interest forcefully. One of the political contradictions that stunted the further development of European unification in the 1960s and 1970s is thus likely to continue in the 1980s. The domestication of West Germany will not be achieved through a confederate Europe simply because the growing crosspressures between West German globalism and European protectionism prevent the emergence of a Europe of sufficient strength. And because of the unusual openness of the Federal Republic to the international economy, West Germany's globalism is likely to be exposed to increasing demands for change that are unrelated to her European connections.[16]

The question of German reunification is the second argument against a Europeanization of the German problem.[17] The existence of another German state ties the Federal Republic more intimately to political developments in Eastern Europe than any of the other advanced industrial states. Drastic political changes in East Germany could very quickly call into question the self-definition of the West German state and, somewhat more gradually, could lead to still another redefinition of the newfound West German national consciousness.[18] Like Prelate Seipel, the Catholic Chancellor of Austria's First

[16] See the recent special issue of *Leviathan* (No. 1, 1979), which presents some of the preliminary conclusions of a research team at the University of Constance; also the contrasting interpretation in Joachim Hütter's "Die Stellung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Westeuropa: Hegemonie durch wirtschaftliche Dominanz?", *Integration* (No. 3, 1978), 103-13.

[17] Wilhelm Bleek, "From Cold War to Ostpolitik: Two Germanys in Search of Separate Identities," *World Politics*, XXIX (October 1976), 114-29.

[18] Gebhard L. Schweigler, *National Consciousness in Divided Germany* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975); Abraham Ashkenasi, *Modern German Nationalism* (New

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Republic, West Germany's Social Democratic Chancellor Willy Brandt enunciated a doctrine of "two states in one nation," rooted in the traditional Central European distinction between a political and a cultural nationalism. Since the prospects for political stability and economic prosperity in the 1980s seem to be declining throughout the industrial world, be it capitalist or socialist, it would be imprudent to rule out the possibility of upheaval in Eastern Europe and the German Democratic Republic. Depending on the character of the national crisis, a resurgence of the unification question could become a rallying point either for the neo-conservatives in the CDU-CSU or for political forces to the left of the SPD. The political potential inherent in West Germany's globalism and nationalism suggests the distinctiveness of the Federal Republic in the 1980s: it is likely to be exposed to greater external changes than the other large advanced industrial states.

Because of West Germany's political stability, the possibility of a change in regime in the 1980s is rarely entertained. But when Edinger does think about the unthinkable, he expresses the traditional fear of what might happen to West Germany's democracy in times of economic crisis (pp. 166-67, 186-87, 356-58). His analysis is strong in enumerating the political conflicts that separate Left from Right in contemporary West Germany (pp. 51, 54-55, 116-17, 121-22, 158, 225-36, 252, 253, 260, 266). It is much weaker in evaluating the possible effects of these conflicts on German politics in the 1980s. Edinger's indeterminacy in addressing the future is rooted in his pluralist perspective. Since neither the right-wing radicalism discredited by the Nazi past nor the left-wing radicalism discredited by the East German neighbor provide useful thresholds for measuring a change of regime, Edinger ignores this task altogether.

A new regime could come about either by changes in mass participation or by changes in elite collaboration as the two defining characteristics of the Federal Republic. From the vantage point of the late 1970s, it appears unlikely that a coalition of the antidemocratic forces of prewar Germany could once again attract widespread popular support for the cause of fascism. Although the first economic recession of the Federal Republic led to sharp gains in the electoral strength of the neo-Nazi National Democratic Party (NPD) in 1966–1968, West Germany's Right failed utterly in exploiting the more prolonged and serious economic crisis after 1973. Similarly, parties to the left of the SPD

York: Schenkman, 1976); Louis L. Snyder, *Roots of German Nationalism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 278-91.

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have been conspicuous electoral failures throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The institutional form of mass political participation in West Germany is unlikely to be challenged in the 1980s. Somewhat more likely are realignments and possibly transformations in West Germany's system of elite collaboration. That collaboration is likely to continue functioning across partisan lines. In the 1950s and 1960s, the unions' and the CDU-led governments' effective cooperation was due in part to the incomplete implantation of the unions on the party's left wing. And in the 1970s, the business community had few problems cooperating with an SPD government whose Eastern policy opened new export markets and whose domestic economic policies since 1973 have been favorable to business.

The most probable source of friction affecting elite collaboration in the 1980s lies in the gradual erosion rather than the rapid transformation of the relations between the SPD and the unions.[19] The success of the stabilization policies of the SPD depends in large measure on the active cooperation of union leaders who have firm control over their followers. In the medium-term, the political compensations for union "responsibility" must exceed the mere prospects of an SPD government staying in power. If they don't, a growth of militancy at the base may eventually offset not only the political bargains struck at the summit, but alter also the institutional centralization of the entire system of elite collaboration. That does not mean that the German model is likely to contract the British disease. The legal constraints imposed on West Germany's labor movement, the self-perceptions of union leaders, and the nature of the ties between the unions and the parties all militate against it. But the complaint brought by the Employers Association before the Federal Constitutional Court in 1977 against the Co-determination Law of 1976, the subsequent official withdrawal of the unions from participation in West Germany's incomes policy in 1977, and the costly steel strike in 1978 indicate that West Germany's social partnership is not immune to gradual erosion. At the point at which such incremental change would change the role of the unions from a stabilizing factor (*Ordnungsfaktor*) to an oppositional movement (*Gegenmacht*), West Germany's entire system of elite collaboration would undergo a qualitative transformation.

Reflections about the possible causes and consequences of instability in West Germany are based on the political experience of the 1930s.

[19] Wolfgang Streeck, "Organizational Consequences of Corporatist Cooperation in West German Labor Unions: A Case Study," paper presented at the 9th World Congress of Sociology, Panel on Interest Intermediation, Uppsala, August 1978.

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But, short of truly catastrophic economic conditions that would transform political regimes throughout the advanced industrial world, the dangers confronting the substance (if not the form) of West German democracy in the 1980s derive not from the lack of stability but from its excesses. The German model faithfully reflects the very low tolerance exhibited by the West German population for all forms of political disorder (Edinger, 98, 208, 362). The ramifications of West Germany's monetary policy and her all-out attack on terrorism illustrate the potentially enormous political costs, both at home and abroad, that accompany the West German yearning for a degree of stability and security which will probably be unobtainable in the 1980s.

Hailed by many as the most important step on the long road to European unification in the past decade, the expansion of a system which pegged several currencies to the *Deutschmark* to a European currency bloc (European Monetary System, EMS) in 1979 was a West German attempt to create greater stability throughout Europe at the price of marginally higher inflation at home. The establishment of the EMS was feasible in terms of the Federal Republic's domestic politics because it met longstanding demands of the dissatisfied unions for monetary expansion, because it curbed the power of the central bank, and because the prospect of a minor devaluation of the *Deutschmark* against the dollar in European markets promised to slow down the general upward drift of the West German currency, which had become a major problem for the country's export industry. Internationally, the EMS was an attempt to insulate the Federal Republic, at least in part, from the deleterious consequences of a lack of American leadership by means of constructing a West European complement to the Eastern policy. The stabilization strategy underlying West Germany's mercantilism of the 1950s and 1960s was narrow. The policy of undervaluating the *Deutschmark* and of fiscal restraint collapsed together with the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates.[20] The stabilization strategy informing West Germany's internationalism in the 1980s is likely to be based on the quiet assumption of political responsibilities on a global scale. West Germany will not play the role of the strong locomotive pulling others out of their economic troubles. More likely, she will attempt to become the engine that switches trains in the yard and heads them in the direction of stability. The German model,

[20] Michael Kreile, "West Germany: The Dynamics of Expansion," in Katzenstein (fn. 10), 191-224; Wilhelm Hankel, "West Germany," in Wilfred L. Kohl, ed., *Economic Foreign Policies of Industrial States* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1977), 105-24.

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rather than the historical memory of two inflations, is the force propelling this stabilization strategy.

West Germany's policy of internal security complements her efforts of economic stabilization. Bismarck's reformist social legislation in the 1880s was a facet of his repressive anti-Socialist policy. In the 1970s, the SPD's policy of domestic security (*Politik der inneren Sicherheit*) complemented its policy of domestic reforms (*Politik der inneren Reformen*).[21] And forty years after the Nazis eliminated from the state bureaucracy and the professions what they regarded as subversive elements, an SPD government dedicated to the extension of democracy joined with the CDU-CSU opposition in imposing its own version of the *Berufsverbot*. This erosion of civil liberties in West Germany in the 1970s began as a defense against the alleged advances made by left-wing radicals and reformers in the educational institutions of West Germany. The erosion accelerated as the terrorist pressure of the Baader-Meinhof group and subsequent generations of Red Army cells galvanized the activities, both legal and illegal, of West Germany's modernized internal security forces and spawned the most advanced computerized method of citizen surveillance anywhere in Europe and perhaps in the advanced industrial world. Yet, the Federal Republic is still a *Rechtsstaat*. At the height of the terrorist wave, for example, the debate about preventive detention was brief, conducted in low voices, and restricted to conservative circles. Moreover, a recent debate within the SPD about the *Berufsverbot* may move policy back to a more liberal course at least on this one issue.

But the 1970s were noteworthy not for a courageous defense of liberal norms of privacy but for the speed with which traditional civil liberties were sacrificed in the interest of internal security. And this encroachment on West German democracy was inaugurated and supervised neither by authoritarian Junkers, nor aggressive generals, nor anti-Semitic Nazis. Well-intentioned Social Democratic reformers have legitimized political practices which under conservative auspices would have elicited much sharper political protests at home and abroad. West German democracy would be taxed to its limits, and perhaps beyond,

[21] Manfred G. Schmidt, "Die Politik der SPD- und CDU-Regierungen: Eine vergleichende Analyse der Politik der Länderregierungen in der BRD 1952–1977," paper presented to the DVPW-Arbeitskreis "Parteien, Wahlen, Parlamente," Neuss, February 1979, p. 27; Jane Kramer, "A Reporter in Europe," *The New Yorker*, March 20, 1978, p. 44-87; Günter Minnerup, "West Germany Since the War," *The New Left Review*, Vol. 99 (October 1976), 40-43; *Terrorism and Politics in West Germany* (Cambridge, CAPG, n.d.); Wolfgang Krieger, "Worrying about West German Democracy," *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 50 (April-June 1979), 192-204; Sebastian Cobler, *Law, Order and Politics in West Germany* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978); and Edinger, pp. 360-62.

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if it had to cope with the magnitude of civil strife of today's Britain or Italy. The question of internal security—like the issue of economic stability—thus illustrates the distinctiveness of the Federal Republic in the 1980s: West Germany is likely to have a lower domestic tolerance of change than the other large advanced industrial states.

The danger in the German problem was that it combined too much change within Germany with too little change outside. The danger in the German model may be that it blends too little change within Germany with too much change outside. If West Germany in the 1980s should become an inverted mirror of its past, the German model will again become the German problem.

IV. Conclusion

American attitudes toward West Germany have changed since 1945. Anxiety has been replaced by indifference; and indifference has given way to admiration. From a distance, West Germany's democracy looks stable, her economy prosperous, her politics bland. The specter of a revival of authoritarian nationalism has receded, and communism has chosen to contain its appeals behind concrete walls and barbed wire. Other countries make better copy. What are the politics of declining empires in modern times? What are the prospects of communism in democratic capitalism? Will state bureaucracies defend national autonomy in an international economy? Can social democracy combine equality with efficiency? These are the questions that excite the political imagination of those thinking and writing about the United States, Italy, France, Japan, Britain, and Sweden. Despite exceptions such as the books by Calleo and Edinger, the academic literature on contemporary West German politics lacks a certain focus. Like its subject matter, it is both competent and dull. Restoration of the brilliance and political relevance exhibited by the generation of emigré scholars who left so few American disciples requires a rethinking of the ways in which West Germany is a model and in which it is a problem. In that enterprise of intellectual reorientation, the conversion of the central premise of analysis into the central question may be as good a beginning as any. Will the cunning of West Germany's future point to the same lesson as the tragedy of Germany's past? Can democracy and peace be endangered by too much stability as well as too little?

In the 1980s, our attitudes toward the Federal Republic will be a mixture of pride and prejudice. West Germany is likely to become *both* a model and a problem. After a long hiatus, the advanced indus-

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trial world may well return to political normalcy. The "ungovernability" of democracy and the "crisis" of capitalism have, after all, been with us since the middle of the 19th century. West Germany is likely to stand as a model for those who wish to reap the benefits of the politics of productivity at home and abroad. She is likely to become a problem because of the manner in which she imposes the costs of her policies on marginal or dissenting sectors of German society and on other countries endowed with less industrial prowess and encumbered by more social conflict. Like all advanced industrial states, West Germany will have to confront the universal task of adjusting domestically to changes imposed from abroad. But her predicament will be unique: bringing in harmony an unusually large international demand for change and an unusually small national tolerance of change. In the 1970s, West German policemen in search of political terrorists and West German bankers in search of fiscal restraint became a common sight far beyond West German borders. Stability *Made in Germany* has become a distinctive trademark. The new Germany, like the old, is projecting abroad its distinctive (in)capacity for domestic adjustment. Ironically, the transformation of Germany from problem to model reaffirms an old maxim: when the Germans agree, others will worry.

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THE "COLOGNE SCHOOL" OF ELECTORAL RESEARCH

By RICHARD L. MERRITT

Franz Urban Pappi, *Wahlverhalten und politische Kultur: Eine soziologische Analyse der politischen Kultur in Deutschland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Stadt-Land-Unterschieden* [Electoral Behavior and Political Culture: A Sociological Analysis of Political Culture in Germany, with Special Reference to Urban-Rural Differences] (Vol. 1 of *Politik und Wähler* [Politics and Voters]). Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1970, vii, 145 pp., DM 17.30.

Hans-Dieter Klingemann, *Bestimmungsgründe der Wahlentscheidung: Eine regionale Wahlanalyse* [Determinants of Voting Decisions: A Regional Electoral Analysis] (Vol. 2 of *Politik und Wähler*). Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1969, viii, 303 pp., DM 37.10.

Max Kaase, *Wechsel von Parteipräferenzen: Eine Analyse am Beispiel der Bundestagswahl 1961* [Changes in Party Preferences: An Analysis of the Federal Parliamentary Election, 1961] (Vol. 3 of *Politik und Wähler*). Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1967, xii, 222 pp., DM 30.40.

Günter D. Radtke, *Stimmenthaltung bei politischen Wahlen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* [Nonvoting in Political Elections in the Federal Republic of Germany] (Vol. 10 of *Politik und Wähler*). Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1972, vi, 84 pp., DM 15.50.

Vera Gemmecke, *Parteien im Wahlkampf: Eine Analyse der Bundestagswahl 1961 im Wahlkreis Arnsberg-Soest* [Parties in the Electoral Campaign: An Analysis of the Federal Parliamentary Election of 1961 in the Voting District of Arnsberg-Soest] (Vol. 7 of *Politik und Wähler*). Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1967, x, 221 pp., DM 29.50.

Dieter von Herz, *Die Politik des verspäteten Machtwechsels* [The Politics of the Delayed Power Shift] (Vol. 6 of *Politik und Wähler*). Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1970, ix, 187 pp., DM 20.80.

Heinz Sahner, *Politische Tradition, Sozialstruktur und Parteiensystem in Schleswig-Holstein: Ein Beitrag zur Replikation von Rudolf Heberles: Landbevölkerung und Nationalsozialismus* [Political Tradition, Social Structure, and Party System in Schleswig-Holstein: A Contribution to the Replication of Rudolf Heberle's Rural Population and National Socialism] (Vol. 9 of *Politik und Wähler*). Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1972, viii, 144 pp., DM 28.80.

Jürg Steiner, *Bürger und Politik: Empirisch-theoretische Befunde über die politische Partizipation der Bürger in Demokratien unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Schweiz und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* [Citizens and Politics: Empirical-Theoretical Findings on the Political Participation of Citizens in Democracies, with Special Attention to Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany] (Vol. 4 of *Politik und Wähler*). Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1969, xiv, 292 pp., DM 35.00.

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World Politics 0043-8871/80/040599-24$01.20/1
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Thomas A. Herz, *Soziale Bedingungen für Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in den Vereinigten Staaten: Eine vergleichende Analyse der Anhänger der Nationaldemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und der Anhänger von Georg C. Wallace* [Social Conditions for Right-wing Extremism in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States: A Comparative Analysis of Supporters of the National Democratic Party of Germany and Supporters of George C. Wallace] (Vol. 12 of *Politik und Wähler*). Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1975, viii, 283 pp., DM 56.00.

Wolfgang Bick, *Mehrheitsbildende Wahlsysteme und Wahlkreiseinteilung: Zur Möglichkeit einer Korrektur des Bias* [Majority-creating Electoral Systems and Delineation of Electoral Districts: On the Possibility of Correcting Bias] (Vol. 13 of *Politik und Wähler*). Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1975, vii, 235 pp., DM 35.00.

WEST Germany in the 1960s saw the flowering of the "Cologne school" of electoral research. In 1961, Erwin K. Scheuch and Rudolf Wildenmann of the University of Cologne, with assistance from the late Gerhard Baumert of the commercial polling agency DIVO (*Deutsches Institut für Volksumfragen*), carried through the most extensive election study that had ever been done in the fledgling Federal Republic. Preliminary results appeared four years later in a special issue of the *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*;[1] in subsequent years, numerous students of Scheuch and Wildenmann (the latter had meanwhile moved to the University of Mannheim), as well as second-generation students, wrote doctoral dissertations using the 1961 data as well as those from later electoral surveys.[2]

The results of this research are far-reaching in terms of our knowledge about politics in the Federal Republic and, more generally, electoral behavior. The diversity of the studies that have appeared since the mid-1960s perhaps makes it unfair to treat them as mere parts of a single intellectual endeavor, as a "school" of electoral studies. And yet, they do have some things in common besides the use of the same sets of data and the guidance of Scheuch and Wildenmann. For one thing, the studies are tied together by an evident collegiality among their authors, in the sense that they refer repeatedly to each other's ideas and analyses.

[1] Erwin K. Scheuch and Rudolf Wildenmann, eds., *Zur Soziologie der Wahl* [On the Sociology of Elections], special issue (9/1965) of the *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* (Cologne and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965); see Merritt, review, in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 60 (June 1966), 438-39. Translations are by the author of this article.

[2] The data are available at the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung of the University of Cologne, the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research at the University of Michigan, and elsewhere.

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An even more significant commonality is their framework for approaching the study of electoral behavior. In American electoral research the approach would be termed "social-psychological," in the tradition of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. The goal of all the authors has been to investigate the extent to which various approaches—sociological, social-psychological, and rational (in the sense of orientation to issues)—help to provide explanations of why and how people vote. The results of their research support some of the findings of comparable research in the United States; in some cases, they will force American scholars to re-examine their premises and theories.

The importance of the Cologne school's findings for researchers in other countries justifies closer attention to some of its better products. In this review, I shall examine those published in the series "Politics and Voters," edited by Scheuch and Wildenmann, together with Ferdinand A. Hermens and René König. The article cannot encompass all the writings of former students at Cologne[3] or other scholars[4] who have used the Cologne data, or the wealth of scholarly articles that have appeared more recently, especially in the journal *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* and the recently terminated *Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik*, edited by Wildenmann.[5] I shall discuss three kinds of analyses: four volumes most likely to be of general interest to non-German students of electoral behavior; case studies on West German states; and explicitly comparative studies.

ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR AND POLITICAL CULTURE

Franz Urban Pappi focuses attention on the institutionalization of voting behavior and its contribution to the stability of German democracy. He has re-analyzed the Cologne study of 1961, most particularly the panel surveys conducted in July, September, and November among

[3] See Werner Kaltefleiter, *Zwischen Konsens und Krise: Eine Analyse der Bundestagswahl 1972* [Between Consensus and Crisis: An Analysis of the National Assembly Elections, 1972], Vol. 2 of *Sozialwissenschaftliche Studien zur Politik*, Publication of Sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungsinstitut der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Bonn: Eichholz Verlag, 1973).

[4] See esp. Erhard Blankenburg, *Kirchliche Bindung und Wahlverhalten: Die sozialen Faktoren bei der Wahlentscheidung Nordrhein-Westfalen 1961 bis 1966* [Religious Ties and Electoral Behavior: Social Factors in the Outcome of Elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, 1961–1966] (Olten and Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter-Verlag 1967), and Blankenburg's important article, "Die politische Spaltung der westdeutschen Arbeiterschaft" [The Political Division of West German Labor], *Archives européennes de sociologie*, X (No. 1, 1969), 3-24.

[5] The first four volumes of *Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik* contain numerous significant articles, many of them in English; see also *Comparative Politics*, II (July 1970), special issue on the West German election of 1969, edited by John H. Herz.

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eligible voters in four districts (with sample sizes of, respectively, 1223, 1179, and 1504), and has also used results from a 1965 survey to provide a temporal perspective.

Proceeding from a framework based on the writings of Talcott Parsons, Gabriel Almond, and Sidney Verba, Pappi develops his own notions of the requirements for a democratic political culture. Although he is quite aware of other forms and indicators of political participation, he concentrates in the first half of the book on voting as an indicator of the legitimacy of the political system, and in the second half on the significance of political integration at the local level for the development of national political identities.

The voting process, in Pappi's view, is a structural element of the polity: it makes possible not only generalized support for the system, but also the realization of unconditional loyalties and a mechanism for legitimating the positions of leadership. Democratic stability requires at a minimum that the voters' loyalty to the system grow commensurately with their motivation to take part in politics. It is preferable, of course, to have the largest possible number of active citizens committed to the prevailing set of democratic institutions and norms. Nevertheless, the presence of a substantial number of conforming subjects —"ritualistic" democrats who follow democratic practices without any particular sense of loyalty to them—is not necessarily harmful to the stability of the system. Indeed, such voters may provide an immobilist drag on overly hasty attempts to revamp the system. Active antidemocrats who can exert an influence on the political élite are much more dangerous.

Pappi's analysis leads him to conclude that the Federal Republic is well on the path toward stable democracy. Using as an indicator of political motivation the individual's own estimate of his or her political interest, he finds strong bivariate correlations with information about governmental procedures ($r = +.40$); the propensity to discuss politics ($r = +.58$); a feeling that voting contributes to political decision making ($r = +.54$) as opposed to being merely customary, a civic duty, or a waste of time; the view that electoral campaigns are absolutely necessary ($r = +.38$); and a rejection of the proposition that "politics ruins one's character" ($r = -.38$). In addition, voters who think that electoral campaigns are necessary are more likely than others to favor representative rather than direct democracy.

A closer look at the characteristics of the respondents suggests some more interesting hypotheses. (The breakdown produced cells with such small populations that the findings must be interpreted with cau-

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tion—a point to be discussed later.) For example, higher levels of education correlate with a greater degree of loyalty to national political norms and institutions. Other studies cause Pappi to wonder whether this loyalty is more than a "rational conformity to the current democratic form of government." The fact that the more highly educated seem more resistant than others to the notions that political conflicts should be brought out into the open and that a fully differentiated polity has certain tasks poses a potential danger for German democracy.

This main finding of the detailed analysis underscores the complex relationship between multiple loyalties and democratic stability. Common wisdom would have us believe that increasing urbanization results in forms of social integration that stress national over parochial loyalties. Pappi finds, however, that such a linear relationship did not hold for the West Germany of 1961. Although the size of the community was important, the degree of structural differentiation in the community and its "completeness" were more critical variables.

Pappi's data show that the more a community is complete unto itself, the more resistant its members will be to full integration into a larger national community. People living in the country, although less interested in and less knowledgeable about politics than others, are more likely to accept national norms and institutions simply because their number is too small and they are too dispersed to develop and foster their own set of political values. Suburbanites, by contrast, look to the city for their source of values and rewards; the urban environment itself is too diffuse to encourage the growth of an independent political subculture.

It is in the small towns—those that have between 3,000 and 15,000 inhabitants and are too far from major population centers to permit ready commutation—that the strongest sense of local identity is likely to emerge. Interest in and knowledge about politics takes on a local coloration; and informal methods of governance appropriate to a small, closed society find greater favor. People in such towns are more likely than others to find election campaigns superfluous, and to reject representative democracy in favor of direct participation—that is, to downgrade precisely those norms and institutions that are essential for a stable democracy in the Federal Republic as a whole. In short, Pappi concludes, access to the political arena is greatest in the small town; but precisely this stress on the politics of the local community makes the internalization of the political values of the national society more difficult.

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DETERMINANTS OF THE VOTING DECISION

Hans-Dieter Klingemann's analysis carries still further one of the key points raised by Pappi and others: the importance of understanding the historical and social context of electoral behavior in a given region. The region he has investigated is the electoral district of Heilbronn in the south German state of Baden-Württemberg. Although it is in many ways typical of Germany as a whole, it differed politically in 1961 in that the small liberal party, the Free Democrats (FDP), obtained a substantially greater share of the ballots—at the expense of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Klingemann has relied on historical and aggregate data, the threefold panel survey of the Cologne study in July, September, and November 1961 (with sample sizes in the Heilbronn district of 309, 321, and 370, respectively), interviews with political leaders, and analyses of the local press.

A detailed analysis of the region's electoral history since the 19th century reveals a definite continuity in voting patterns. Since 1893, ecologically distinct subregions have tended to support one or another political party (and its successors). By 1961, in effect, many people in a particular area could say that they cast their ballots for a given party "because that is the way people around here have always voted." The development of these political subsystems with their particularistic loyalties has in turn influenced the parties' selection of candidates, electoral strategies, and appeals for votes.

Political tradition, however, is but one determinant of voting behavior. Religious activity, as Juan Linz and Erhard Blankenburg have shown,[6] has a differential effect. Regardless of their occupation or social stratum, Catholics who went to church regularly tended to vote for the CDU. Again the influence of social context is noticeable: the tendency was strongest in areas where Catholics constituted a clearcut majority or a small but visible minority, and weakest where the numbers of Catholics and Protestants were about even or where there were fewer than fifty Catholics. Protestant voting, to the extent that it revealed any consistent pattern at all, seemed to be based more on economic considerations.

The significance of intermediary organizations emerges clearly from a lengthy chapter with numerous tables on the behavior and perceptions of the 97 workers, 62 civil servants and employees, 35 nonagri-

[6] See Juan José Linz Storch de Gracia, "The Social Bases of West German Politics," Ph.D. diss. (2 vols., Columbia University, 1960), available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan; and Blankenburg (fn. 4, 1967).

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cultural independents, 25 farmers, and 149 housewives in the sample of November 1961. Membership in a labor union was strongly associated with voting for the Social Democratic Party (SPD), as the farmers' membership in professional associations was with voting for the FDP. In their campaigns, the parties recognized and sought to utilize the potential influence of such intermediary organizations.

The effect of the electoral campaign itself varied. It had the smallest impact on CDU voters, who relied mainly upon their primary groups (family, friends, and co-workers) for cues on how to vote. For a limited portion of the district's population, the themes introduced in the campaign were of central importance. These voters began to perceive their environment or their primary and secondary groups in political terms, which enabled them to see where they fit in and how they should vote. Klingemann raises for future research the important question of the sequence in which individuals politicize their images of themselves and relevant others. He hypothesizes that the interaction of electoral campaigns, the influences of one's primary environment, and the voter's perception of both have a built-in time lag: voters orient themselves according to the contours of yesterday's environment.

By and large, party preferences were remarkably stable during the course of the electoral campaign, judging by the responses of the 198 persons who were interviewed in all three panel surveys. In contrast to Max Kaase's conclusion (discussed below) that, for the Federal Republic as a whole, floating voters differ only slightly from constant voters, Klingemann finds that in the Heilbronn district the former were less interested in politics than the latter. However, floating voters revealed that, during the period in which they were changing their views, they discussed politics much more than would have been expected solely on the basis of their reported level of political interest.

According to Klingemann, social context played a determining role here, too. On the personal level, floating voters lived in a much more heterogeneous primary and secondary environment than did constant voters; hence, they were more subject to social crosspressures. Klingemann hypothesizes that they needed arguments that would restore a sense of cognitive consonance, and actively sought out political discussions that would deliver such arguments. He further hypothesizes that, on the systemic level, the inclination to change one's voting preference varies with the probability that such a change will make a difference in electoral outcomes. The chances of such an effect, though slight at

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the federal level, are substantially greater in the local electoral district, and hence condition a somewhat greater propensity for an actual change in individual voting preferences.

CHANGES IN PARTY PREFERENCES

Max Kaase uses data from the 1961 Cologne study—especially its threefold national panel survey comprising 703 respondents—to inquire into the characteristics and motivation of floating voters. He differentiates among three kinds of floaters: (I) "effective switchers" who voted for different parties in the 1957 and 1961 parliamentary elections; (II) "intentional switchers" who changed their reported voting intention from one interviewing date to the next; and (III) those who changed their "psychological distance" from a particular party, as indicated either by changes in their rank-ordered preferences among the parties or by shifts in the position on an eleven-point scale at which they locate these parties.

A major finding is the relatively small number of switchers. Looking at reported votes in the 1975 and 1961 elections (Type-I switching), Kaase discovered that between one-half and two-thirds of the samples in various surveys voted consistently for the same party, and only between one-twelfth and one-eighth switched. (The remainder either did not vote or did not report their vote for one or both elections.) Among those reporting their votes in all four federal elections between 1949 and 1961, 71.5 percent voted consistently and 21.0 percent changed their mind but once. A breakdown showed that the most dramatic shift from 1957 to 1961 was from the CDU and its sister-party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU), to the FDP; the SPD also gained substantially from the CDU/CSU, but lost some ground to the FDP.

The panel survey, which inquired in July and September 1961 about the respondents' intended votes and in November about their actual votes (Type-II switching), produced quite similar results: 60.3 percent remained consistent in their responses on all three occasions, whereas about one-sixth (16.1 percent) reported a change. Among those who changed their preference only once after July, about four in nine had done so by the September interviews; the remainder switched later. Many of those who switched early indicated that they had already considered a change during the previous state or communal elections, a finding which suggests that the electoral campaign of 1961 merely strengthened an earlier inclination.

An analysis of Type-III switching revealed considerably more flexi-

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bility among German voters. About one-third of the 439 respondents who answered the relevant question in each of the three panel surveys changed their rank-ordering of parties either from July to September 1961 (38.5 percent) or from September to November (32.6 percent). Only 29.0 percent were consistent in the distance separating their attitude toward the SPD on the one hand and the bourgeois parties (CDU/CSU and FDP) on the other. Moreover, an average of 72.6 percent of those classifiable in the three panel surveys saw the parties separated by three or fewer points on an eleven-point scale; an average of 89.5 percent perceived the distance as five points or less.

Focusing more specifically on Type-I switchers, Kaase then tested and found wanting several propositions found in earlier American and British literature on floating voters:

—The notion that floating voters constitute a distinct bloc of people who follow the issues closely and swing their votes accordingly finds little support in the Federal Republic (a lack of support that parallels more recent American findings as well). Differences in socioeconomic characteristics between switchers and consistent voters are small in magnitude and point in various directions, not toward the existence of an homogeneous group.

—Earlier American evidence that linked switching to a particular social class—either the middle class, because of the various crosspressures to which its members are subject, or else the politically more disinterested lower class—is not matched by data from the 1961 election in West Germany. The only group that was moderately distinctive in this respect consisted of those who switched to the FDP (and who in fact were more apt than others to be in the upper social classes).

—Earlier (but not later) American electoral studies noted that switchers were usually politically disinterested. Kaase found the opposite to be true in the Federal Republic. Type-I switchers were actually more likely to express an interest in politics than were consistent voters.

—Even taking into account the limited number of respondents on which the findings are based, individuals who are under crosspressures because of their membership in politically contrary reference groups—whether of a primary or secondary nature—do not appear to be more likely than others to be switchers.

Kaase also suggests that political events played a role in people's willingness to alter their voting behavior (Type-I switching). Disappointment over recent actions by the Federal Republic's chancellor, Konrad Adenauer—his decisions in 1959 to run and then not to run for the presidency, and his inappropriate response to the crisis unleashed by East Germany's construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961—was

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probably most significant for the 1961 election. A majority of respondents listed such political factors in explaining their vote in September.

Summing up his findings, Kaase argues that the flexibility of the voters and the low degree of polarization augured well for a future change in government. Indeed, he adds, the SPD's effort in the 1965 election to seek a "grand coalition" with the CDU/CSU rather than to pursue the role of a functioning parliamentary opposition suggests that the people may have had a greater understanding of democratic norms than did the parties.

NONVOTING IN POLITICAL ELECTIONS

Over the course of seven parliamentary elections between 1949 and 1972, an average of only one in eight West Germans stayed away from the polls. What accounts for this electoral discipline is a topic that has interested numerous scholars. Günter D. Radtke looks at the other side of the coin: Why do 13 percent of the qualified voters fail to vote? Do they comprise a hard core of Germans who refuse to accept the Federal Republic's form of democracy? Are they the unmobilized stratum of West German society? Or are they simply crosspressured individuals who stay home rather than confront their uncomfortable situation?

Radtke uses both official statistics[7] and survey data from 1961, 1965, and 1969 to investigate such hypotheses. His data enable him to distinguish three types of nonvoters: (1) those who said that they had no intention of voting in a forthcoming election; (2) those who professed not to have voted in a recent election; and (3) the hardcore nonvoters —those who said that, in general, they never vote in Bundestag elections. Because his is a secondary analysis of data gathered by others for different purposes, Radtke was not in a position to test all relevant hypotheses with respect to all three types of nonvoters; moreover, the size of the entire samples (ranging in size from 1,183 respondents in September 1965 to 1,799 in August 1969) limited the kinds of testing that could be confidently done on the relevant subsamples.

The bulk of Radtke's volume is oriented to individual behavior—why people did not vote. The starting point is the hypothesis that nonvoting was less a deliberate political act than a consequence of

[7] Since 1953, the Federal Statistical Office has asked questions of a randomly selected sample of voters at the polls. The results are presented in various issues of the monthly, *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, and in Fachserie A, Reihe 8 of *Statistik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, both published by the Statistisches Bundesamt. Social background data (age, sex, size of community, religion, etc.) are correlated with the individual's actual vote as indicated on his or her ballot.

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temporary factors influencing the citizen. Compared to voters, nonvoters were less inclined to express an interest in politics, saw less likelihood that their activity could affect the course of politics, and were less knowledgeable about the parties' positions on issues and about the capabilities of the candidates for the chancellorship. Despite some overlap, those who did not vote in one election usually did vote in the next. Conscious that the social norm prescribes voting, most nonvoters also indicated their willingness in principle to vote. Only about one-third of the nonvoters (or 4 percent of the entire population) seemed determined not to participate.

Radtke seeks an explanation for the remaining two-thirds of nonvoters in their role expectations. Social-structural differentiation accounts for more than half of this behavior (or for 5 percent of the total population). That is, if the less well-educated voted at the same level as those with more education, the younger and older at the same level as those between 40 and 65 years of age, and women at the same level as men, the electoral turnout could be expected to be 92 instead of 87 percent.

Conflicting role expectations prove to have been less important than might have been expected in explaining nonvoting. The basic idea is that the citizen, crosspressured by membership in politically contradictory groups of a primary or secondary nature, seeks refuge—at least temporarily—in nonvoting. Radtke's data, however, lend no support to arguments that social mobility (as indicated by changes in profession between the respondent and his or her father) or membership in a greater number of groups produce such an effect. Nonvoters seem to be remarkably free from crosspressures. The only circumstance supporting the hypothesis is one in which contrary expectations of how the individual should vote stem from neighbors but are incompatible with both the individual's own attitudes and those of other important reference persons. In this case the cognitive dissonance deriving from the conflict balances out the feelings of guilt for violating the community norm of voting—and the individual does not vote.

Nonvoters were somewhat less likely than voters to be linked to the political communication system. Radtke found that voting rates were highest in towns with a population between 3,000 and 20,000—suggesting (in agreement with Pappi) that the degree of integration was highest in small towns where communication structures are intensive. Type-1 nonvoters tended not to seek new information but rather to avoid it; Type-2 nonvoters were more conscious of their lack of information.

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In a brief final chapter, Radtke examines nonvoting in terms of its effect on the political system. One hypothesis prominent in the literature is that, because voting is a control mechanism in democracies, nonvoting weakens the population's ability to guide its political leaders. Radtke argues that this has not been a problem in West Germany. First, the rate of nonvoting was generally quite low compared to other democracies, and did not seem to be politically inspired. Second, West Germany's citizens, including nonvoters, have other means to check their government—most notably their propensity to criticize, which rests on their demonstrated willingness to acquire political information.

Another hypothesis is that nonvoting indicates a gap in a country's social integration. It is true, Radtke finds, that rates of nonvoting varied inversely with socioeconomic status (indicated in various ways), and that nonvoters knew less about the practice of democracy and shied away from the notion of political conflict as a legitimate social norm. But such a frame of mind existed among voters as well. Lack of integration into the social system may thus predispose citizens to withhold their vote, but it does not indicate a basic difference in politically relevant values between voters and nonvoters.

REGIONAL CASE STUDIES

In addition to the more general concerns of the Cologne school, several case studies of the electoral campaign in particular regions have been published. Two such discussions, by Peter Pulzer on Heilbronn and David Schoenbaum on Marburg, appeared in the original volume, *Zur Soziologie der Wahl*. Klingemann's analysis of the Heilbronn electoral district also began as a case study and contains a wealth of interesting information about the district's parties, candidates, and issues; the broader ramifications of this work nonetheless take it out of the category of case studies. Two other volumes, more in the tradition of Uwe Kitzinger's excellent analysis of the 1957 election in the Federal Republic,[8] provide fascinating descriptions of what the electoral campaigns in particular districts were actually like. Another volume harks back to an earlier tradition of electoral ecology.

Parties in the Electoral Campaign. Vera Gemmecke examines two districts in western Germany: Arnsberg and Soest in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. These rural areas together had a population of

[8] See Kitzinger, *German Electoral Politics: A Study of the 1957 Campaign* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960).

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233,536 living on 471 square miles; the people are generally Catholic and have a history of conservative voting. In 1961, almost twice as many voted for the CDU (56.4 percent) as for the SPD (28.6 percent), with the FDP—stronger in Soest than in Arnsberg—obtaining 14.6 percent, or about one-quarter of the amount received by the CDU.

The main contribution of the volume lies in the care with which Gemmecke describes the 1961 campaign in Arnsberg-Soest. She discusses the parties' organization, candidates, and financing; the events conditioning the course of the campaign itself—most notably the communal elections in March 1961 and the process by which the parties selected their parliamentary candidates; the campaign, with emphasis on the forms of publicity used by the parties (including some quantitative data on themes, media, and publicity expenditures); the structure and influence of organized groups—especially the church, unions, employers' associations, and farmers' organizations; and the role of the mass media, again with considerable quantitative data both on the distribution of attention and on popular reception (as indicated by findings from the Cologne study).

A lengthy chapter, based on official statistics as well as on findings from the Cologne study, deals with the behavior of the voters in Arnsberg-Soest. A somewhat greater proportion went to the polls here than in other districts of West Germany. They were, moreover, less apt to cast invalid ballots—a fact Gemmecke attributes to the political distinctness of the parties, which obviates a major source of crosspressure. The conservative edge (with a difference between CDU and SPD votes of 27.8 percent), although 9 percent greater than in the Federal Republic as a whole, had dropped sharply from 38.4 percent in the 1957 election to 18.4 percent in 1961 for the entire country. Among the most important social structural factors favoring CDU voting was religion, with the size of the community of only secondary importance: the smaller a community's size and the larger its percentage of Catholics, the smaller was the CDU's loss of votes between 1957 and 1961. The degree of a community's industrialization was also secondary to religion.

Gemmecke interprets the parallelism of declining CDU votes in Arnsberg-Soest and the Federal Republic as the consequence, not of changes in social structure, but of intervening political events at the national level. (Local political issues played almost no role in the 1961 election in Arnsberg-Soest.) In this trend, which continued into the 1965 federal election, Gemmecke sees the greatest prospect for a change in the political leadership of West Germany.

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The Politics of the Delayed Power Shift. Dieter von Herz interprets the 1966 state parliamentary election in North Rhine-Westphalia as an indication of future political power shifts in the Federal Republic. Both nationally and in North Rhine-Westphalia, the CDU had been dominant since the late 1940s. Compared to its share of the vote in the 1958 state election, however, the CDU lost 4.1 percent in 1962 and dropped by another 3.6 percent in 1966, whereas the SPD gained 4.1 percent between 1958 and 1962, and 6.2 percent between 1962 and 1966. By giving the SPD plurality status (49.5 percent) in 1966, the voters of North Rhine-Westphalia—and, by extension, voters of the Federal Republic as a whole—signalled that they were prepared for the SPD to take over the reins of government.

The volume concentrates on carefully describing the 1966 campaign in West Germany's most populous state. Herz outlines the history, organization, and internal flow of communication of the three major parties, as well as the special problems each faced in competing with the others. A lengthy section then details how the parties searched for the mode of self-presentation that would appeal most to the voters. By focusing on such central questions as the selection of candidates and the development and implementation of an advertising strategy, Herz shows how the major parties had actually become very similar to each other. Finally, he analyzes aspects of the electorate's behavior at the polls, relying heavily on data and findings reported previously by public opinion research institutes, especially INFAS (*Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft*) and EMNID (the West German Gallup affiliate) and various scholars, especially Blankenburg.

In view of the dramatic success of the SPD in the 1966 state election, it is most remarkable that the party had to remain in the opposition, at least temporarily. An electoral system comprising only single-member constituencies would have thrust it into power immediately, and with a comfortable margin at that. Together, however, the CDU and FDP polled 50.5 percent of the popular vote, which gave them 101 of 200 parliamentary seats. For reasons to be found in the close relationship between politics on the federal level and in North Rhine-Westphalia, the two parties opted to continue their coalition. Only five months later, when CDU/FDP coalitions collapsed in both, was it possible for the SPD to get into power. Pressure from national leaders notwithstanding, the state CDU and SPD organizations chose not to form a "grand coalition"—as the national parties subsequently did. Instead, the SPD aligned itself with the FDP in a move that presaged by three years the formation of an SPD/FDP coalition at the national level.

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Political Tradition, Social Structure, and Parties. Heinz Sahner has sought to test the relevance of findings taken from Rudolph Heberle's classic study of the rise of National Socialism among the rural population in Schleswig-Holstein[9] in order to understand postwar supporters of the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). He approaches the problem through ecological analysis—the intercorrelations of such aggregate data about a region and its population as the number living in towns of various sizes, holding particular occupations, and voting for one political party or another. Extensive tables and maps, and awareness of the potential problem of the "ecological fallacy," enhance the volume's value to the reader. The main question, though, is whether and to what extent the NPD of the 1960s was truly equivalent to the National Socialists (NSDAP) of 1924–1933. Leading politicians and journalists *said* it was, but they did not seriously try to ban the NPD as an anticonstitutional party; nor were they successful in convincing many voters of the putative equivalency. (See the discussion, below, of the study by Thomas A. Herz.) In this sense, Sahner's analysis can tell us much about support for the NPD, but considerably less about the validity of Heberle's theses.

One of Sahner's major findings is that it was the CDU, not the NPD, that most clearly obtained support from areas that had previously voted heavily for the NSDAP. By contrast, a definite continuity characterized SPD voting in the 1920s and 1960s. Growth in the share of votes for the NSDAP and the NPD cannot be attributed to the mobilization of new voters; indeed, ecological correlations show that the SPD was the party most likely to profit from growth in the size of the electorate. The NPD attracted voters from both major parties but mainly from the FDP, from people between ages 45 and 60, from small communities rather than major population centers, and from all occupational sectors (although somewhat more than average from farmers and their families).

Social-structural factors played a role in other regards. First, the distinctive political outcomes in each of Schleswig-Holstein's three main regions continued from the 1920s into the early 1960s: areas that had been conservative then are still very much so today. Second, Sah-

[9] Heberle, *From Democracy to Nazism: A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945). The revised and expanded version used by Sahner for his analysis is Heberle's *Landbevölkerung und Nationalsozialismus: Eine soziologische Untersuchung der politischen Willensbildung in Schleswig-Holstein 1918 bis 1932* [Rural Population and National Socialism: A Sociological Inquiry into the Growth of Political Consciousness in Schleswig-Holstein, 1918–1932], No. 6 of *Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1963).

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ner modified Heberle's thesis—that the more an agricultural area is monocultural and sensitive to crisis, the greater are the chances of extremist parties—by showing that monoculturality counts for less than the fact that the product grown is subject to marketing crises. If this meant hog raisers and cabbage growers in the 1920s, it meant grain farmers in the 1960s. Third, the structure of the immediate community influenced electoral behavior: unless the agricultural workers in an area were sufficiently numerous to develop a group identity as workers (in which case they would lean toward the SPD), they would take their electoral cues from CDU-oriented farm owners and even oppose organized workers in other economic sectors. A similar contextual patterning, although in the opposite political direction, held true of postwar refugees.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSES

By implication at least, the entire Cologne school has examined West German electoral behavior in a comparative framework. That is, the source of hypotheses for individual studies and the starting point for designing the surveys lie in previous work carried out in the United States and, sometimes, Britain; references to the Anglo-American literature occur throughout most of the books reviewed here. Two studies in the series are even more explicitly comparative: one dealing with Switzerland and the Federal Republic, the other with right-wing parties in the United States and West Germany. (Still another, which will not be discussed here, focuses primarily on the Netherlands and Austria.)[10] Another comparative study deserving at least brief attention examines the outcomes of various electoral systems.

Citizens and Politics. Jürg Steiner is mainly interested in the correlates of political participation in Switzerland and the Federal Republic, although he also refers to relevant findings in the literature on other Western democracies.[11] His analysis is based on surveys carried out in 1962–1964 in Switzerland and on an independent pair of West German surveys conducted in 1965 by DIVO (*Deutsches Institut für*

[10] Rudolf Steiniger, *Polarisierung und Integration: Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der strukturellen Versäulung der Gesellschaft in den Niederlanden und in Österreich* [Polarization and Integration: A Comparative Inquiry into the Structural Compartmentalization of Society in the Netherlands and in Austria], Vol. 14 of *Politik und Wähler* (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1975).

[11] See also Steiner, *Gewaltlose Politik und Kulturelle Vielfalt: Hypothesen entwickelt am Beispiel der Schweiz* [Nonforcible Politics and Cultural Diversity: Hypotheses Developed from the Example of Switzerland] (Bern and Stuttgart: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1970); reviewed in *Acta Sociologica*, XV (No. 1, 1972), 96-97.

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Volksumfragen), under the direction of Rudolf Wildenmann. The two sets of questions, though far from identical, permit some fairly direct comparisons, but Steiner does not deeply explore the vital issue of functional equivalence, both of the questions themselves and of the importance of participation in the political life of the two countries.

Steiner's preliminary study on Switzerland led him to formulate eleven hypotheses on the correlates of electoral participation. To test these hypotheses, he presents in bivariate form (with Chi-square scores) data from the main surveys in the two countries. He finds that in both countries voting and other forms of political activity were associated in a linear fashion—no checks for curvilinearity were presented—with each other, first of all, and also with the voters' appreciation of the influence of politics on their personal lives, the extent to which they felt they could influence the course of politics, their view of voting as a social norm (no data for the Federal Republic), a positive attitude toward the political system, higher socioeconomic status, membership in organizations (although not necessarily the voters' degree of social integration), and (in West Germany only, because women did not then vote in Swiss cantons) sex (with men more active than women). Steiner finds no significant relationship between degree of political activity and either crosspressures on individuals or geographic mobility (no data for the Federal Republic), age (no data for Switzerland), size of community, and religious affiliation.

Steiner ties his findings together in a partial theory of political participation, the central feature of which is the degree to which individuals felt that they were directly affected by politics and could influence political decisions. The upper social strata, which were more likely to exhibit these characteristics than the lower strata and thus more competent within the existing political system, were also most likely to be the mainstays of that system.[12] The author further hypothesizes that changes in the level and quality of participation affect the character of the political system as a whole and, through a feedback process, the very bases of political participation. In particular, he sees political activity as increasing during times of crisis and decreasing the more the principal parties become like each other. A set of 16 propositions describes the interaction among the social and individual aspects of political participation.

[12] Steiner's indicator of social status combined occupation, father's occupation, education, standard of living, newspaper reading, and whether or not the respondent's political advice was sought by others.

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Social Conditions for Right-wing Extremism. In what is methodologically the most sophisticated study discussed thus far, Thomas A. Herz views the National Democratic Party in West Germany and George C. Wallace's American Independent Party as functionally equivalent for the two societies. Differences in organization and the type of person to whom they appeal notwithstanding, their political goals and tactics are sufficiently similar to justify intensive secondary analysis of public attitudes toward them. The data for the Federal Republic consist of nine surveys conducted between January 1968 and March 1969 by DIVO. Herz treats six of these, which he considers sufficiently reliable and similar to permit cumulation,[13] as if they comprised a single sampling; he also uses them as a basis for selecting 1,689 respondents to be interviewed in late 1969 as the "second wave" of a panel survey. The American data consist of a two-stage panel survey conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan before and after the 1968 presidential election. The original sampling contained 1,557 respondents, of whom 87 percent were available for a second wave of interviews.

The findings suggest substantial differences between followers of the two parties. Neither of them can be said to espouse a full-blown ideology, although NPD adherents were considerably more ideological in their views than were Wallacites. The NPD drew strong support from anomic voters, whereas supporters of Wallace felt that they had control over their own destinies; both, however, argued that their respective governments were failing to live up to their own conception of what societal norms are.

In neither case can one speak of a radicalization of the petite bourgeoisie. Potential support for right-wing extremism seems most likely in the lower strata in West Germany, but in the middle and upper strata in the United States—in both cases people facing the threat of status deprivation in a climate of far-reaching social change. Strong attachments to a political party, church, or, in West Germany, a particular community were associated with rejection of the extremist par-

[13] For a critique of this method, see Hans D. Klingemann and Franz Urban Pappi, "Möglichkeiten und Probleme bei der Kumulation von Umfragen" [Possibilities and Problems in the Cumulation of Polls], in Rudolf Wildenmann, ed., *Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik*, 1 (Munich and Vienna: Günter Olzog Verlag, 1969), 173-90. For their own procedures and findings, see Klingemann and Pappi's *Politischer Radikalismus: Theoretische und methodische Probleme der Radikalismusforschung, dargestellt am Beispiel einer Studie anlässlich der Landtagswahl 1970 in Hessen* [Political Radicalism: Problems of Theory and Method in Research on Radicalism, Illustrated by the Example of a Study of State Elections in Hesse, 1970] (Munich and Vienna: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1972).

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ties, but membership in other secondary institutions, such as unions or professional associations, was related to such attitudes, albeit in varying degrees. In the Federal Republic, but not in the United States, acceptance of rightist notions was in part a question of generations; those who had begun their professional careers during the Nazi era were most susceptible. (The strong relationship between National Socialism and postwar right-wing extremism may mean that the potential for extremism will die out in Germany with the generation in question, whereas in the United States the potential, geared more to the political issues of the day than to an overriding ideology, will remain alive.)

Political issues were paramount among the conditions for right-wing extremism. Herz finds that rightist adherents in both countries behaved "rationally" in the sense that they understood the issues, knew where they stood with respect to them, and could translate their attitudes accordingly into a party vote in the "right" direction. Efforts by some West German politicians and media to label the NPD a successor to Nazism, and its supporters as deviates in terms of the FRG's political norms, were by and large unsuccessful: only one-third of all West German respondents internalized the characterization; in fact, NPD supporters were no more likely than SPD voters to be insulated from society by having primary ties only with those of a similar political persuasion.

Herz uses path analysis to develop and test several interactive models of right-wing extremism in the Federal Republic and the United States. These are essentially heuristic models, since it is by no means clear that the variables are either the best for indicating the underlying concepts in which Herz is interested, or functionally equivalent for the two countries. One basic model is social-psychological: the crosspressure in the individual's civic and occupational roles, felt by the person caught up in the process of social change, in turn yielded tension in political perspectives; all three dynamic conflicts contributed to a rigidity in personality that led to right-wing extremism. The other basic model is political: alienation vis-à-vis the candidates offered by the mainstream parties interacted with the significance the individual attached to democratic sentiments, and with age, to color the individual's perception of extremist parties and orientation to issues; these combined to produce the individual's sympathy for right-wing extremism. The latter model most nearly characterizes support in West Germany for the NPD, but an explanation of Wallace's adherents requires elements of both.

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Majority-Creating Electoral Systems and the Delineation of Electoral Districts. A third comparative study warrants mention even though it is tangential to the main thrust of the works discussed in the rest of this review. Wolfgang Bick examines biases allegedly produced in electoral results by relative-majority systems with single-member constituencies. A number of factors may exaggerate the electoral impact of small majorities: gerrymandering that concentrates majorities, differences in the size of electoral districts, variable degrees of voter turnout, and the impact of third parties that take away votes from a major contender in an election. Bick uses electoral statistics from several countries, with special emphasis on the Federal Republic, to develop indicators showing both the amount of bias in electoral systems and the degree to which these four factors account for it. Having found that what he calls "exaggeration effects" stemmed mainly from the distribution of votes among the parties and the size of the electoral districts, Bick then uses computer simulations to ascertain what changes in outcomes could be produced by altering these variables. Finally, he proposes means to reduce existing and potential biases. The most reasonable, he concludes, would use the d'Hondt system of proportional representation in relatively small districts, each of which would elect several representatives to parliament.

THE COLOGNE SCHOOL AND COMPARATIVE ELECTORAL RESEARCH

Paradoxically, one of the main strengths of the series as a whole may appear as a weakness to many sophisticated students of electoral behavior. German political sociology in the early 1960s was just beginning to recover from the tremendous losses of the Nazi era—the flight of many of the country's most innovative social scientists, the political deformation of the universities and their study of political phenomena, and the postwar lack of facilities and funds. That is not to say that there were no outstanding scholars, for in fact there were. What is more to the point is that the entire profession in the Federal Republic had not been able to keep abreast of developments elsewhere—particularly in the case of the "behavioral revolution" in American political science.

The initial studies of the Cologne school aimed in a very real sense at bringing the community of German political scientists and political sociologists back into the international mainstream. One of the chief accomplishments of these studies was therefore the transmittal of a whole new set of concepts and methodologies to highly independent and justifiably skeptical scholars. Scheuch, Wildenmann, and their

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colleagues and students were at the very forefront in revolutionizing the study of political sociology in the Federal Republic.

This vital task of transmitting information and concepts requires starting with basics. It involves, first of all, an extensive elaboration of the theoretic and empirical framework of the individual studies. Thus, substantial portions of most of the volumes under review are devoted to discussions of the ideas of Parsons, Almond, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, Campbell, Butler, and others. Advanced students of electoral behavior may find these portions tedious because of the care with which the authors explicate this previous work, often at a very elementary level. The cumulative effect produced by the entire set of studies is, moreover, repetitive.

Yet the justification is quite strong in the German context: the authors were seeking to educate an entire generation of German political sociologists. In this respect they have succeeded. There can hardly be a well-read scholar or student in West German departments of political science or sociology who is not now conversant with the relevance of American and British theorizing and research to the analysis of political behavior in the Federal Republic. In the meantime, several of the authors, including Scheuch and Wildenmann, have gone on to make new contributions to empirically verified theory in political behavior.[14]

Second, the level of analytic refinement is only modest, especially in the earlier volumes of the series. Before the publication of the studies by Thomas Herz and Wolfgang Bick, analysis did not go much beyond the presentation of data in the form of tables with two or three variables. Not too often was any statistic given to show the strength and significance of the findings. Multivariate analysis, scaling, tree-building, and the other forms of more complex analysis—which by the late 1950s were the stock in trade of American graduate students in major universities—were for the most part missing or, if they had been carried out, relegated to oblique references in footnotes and appendices.

What can we make of this? The authors had the opportunity to

[14] See, for example, Kaase's "Determinanten des Wahlverhaltens bei der Bundestagswahl 1969," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, XI (March 1970), 46-110, and "Die Bundestagswahl 1972: Probleme und Analysen," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, XIV (May 1973), 145-90; Klingemann, "Issue-Kompetenz und Wahlentscheidung: Die Einstellung zu wertbezogenen politischen Problemen im Zeitvergleich," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, XIV (May 1973), 227-56; Klingemann and Pappi (fn. 13); and Uwe Schleth and Erich Weede, "Causal Models on West German Voting Behavior," in Wildenmann, ed., *Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik*, II (Munich and Vienna: Günter Olzog Verlag, 1971), 73-97. Wildenmann, Kaase, Klingemann, and others are now directing the Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA), an academic institute for social sciences in Mannheim, supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.

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receive excellent training in advanced research techniques from outstanding methodologists, including König, Scheuch, and Wildenmann; and some had spent time at important American centers of the behavioral sciences, such as the University of Michigan. The answer, I suspect, is threefold. First of all, West German universities in the early 1960s simply did not have access to the sophisticated computational facilities that were available at most major American research institutions. Then, too, most of the volumes were written as doctoral dissertations; and in West Germany as well as in the United States there is pressure on a graduate student to complete a less complex study rapidly rather than to labor for a long time on something more sophisticated and hence more risky. Presenting data in simple forms was also important for educating German political sociologists to an appreciation of the uses and limitations of these data in understanding political behavior. More complicated forms of analysis might simply have run into a brick wall of incomprehension. As I have suggested, these volumes served as an excellent basis for later, more intricate studies by many of the same scholars.

Third, reliance on secondary analysis of surveys conducted for general purposes inevitably produced its own problems. One of these was simply that certain questions had not been asked, or had been phrased less felicitously than they might have been. Another was that national or even regional samples did not produce as many respondents of special types—such as floating voters or nonvoters—as might have been desirable for a particular analysis. Such problems are not peculiar to the Cologne studies; they occur in other secondary analyses as well.

A more serious shortcoming was an author's occasional tendency to base weighty conclusions on an unsatisfactorily small sample. The most glaring example occurs in Klingemann's observation that "a relatively large portion of the politically interested in small towns saw voting as a waste of time" (p. 118). The table referred to in the text reveals, however, that the finding rests upon *two* individuals with a very strong or strong interest in politics; the remaining 32 small-town respondents with such an interest thought either that voting enabled them to participate in political decisions (22) or that it was their duty as citizens (10). A "parallel" finding to which Klingemann points is that politically interested people in small towns are less enthusiastic about electoral campaigning. Again, the number of those who called campaigning pretty superfluous (3), or even destructive (1), is far outweighed by those who deemed it absolutely necessary (10), or useful (20). Of the 97 people living in small towns who had little or no

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political interest, by contrast, almost half (45) saw campaigning as pretty superfluous. Klingemann's later generalization—that "in the small towns, where political interest is all-in-all greatest, it is precisely the politically motivated who have very little understanding for the necessity of voting" (p. 137)—is, although hardly convincing on the basis of the data presented, nevertheless both intriguing and heuristically significant.

A final, mildly disturbing point, due no doubt to political developments in the Federal Republic itself, indicates how closely the Cologne studies represent the state of the art of electoral studies in general. The CDU/CSU had been the dominant party since the first parliamentary elections in 1949 and still appeared to be going strong after its electoral victory in 1965. Does it surprise us, then, that an underlying question in many studies—indeed, almost a preoccupation—was the possibility that the SPD would *ever* attain power? The particular question and its various formulations may interest only few foreign observers, particularly since the 1969 elections turned the tables and brought an SPD/FDP coalition into power.

The question is of far more relevance to students of comparative electoral behavior because the authors' answers imply a prognostic model governing their research. No such model existed—or, if it did, it was never fully explicated. What the reader finds instead is the postulate of persistence: prediction as a diagnosis of causes of past events. In retrospect, the major Cologne studies, like the efforts of commercial and academic polling institutes in the United States and elsewhere, were good in short-range prediction of electoral results, but less successful in explaining the processes of change that could lead to longer-range predictions. "We still lack process analyses of elections," Rudolf Wildenmann recently pointed out.[15]

Even if these shortcomings and other methodological and interpretative reservations are taken into account, the intrinsic value of the Cologne studies remains substantial for students of electoral behavior. Several specific contributions to theory stand out: the emphasis on social context in understanding the behavior of voters; sharper delineations of concepts such as the floating voter; a recognition that party

[15] Wildenmann, "Possibilities and Limitations of Surveys for Predictive Political Theory: A Position Paper," presented at the X World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Edinburgh, August 1976. For a sharply focused critique of alternative prognostic "models" used by the Cologne school and the commercial firm INFAS, and the frequently acrimonious dispute between the two, see Frieder Naschold, *Wahlprognosen und Wählerverhalten in der BRD* [Electoral Forecasting and Voting Behavior in the BRD], Urban Taschenbücher, Series 80, No. 808 (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1971).

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identification, however useful it may be for American electoral studies, does not explain much variance in West German voting patterns; the static bias of concepts such as the "normal vote"; and the relative importance of issues and ideology to German voters. The conceptualizations and findings represented in the series reviewed here and the later research of the Cologne school can serve as a valuable corrective to the frequently parochial perspectives of American students of political behavior.

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DEMOCRACY, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND INEQUALITY IN INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT

By ATUL KOHLI*

Francine Frankel, *India's Political Economy, 1947–1977: The Gradual Revolution*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978, 600 pp., $12.50.

THE political leaders of India have repeatedly asserted that they want to steer India toward a socialist pattern of development. While the content of their socialism has often varied and is as often unclear, at minimum it has involved a belief that a desirable pattern of development must lead to some redistribution of the fruits of economic growth. Whether India can achieve this within a democratic framework—and if so, how—are the larger questions which need to be and, over the years, have been raised by many thoughtful observers. For many—barring the two extreme positions of either free enterprise only or a dictatorship of the proletariat—the reconciliation of political democracy, economic growth, and the redistribution of wealth in India is an issue of considerable and continuing concern.

Francine Frankel's new 600-page book on India revolves around the question of whether it is possible to transform the hierarchical social structure of India so as to create a relatively egalitarian pattern of development by reformist, nonrevolutionary means. She arrives at her qualified affrmative answer by examining India's thirty-year record of deliberate development. Why has India not succeeded in creating a socialist pattern of development so far? Frankel's analysis leads her to conclude that it was due primarily to the failure of the political leadership to mobilize and organize the lower classes as a social force in their own right. Only such mobilization could have influenced the policy process in favor of the poor. According to Frankel, political parties in India must attain a genuine lower-class—especially lower agrarian class—constituency. If they do, a democratic implementation of radical

* I would like to thank Pranab Bardhan, Dijana Plestina, and Don Van Atta of the University of California, Berkeley, for their useful suggestions on an earlier draft. Some of the ideas presented here were developed in the course of informal conversations with four India-based scholars: Bashiruddin Ahmad, Marc Franda, Rajni Kothari, and Raj Krishna. This paper was written while I held fellowships from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Institute for the Study of World Politics, New York.

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land reform will be possible, and will in turn create better prospects for both rapid economic growth with distribution and stable democratic politics.

Frankel is of course not alone in advancing this analytic/prescriptive orientation on India's development. Now that many political developmentalists have turned their attention to the issues of economic development, and economists to those of political constraints, a "democratic socialist" consensus appears to have emerged: if India's attempts to create a democratic socialist mode of development are to progress, what is needed is the political organization of the rural poor. Marc Franda, another old India hand, has made an almost identical argument in his new book on the politics of India's rural development.[1] Raj Krishna, a prominent economist/policy maker in India, has gone so far as to argue that the Indian government should provide funds in order to accelerate the unionization of the rural poor.[2] And the influential Planning Commission of the Government of India has also been moving toward a similar position.[3]

In this review essay, I will dissent from this democratic socialist viewpoint. I will argue that the organization of the lower classes has seldom led to a significant redistribution of economic resources in a democracy, and that it is not likely to do so in India. Underlying the well-meaning democratic socialist prescription is a liberal fallacy which states that in a democracy, the numerical weight of the lower classes can be transformed into an effective political power aimed at incremental redistribution of economic resources. The problem is an old one. Aristotle worried about it when he argued that "if justice is made to consist in the will of a majority of persons, that majority will be

[1] Franda argues that "a number of outstanding issues in rural development . . . could conceivably be carried out within a democratic framework. . . . What would seem necessary before politically difficult measures can be implemented, and justice made more prompt, would be the effective organization of the bulk of rural society." See *Small is Politics: Organisational Alternatives in India's Rural Development* (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Limited, 1979), 279. The American edition of this book is to be published soon by Indiana University Press under the title *India's Rural Development: An Assessment of Alternatives*.

[2] According to Krishna, who was a member of India's Planning Commission, "it is critical for achieving the distributive goals of the new plan that political workers, social workers and trade union leaders immediately undertake the task of unionizing the poor throughout India. . . . I have been advocating the establishment of a public fund which should subsidize some of the expense involved in organizing the rural poor." See "The Next Phase in Rural Development," mimeo., 19. Also published in *Seminar*, No. 278 (New Delhi), August 1978.

[3] India's planners have recently argued that "critical for the success of all redistributive laws, policies and programmes is that the poor be organized." See Government of India, Planning Commission, *Draft Five Year Plan, 1978–83* (1978), 15.

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sure to act unjustly and confiscate the property of the rich minority."[4] But Aristotle need not have been concerned: democracies have long found solutions for preserving substantial economic inequalities despite formal political equality. If India stays democratic, it will also discover these solutions; more precisely, the prior institutionalization of these solutions may well become the precondition for the survival of democracy in India. Implicitly, Marxists have always used this argument; of late, even those committed to liberal democracy, such as Robert Dahl, have recognized that pluralist politics, whether class-based or not, does not lead to a redistribution of economic resources.[5]

I

Frankel's book is on the whole a commendable achievement. It is probably the first comprehensive book on India to combine political and economic analyses at a sophisticated level. In that sense, it not only provides a much-needed "political-economy" analysis of India's development experience, but also represents a conceptual breakthrough in analytically combining the study of social forces, political institutions, and strategies of economic development in a coherent case study.[6] The book should be read by every social scientist with a scholarly interest in India or in the general area of the politics of economic development. The author has based her work on government documents, newspapers, extensive interviews, field trips, and a solid twenty years of intellectual interest in India. It clearly establishes Frankel as a prominent North American scholar of India.

However, the specific sections vary in quality, usefulness, and originality. The historical analysis of the conflicting imperatives in India's nationalist struggle is stimulating. Here, Frankel sets out to explain

[4] *The Politics of Aristotle*, ed. by Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 261 (Book VI, chap. 3, sec. 3).

[5] Dahl has recently argued that there is no reason to believe "that organizational pluralism is a dynamic force with a more or less steady thrust toward the reduction of inequalities. I am not aware of any theoretical reasoning that has been advanced on behalf of the existence of such a dynamic force." On the contrary, "organizational pluralism can produce a stable system in which mutual vetoes prevent the reduction of inequalities and more generally, structural changes in the status quo." See "Pluralism Revisited," *Comparative Politics*, x (January 1978), 199.

[6] To be fair, many economists have for some time now continued to write on the Indian situation from a perspective that situates the economic processes within a larger social framework. An incomplete list would include Pranab Bardhan, P. C. Joshi, A. N. Khusro, Michael Lipton, B. S. Minhas, Gunnar Myrdal, K. N. Raj, and Ashok Rudra. While the sociological insights of these economists have often been useful, systematic political analysis has not been their strong point.

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the origins of the recurring tension in India's political economy—between a mass orientation on the one hand and a refusal to attack the propertied classes on the other. Of course, Gandhi and his strategy of nonviolence occupy center stage: the argument is that the relatively moderate character of India's nationalist movement can be explained neither by the religious underpinnings of the political ideologies nor by the fact that Congress was a movement supported by the propertied classes. These factors contributed, but the leadership's orientation was central, i.e., Gandhi's belief that a "direct attack on the propertied classes . . . would in the long run have a disastrous effect on political development in India" (p. 44). Aside from Gandhi's own writings, however, the evidence to support this argument is meager. Frankel appears to have been convinced at least in part by her own belief that revolutionary solutions are not realistic for India.[7] She may be right; but her analysis of why the nationalist struggle was mass-oriented in goals and yet conciliatory to the dominant classes is not totally convincing.

The question why Gandhi chose nonviolence as a strategy could have been framed differently: Why did Gandhi and his nonviolent approach, rather than the militants of the left or the right, gain the leadership of the Indian nationalist movement? The answer would immediately reveal the relatively cohesive nature of India's social structure as significant. Because of the absence of social polarization in Gandhi's India, it was not likely that revolutionary ideologies would catch the imagination of the masses. A nonviolent approach which chose class conciliation rather than class conflict as its modus operandi was therefore "destined" to succeed in India—if for no reason other than the lack of alternatives. Furthermore, to the extent that the militant left and right were successful in mobilizing some support, they were far more prey to repression by the British rulers than were Gandhi and his followers. Aside from the leadership's orientation, therefore, the larger social and the colonial matrix was of considerable significance in molding the shape of India's nationalist movement.[8]

[7] Thus Frankel argues, "the fact is that theories calling for revolutionary actions are 'non-theories' under Indian conditions once they are tested against political constraints . . . a revolutionary solution in Indian conditions . . . holds out the possibility for incalculable levels of destructive violence" (p. xii).

[8] The significance of a cohesive social structure for the absence of radicalism in India has been suggested in the chapters on India and on peasants and revolution in Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). An account of India's nationalist movement emphasizing the role of the colonial framework remains to be written. Scattered evidence to support this argument can be found in such general historical accounts as Percival Spear, *A History of India* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970); Gene Overstreet and Marshall Wind Miller, *Com-*

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Frankel's analysis of the creation of the new political order in India is brilliant. Her cogent insistence that the constitutional and administrative frameworks were designed with the interests of the propertied in mind is well documented. The clauses on the protection of fundamental economic rights, including the rights of property, the maintenance of the administration as an elite service, and the assignment of significant powers to the dominant class-controlled state governments over the vast rural sector, all put severe brakes on the possibilities of any "sweeping changes of the social order by action from above" (p. 81). Frankel correctly points to the leaders and to economic interests as the independent variables. Aside from the fact that "the dominant landowning castes in alliance with the urban businessmen" (p. 74) controlled most levels of government below the center, Sardar Patel's conservative leadership at the center and the failure of the democratic left to provide a cohesive alternative under Nehru's leadership were responsible for this decisive conservative tilt in the design of the new political institutions. Because leaders often create new institutions, Frankel's focus on leadership and interest groups pays off handsomely here.

Soon after independence, Nehru became established as the dominant leader of the Indian Republic. With the aim of facilitating planned development, he initiated the creation of the prestigious Planning Commission. Frankel's analysis of the developmental role of Nehru and the Planning Commission is disappointing, however. In view of the extensive secondary materials already available for this period, a tighter analysis might have been expected. Frankel sets out to explain the limited successes of this period, both in economic growth and in distribution. The causal variable is the failure of the planning process to reorganize the rural society successfully and radically. The suggested relation between the failure of land reform and rural income inequalities is unquestionable; but this failure is also somehow held responsible for the minimal agricultural growth and the limited mobilization of savings from the agrarian sector and, therefore, for the overall sluggish economic performance. This connection is not convincing. The argument that radical land redistribution is a precondition for improved agricultural as well as for overall growth is both old and controversial. It does not become more readily acceptable by repeated assertions.[9]

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munism in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959); and Stanley A. Wolpert, *Tilak and Gokhale* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

[9] We may recall that Gunnar Myrdal concluded, after balancing various pros and cons of land redistribution as an approach to agricultural development, that under

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Frankel makes neither a theoretical nor an empirical case to establish this important relationship. A convincing argument would require a mode of analysis different from the one she employs; it would have to demonstrate that one leads to the other, rather than merely to correlate the simultaneous failure of the two.

In her political analysis of the Nehru period, Frankel attempts to trace the political underpinnings of its minimal success in growth and distribution. The importance assigned to land redistribution raises the question why Nehru did not succeed in steering India's planning into a more "socialist," i.e., redistributive direction. In this section one learns a great deal about the controversies of Indian planning; they revolve around the size of the plans, the role of the public and the private sectors in production and trade, institutional versus technological emphasis in agricultural growth, the role of the center versus that of the states, and so forth. However, one does not learn nearly enough about how and why these controversies were resolved in the manner that they eventually were. On one hand, Nehru is portrayed as a powerful and effective leader;[10] on the other, as a committed socialist.[11] The question that arises and is never resolved is why, under a powerful, socialist leader, a more decisive thrust was not made toward socialism. Instead of an answer, Frankel treats Nehru (whom Moore has called the "gentle betrayer of the masses"),[12] sometimes as not all that powerful and at other times as not all that socialist. I would suggest that this explanatory confusion stems from an analytical overemphasis on the leaders and their rhetorical promises and an underemphasis on the systemic constraints generated by the hierarchical social structure of India, within which democracy and socialist development may well be impossible to combine.

Frankel provides a succinct analysis of the post-Nehru retreat from socially oriented goals of planning and the consequent move to a more production-oriented strategy, focusing especially on the significance of the external constraints in this transition. That the brief Shastri inter-

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Indian conditions it would be preferable to make a deliberate policy choice in favor of capitalist farming. See *Asian Drama*, II (New York: Pantheon, 1968), chap. 26, secs. 23 and 25.

[10] Thus Frankel argues that "from 1955 to 1964, Nehru's pivotal position permitted a handful of men [chosen by Nehru] to determine national economic and social policy and methods of development" (p. 114).

[11] Nehru's broad vision for the future of India is quoted by Frankel in his own words: "The picture I have in mind is definitely and absolutely a socialistic picture of society. . . . I mean largely that the means of production should be socially owned and controlled for the benefit of society as a whole" (p. 117).

[12] Moore (fn. 8), in his chapter on India.

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regnum was mainly responsible for this shift is an argument which has never been made with this degree of force and clarity before. The considerable role of such aid-giving institutions as the World Bank, U.S.A.I.D., and other American-based private foundations in influencing India's economic policies has also never been brought out with such detailed authority. However, confusion persists about the domestic forces that contributed to this decisive change in the development strategy. Was this shift caused merely by the victory of the more conservative political factions in the game of maneuvering for the policy-making positions or did it also reflect larger social trends? If it is the former—as Frankel seems to suggest—then how does one explain the commanding role of a handful of individuals in altering the course of social change in a country the size of India? What does this say about the nature of the Indian democracy? More specific to the period, was it the new *leadership* that weakened the Planning Commission, strengthened the ministries, and led to the creation of a Prime Minister's secretariat staffed with key conservative bureaucrats—thus bearing responsibility for the retreat from social goals? Or, was it the *weakness* of Shastri and others as leaders, which created a *de facto* transfer of power to the more conservative elements within the bureaucracy and was thus responsible for the new priorities? In other words, too much emphasis on the political elites and factions and not enough on structures and institutions has once again led to confusion about the reasons for a major shift in policy. More importantly, if leadership is the causal variable, the misplaced emphasis on elites obscures the analysis of the conditions under which leadership becomes a decisive political force.

For the Indira period, Frankel traces a story of steady disintegration of the Congress hegemony, and its replacement by a populist and authoritarian leadership. Politics in this period is depicted as increasingly a politics of survival rather than a politics of development. The fact that this period marked a break in Indian politics has been recognized by others,[13] but Frankel's suggestive comment that it represented a categorical break in India's "political idiom" from "one of conciliation to one of conflict" (p. 433) promises to capture the imagination of many who are trying to understand India's political economy.

The argument here is that both the commercialization of agriculture

[13] For example, see Stanley A. Kochanek, "Mrs. Gandhi's Pyramid: The New Congress," in Henry Hart, ed., *Indira Gandhi's India* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976), 93-124; and Rajni Kothari, "Democracy without Consensus," *Seminar*, No. 283 (New Delhi), January 1979.

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and the increasing politicization of the lower classes had by now mobilized new political forces within the Indian society. Indira sought to build on and to contribute to this mobilization by going "directly to the masses," thus strengthening her power position vis-à-vis competing political elites. At the same time, however, she bypassed most of the intermediate elites, thus creating an organizational vacuum. Consequently, while she gained the support of the lower classes by promising them redistributive policies, she was incapable of realizing these because of the absence of a supporting party organization and the presence of an entrenched bureaucracy not necessarily sympathetic and committed to her social goals.

This analysis covers both the pre-emergency and the emergency periods. Populism, leadership dominance, and organizational weakness characterized the entire Indira period. The gap between promise and performance increased. Frankel argues, however, that prior to the emergency, the political opposition had adopted a similar and equally successful strategy of going directly to the masses. As Jaya Prakash Narain's leadership gained momentum, Indira's power position was threatened, leading to the brief authoritarian interlude in the otherwise democratic evolution of India's politics.

The analysis here is convincing. Frankel could have gone further and asked why it was so difficult for Indira to create the organizational arrangements needed for realizing redistributive policies. In this regard, she should also have probed the issue of the legitimacy function of the populist promises as distinct from their real policy intent. However, one cannot disagree with the analytical assertion that, if the leadership was sincere in its goals, the organizational vacuum would have to be held responsible for the failure of implementation.

Although this analysis is persuasive, the conclusion remains controversial. To Frankel, the brief emergency period provides sufficient evidence to warrant that "absolute power" in India cannot bring about "basic social changes" (p. 566). Evidence for this conclusion is meager. Frankel's analysis suggests that the emergency was more a failure of an authoritarian leader without an organizational base than a failure of authoritarianism *per se*. Elsewhere, Frankel has recognized that an authoritarian government can be either "soft" or "hard," and since the same can be said for a democratic regime, the real issue is not primarily one of democracy versus authoritarianism.[14] The real issue is what type

[14] See Frankel, "Compulsion and Social Change," *World Politics*, xxx (January 1978), 217 and 234. The concept of a "soft state" was introduced by Myrdal (fn. 9), 66. In his usage, a soft state was a state that could not carry through the proclamations

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of state will not be "soft"—i.e., will be capable of bringing about a desirable pattern of development. And it is egalitarian development that is deemed desirable by Frankel. A state capable of facilitating this will have to be controlled by political forces which not only represent, ideologically and organizationally, the interests of the lower classes, but which also do not allow the upper classes to penetrate the political process so as to subvert these attempts. Irrespective of one's political preferences, a regime that largely seeks to exclude the interest of the upper classes and to represent primarily those of the lower classes is more likely to resemble a revolutionary-authoritarian model than a democratic-capitalist one.

II

The analysis as well as the evidence that Frankel presents can be read as making a case for how a democratic form of government has not been able to create a socialist mode of development in India. In her conclusion, however, she holds responsible not democracy *per se*, but rather a wrong type of democracy. She argues that, given the numerical weight of the lower classes, democratic politics organized around classes and class issues, rather than around factions of traditional patrons and clients, would be more effective in bringing about egalitarian development. At the core of this "left liberal" world view is the faith that the democratic process will eventually transform the lower classes into effective political power. The analytic correlate of this world view is that it conceives the outputs of the political process to be largely determined by the leadership and the underlying economic interest groups. It follows that, if one set of interests predominates at one time, another set can at least compete with the first at a later date. As franchise and organization are the processes whereby economic interests are converted into political power, there is reason to feel optimistic that the interests of the lower classes, once organized, can be transformed into a significant political force.

What this widely shared perspective on politics fails to recognize is that inequalities of power are not merely a consequence of the degree of organization. Rather, they are "prior" to the "political"—that is, they are rooted in the social organization itself. They are very much a function of the position various social groups occupy in the division

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and desires of its leadership. He argued that, whether democratic or authoritarian, the states of South Asia are generally soft.

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of labor. In this division, some manage, control, and/or own the means of economic production of a society. Others serve, obey, and/or —as they own little else—sell their labor for survival and continuity, while obeying the "rules" of selling and buying. Those at the top of this social hierarchy are intrinsically more powerful than the ones below them. This inequality of power can certainly not be reversed in a stable democratic framework; it can at best be mitigated.[15]

Viewed from this perspective, the prospects of generating effective lower-class power in a stable democracy appear dim. If one traces the steps whereby political inputs are transformed into outputs, one is struck by the layers of obstacles that any attempt at converting the majority interests into redistributive policies must face. Some of these layers can be delineated in a general way; others are distinctive to individual societies, including India.

First, a community of shared economic interests has to be perceived by the members of the lower classes. Here there are objective and subjective constraints. Objectively, there is in no society—and certainly not in India—one single "exploited class." There are only vaguely specifiable lower classes. The interests of various groups within them are not identical. To the extent that, at a macro-level, one can discuss lower- versus upper-class interests,[16] the entire socialization apparatus of a hierarchical society tends to detract attention from the recognition of this cleavage. Representatives of the upper classes penetrate and often control religious, educational, and informational institutions. The value systems generated and/or sustained by these institutions lead to the creation of an ideological obstacle within the political process. This type of thinking not only tends to neutralize what should come "naturally" to citizens belonging to the lower classes—i.e., consciousness of shared economic interests; but, if effective, it can also lead to the creation of a belief structure which specifies that the interests of the lower classes are best served by pursuing common endeavors with

[15] The experiences of Western democracies, such as that of Britain, might be said to contradict this argument. While this objection would stem from a widely shared belief about the consequences of franchise on social and political inequalities, the evidence on this issue remains highly ambiguous. The extent to which democratic politics in the West has facilitated the reduction of socially rooted inequalities is at best limited. For a recent balanced review, see José M. Maravall, "The Limits of Reformism," *British Journal of Sociology*, xxx (September 1979), 267-90. Also see Dahl (fn. 5).

[16] For example, in a society such as India, while the interests of the landless agricultural laborers and the small farmers who occasionally need to employ them may be in conflict over the issue of agricultural wages, they are both likely to be on the same side on such "upper versus lower class" issues as the redistribution of the land of large landowners.

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the upper classes, such as increasing production and maintaining systemic stability.

Second, individuals with common interests have to be organized into unions to pursue economic gains, or into parties to wage a political and economic struggle. For the organizers, there are a number of discouraging elements: minimal economic rewards, scarcity of resources to pursue the tasks of organization, and prospects of being socially "punished" in either subtle or overt manner. These factors tend to reduce the pool of potential organizers of the lower classes. Likewise, even if those who have to be organized perceive a commonality of interests, they do not always follow their perceptions with predictable political behavior. Not only can other values compete with economic ones in the choice of association, but economic dependency and the fear of reprisal can act as factors inhibiting association for economic gains. Cumulatively, the factors stacked against organizers and organized create conditions under which the task of mobilizing the lower classes is an arduous one. Furthermore, even if the efforts succeed, organization itself is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it transforms atomized interests into a potential social and political force; on the other, it opens up the possibility of co-opting or compromising the interests of the organized *en masse*.[17]

Third, in a democratic polity this potential political force, once organized, needs to be converted into electoral power. Here again, the limited resource base of the lower classes as well as their limited access to the informational institutions of the society either put them at a permanent disadvantage vis-à-vis the upper classes or lead them to make significant compromises with others higher up in the social hierarchy. Furthermore, because lower-class parties generally enter the political arena as latecomers, they have to fight established beliefs concerning the legitimate mode of politics and the appropriate role of the state in social life. Since these values were institutionalized while the interests of the upper classes were dominant, the battle of creating legitimacy without significant compromises is an uphill one for the lower-class parties. Even if they achieve success in the electoral process, they often face another obstacle in the structure of the government itself. The ineffectiveness of parliaments as policy-making bodies is an example: in democratic polities, it is not uncommon for some "higher

[17] For a perspective that stresses that organization can be a moderating, or even a conservative, rather than a radicalizing force for the lower classes, see Francis F. Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People's Movements* (New York: Pantheon, 1977).

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authority" to usurp power when faced by parliaments whose sentiments favor the lower classes.[18]

If, despite the ideological, organizational, electoral, and governmental obstacles, those representing lower-class interests manage to gain control in important policy-making bodies, it is still not the end of their struggle: policies have to be implemented. Established bureaucracies are not only incremental and therefore by nature resistant to sweeping social change; but, since they have usually been designed by upper classes or by colonial rulers, they are biased against the lower strata. Implementation of redistributive policies through established bureaucracies is therefore an inherently difficult task, and the same holds true for the creation of new, competing structures.

Finally, if the implementation of redistributive policies gets under way, the short-run consequences are, as a rule, disruptive of stability and production efficiency. This is due partly to the reorganization of the production process which such changes often involve and partly to the fear and blackmail by the upper classes as manifested in flight of capital, hoarding of goods, and minimal new investments. At the same time, the more extreme elements, encouraged by the gaining strength of the lower classes, tend to go "too far." Illegal confiscation of property, lockouts, and other activities disruptive to property and production may take place. As a consequence, generally speaking, production goes down, and goods are often scarce in the markets. Meanwhile, lower-class expectations rise and explosive inflationary tendencies build up. In other words, the rise of leftist governments and the implementation of redistributive policies can lead to a problem of "law and order." The failure to absorb the consequences of change within a democratic framework tends to undermine the legitimacy of governments that favor the lower classes. Ironically, therefore, what starts out as a battle to organize the lower classes into an effective political force can lead to their disenchantment with their own representatives. They may even vote them out of office themselves in order to try to regain a modicum of predictability and stability.

For reasons like these, one cannot feel very optimistic about the possibilities of converting lower-class interests into effective redistributive policies within a stable, democratic framework. The prospects of transforming plurality of numbers into real economic gains for them are made very slim by layers of obstacles at the ideological, organiza-

[18] Frank Myers analyzes how this process has been at work in established democracies in "Social Class and Political Change in Western Industrial Systems," *Comparative Politics*, II (April 1970), 389-412.

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tional, electoral, governmental, and bureaucratic levels. Substantial success, if achieved, tends to undermine the stability of a democratic polity. Therefore, in stable systems, a modicum of success is achieved only at the expense of considerable compromises in the goals. Although these are "functional" for the "maintenance of the system," such compromises water down the potential political capacities of the lower classes. When the obstacles are routinized and effective, the range of demands placed on a democratic state is limited. That is what leads to stability. Some political scientists have euphemistically called this routinized mode of filtering out the demands of the lower classes the process of "institutionalization" or even "political development."[19] The fact that lower-class parties do come to power occasionally is a testament to their enduring capacity to fight for their interests and against the efforts to institutionalize a political process that does not serve them. However, the "system's" failure to absorb the consequences of the changes introduced by leftist governments often marks the beginning of the end of such efforts in democratic polities.

The foregoing is true for most democracies, but in a polity such as India a whole range of additional obstacles stems from its old and established social structure. Caste, village, and regional loyalties remain strong.[20] The citizens therefore have not yet been fully released as individual political actors free to associate in class-based politics. Frankel recognizes these obstacles just as she recognizes that this situation is changing rapidly. She fails to understand, however, that the emergence of individuals as citizens in India, as elsewhere, does not open up realistic possibilities for a steady increase in the democratic power of the lower classes.

Whenever it becomes clear that the lower classes may gain politically in the process of social change, the upper classes respond by creating what I have called layers of obstacles. In India, the lower classes are only beginning to be perceived as a real threat, and the layers of obstacles necessary to combat them politically are only now being institutionalized. The degree of success this institutionalization will achieve is impossible to predict. It is certain, however, that the survival of democracy in India will be a function of the success achieved in filtering out,

[19] See Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), esp. 1-92. While Huntington equated "institutionalization" with "political development" in his earlier works, over the years he has dropped all references to political development.

[20] "Traditional" social forms are of course not only obstacles, but may even facilitate an interest-group type of politics. See Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), esp. 17-154.

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through institutionalized modes, many of the demands of the lower classes for substantial redistribution of property and income.

III

To conclude: attempts to organize the lower classes in India into an effective democratic political force aimed at redistributive development are not likely to be very successful. I have listed the reasons why the task of organizing the lower classes as a political force is a difficult one. The difficulty is especially great if the significant demands of the lower classes—such as for land—are not to be compromised. Where organizational efforts do succeed, one of two outcomes is possible. On one hand, radical aspects of redistributive demands may already have been compromised. In that case, modest gains in the absolute conditions of the lower classes can be made democratically.[21] On the other hand, forces seeking significant redistribution of land and income may emerge as the leaders of the lower classes; this is the possibility that Frankel and others appear to consider desirable. I have argued that this scenario is the one least likely to occur; but if it did, attempts to bring about redistributive change would tend to undermine the democratic process in India, rather than to strengthen democracy, as Frankel argues.

Simultaneous optimism for India's democracy and for India's poor is not realistic. Either India will have to sacrifice redistribution of wealth for modest improvements over the present conditions of absolute poverty under a democratic regime, or it will have to take the less probable path of revolutionary and authoritarian politics. In either case, the gulf between what is likely to happen and what one may consider desirable will continue to remain a wide one.

[21] As modest gains are certainly better than no gains, I do not wish to imply here that organizational efforts should not be encouraged. My argument does not have any clearcut "policy" implication. It is meant primarily to neutralize the undue optimism stemming from a left-liberal world view.

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WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XXXII
October 1979—July 1980

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WORLD POLITICS. ISSN 0043-8871. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. Vol. XXXII, October 1979-July 1980. Second Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

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



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



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